

NIELS DANIELSEN

AN ESSAY ON NOMOS AND HUMAN LANGUAGE

Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab
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Synopsis

This book is an attempt to disclose the universe of human language in terms of simple devices of analysis. It is a challenge to any theory of language which claims the scientific validity of monoglottic *deep structure* operations. Its gospel, that a valid linguistic theory should rest on a strict empirical basis, is certainly not a new one, but the methodological demands which may be reduced to the demand for the highest possible empirical content, not least the demand for the highest attainable level of universality and the demand for the highest possible degree of precision, have often enough been overlooked in the field of linguistics. Through *nomic analyses* of a representative sentence material from ideal languages we demonstrate the hitherto unnoticed existence of three basic *transversal relations* which seem to rule the furnishing of any human proposition, and our *kinetic analysis* seems to penetrate into the profoundest depths of human sentences without being thrown upon the use of delusioning transformations. In a final chapter on the critical fields of distribution (CFDs) we succeed in defining human language as the combination of a limited set of CFDs and three simple transversal relations (with their reduced or extended variants).

PREFACE

We live in a remarkable age of uncertainty and futility between the good old days of yore and the future: the good old days of our great linguistic ancestors, and the future which will give us some day the answers to important questions yet unsolved.

Few are the linguists who touch writing implements nowadays. Nevertheless the amount of linguistic publications is steadily increasing every hour and day by day. In this age of inflation this book is an attempt to actualize a whole set of new questions and to make sure that they will be answered according to the demands of the highest attainable degree of scientific integrity.

I thank my students for many upright questions and innumerable lifegiving discussions. I thank many good friends here and abroad for their inspiring curiosity and moral support. First of all, I thank the man whom I owe everything, my survival, my will to go on, my lack of fear, professor Louis L. Hammerich, now in the realm of those who know the answer to the question which encloses in itself all other questions. Secondly, I thank a man of great linguistic insight and honesty, fil. lic. Olov Bertil Anderson, my indomitable Swedish friend, indefatigable in fruitful discussions on Chinese syntax, Russian composition, and Georgian verb constructions. Thirdly, I thank my Norwegian friend, professor Magne Oftedal, in Oslo, whose knowledge of hitherto rarely exploited Celtic tongues (not least Scottish-Gaelic) has been of great help to me.

I thank my Kanarese-speaking informant Harish Gaonkar for valuable examples which you do not find in the grammars. His Paninian and philosophical challenges have had a great and ever-lasting impact on my reflections on human language during these last years. I thank my Pakistani friend Mohammed Riaz, the welder, now a student at the University of Odense, a man of ingenious common sense, one of the very few people I know of who seem to understand intuitively that a sentence may be without any subject whatsoever and still have everything. And I thank my true friend Marian Lurie, the exiled and yet unconquerable lawyer, now in Odense, equally a man of great genius, whose sparkling intellect has been an inexhaustible source of information within the field of syntactic developments in the vivid modern Polish vernacular.

I also thank my skilful English-speaking proof reader, cand. phil. Jytte Døør, and my friend John Warbrick, without whom my book would have been richer in printing errors and whose criticism of several stilistical points I have paid great attention to.

Odense, January 26th, 1976

The author

INTRODUCTION

Man forms a striking contrast to all other species by virtue of his specific faculty of speech. Any sentient member of the human family who is still physically and mentally intact has been bestowed with the unique capacity of expressing himself in meaningful sentences. Some use it well, others abuse it. A great many people do not care if they use or abuse it.

This is the reason why mankind had to bring in the law. Our glorious forefathers called it *nomos*. It was a very useful thing. It could be used well if you did not abuse it. And those who did not care could still use or abuse it.

Human language reflects humanity itself. Its usufructuary calls for law. Some sentences, perhaps the majority, are obedient to it. Others are not. A great many of them don't care.

Down through the ages resounds the never-ceasing and many-faceted dialogue of humanity, and yet it occupies but a fraction on the vast time-scale of the universe. To mankind it is the everlasting mediator of joy and agony, anger and recognition, desire and indifference. None would be the spiritual achievements of mankind without it, few would be the results of striving for material progress, and even less the entelechy of the creative brain. In it it contains the justification of our spherical order which only becomes conceivable and proportioned through it. Language is the name of this utmost and prerogatory universal conclusion.

Only through it can the universe become aware of itself. Language is pre-condition and coronation at the same time. Only through the word does creation become meaningful, and only through the word can creation comprehend itself. Language is the self-evident and implicative conclusion of a universe of our kind. It is the keystone and the mirror of creation. Without it creation would be no creation. Only through the word does our imperishable world obtain its coherency and its *raison d'être*. Language is the categorical last inference of a cosmos which would remain undefined without it. Endless inward and endless outward creation searches its own delimitation and finds it in language. Language is the alternative to a purely physical world of contingency within the frame of universal laws which remain unexplained. Only when language is there has creation reached its own fulfilment. Language is the intellectual *dynamis* of a physical universe which strives for its own rectification.

Whether in the mouth of a Demosthenes, or in the hand of a Dante, or between the teeth of a dead-drunk damsel in a dirty dive, it is the materialized power of mental lawfulness. In it rest the rejoicings and the griefs of mankind, the sweetness of love and the harshness of hatred, the longing for a better world and the brutality of destruction. But primarily it is the treasure-chamber of human progress, in great poetry, in ingenious research, and in the fight for social prosperity. And through the centuries our universe listens to this endless discussion of its own. For the word, δ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, was always there. Only through the reasoning of a perceiving creature does creation come to full existence. This world is only there through me and you.

Every human sentence is the image of its own intellectual *nisus formandi*. In a given language this process follows a certain set of rules. Without these rules the speakers of the language would not be able to communicate. Language sentences are expressive of lawfulness. This may seem to be an extremely trivial statement, and it certainly runs the risk of being misapprehended if it is abused. The fact that a human sentence is expressive of lawfulness by no means implies that it succumbs to any sort of rigid discipline which is the mere phantasm of an overwrought brain. Future computer linguists may construct a monstrous speaking-bulldog which obeys the word of command, and it will surely be the greatest disaster in the history of mankind if they succeed in passing themselves on their fellow inhabitants of the Earth as the anxiously expected inventors of the machine which is able to speak. No machine can speak. You must find another word for its poor outputs. Only man can speak. And that subtle instrument which is called language can only be used by him according to its entity and its purpose. Man is something which a machine isn't: he is free. He is free to keep the law, he is free to break the law, he is free not to care if he does one thing or the other. He is even free to die for all three of those views. Language is the image of human freedom *sub specie legalitatis*, and every living human creature is free to make use of its legions of potentialities according to his own exigency and ingenuity.

Any linguistic theory, therefore, which tries to subject its object to a set of meta-linguistic rules or operations is foredoomed to fail or to fritter down to microscopical truisms. Pāṇini knew. Aristotle must have known. Pāṇini was a grammarian. Aristotle was a philosopher. A large part of Pāṇini's renowned Sanskrit grammar from about 350 B.C. is made up of rules describing the relationships between the so-called *vibhakti* categories and the so-called *kāraka* categories. As a grammarian Pāṇini knows that you cannot separate syntax and semantics from one another. He also knew, that the act of speaking is effectuated *uno actu*. This is the reason why he considers sentences as strings made up of a verb and underlying nouns in different case forms. By means of his *kāraka* categories he describes the interdependencies between the verb and the different case forms of the nouns; by means of his *vibhakti* categories he simply makes an inventory of the different case forms which he finds in the surface structure. Aristotle does something completely different, simply because he is a skilled logician. He tells sentences how to behave if they are to be considered as good sentences

which go neatly into logical operations.¹ He states the fact that such sentences (or rather judgments) can be split up into what he calls a *hypokeimenon* (a subject) and a *kategoroumenon* (a predicate). This observation has been of great value to later generations. Considerable, to be sure, is the damage it has come to cause linguistics. The Aristotelian terms are purely pragmatical ones. Aristotle must have known his Greek language so well that he would have realized spontaneously that human speech knows of no such two absolutes. It was not until 1747 that the French grammarian Gérard invented the grammatical terms *subjectif* and *prédicatif* which were soon changed into 'subject' and 'predicate' and used as such all over Europe and the Western World.

So this is where we are in the year 1975. The only excuse seems to be that linguistics is a young science which is but in swaddling clothes. More than two thousand years separate modern linguistics from Philip of Macedonia and still, due to an awkward misunderstanding, the Greek King's domestic tutor is the omnipotent authority within a learned community whose mentorship he himself had hardly ever aspired to acquire.

According to J. N. Keynes² logic is the science which investigates the general principles of valid thought. From a purely philosophical point of view this is a highly questionable statement as long as nobody is able to tell anyone else what valid thought is, and there is hardly any doubt whatsoever that Keynes' definition is to be taken in a strictly normative sense: he believed that man thinks logically or at any rate that he is able to do so, and that logical mistakes must be mistakes of thought. F. Überweg falls into the same error when he defines logic as the science of the normative laws of human knowledge of truth.³ Any science which is normative is absolute or even absolutistic and therefore no human science whatsoever. Great thinkers from the recent two or three decades tell us a lot of interesting things about what science ought to be — and that is certainly much more adequate for anyone who wants to call himself a scientist or a good scholar. One of the most brilliant thinkers of our age, Karl R. Popper, would define logic as the science which deals with the general principles of refuting the validity of conjectures.⁴ The requirement of refutability is the most exact and indispensable prerequisite ever made on scientific work.

Linguistics always tended to be normative. It did so because it wanted to be exact. So it took over a lot of terms from its big brother logic whose aim has always been to find the exact truth. It started with Saussure and ended with the generative

¹ Cf. Hans Glinz: *Die innere Form des Deutschen*, 2nd edition, Bern/Munich 1961, p. 13: "Aristoteles will eine Lehre vom richtigen, zum Finden der Wahrheit geeigneten Denken aufstellen und vor falscher Verwendung der Sprache als Denkmittel warnen. Daher hebt er diejenigen Einheiten und Kategorien heraus, die für solches Denken brauchbar sind: Subjekt und Prädikat . . .".

² J. N. Keynes: *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic*, 4th edition, London 1906.

³ F. Überweg: *System der Logik*, 5. verbesserte Ausgabe, Bonn 1882.

⁴ Karl R. Popper: *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, London 1963; Karl R. Popper: *Logik der Forschung*. 1st ed. Vienna 1935, 4th ed. Tübingen 1971; Karl R. Popper: *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London 1959 (5th revised ed. 1968); Karl R. Popper: *Objective Knowledge*, London 1972

tragedy.¹ No one seemed to realize that normative logical terms cannot be used uncritically when one deals with the most capricious and dapper object of human science, language itself, the often but barely heeded flexor of all other human sciences, without which all human intellect would be crippled in its operations. More than any other field within human knowledge linguistics has the right — and the duty — to be master in its own house.

Human language, as stated above, is expressive of lawfulness. This non-committal quality of man's most efficient and most subtle instrument of communication has misled its own scholars to submit it to laws. The laws enacted are in accordance with valid thought or normative rules of human knowledge of truth. Language itself is only recognized if it is willing to follow the laws bestowed upon it from outside by persons who are able to think logically.

The greatest fault ever committed by linguists was the uncritical adoption of non-linguistic laws to describe the lawfulness of language. Language has its own laws and can never be described exhaustively and adequately by means of metalinguistic laws. Metalinguistic laws can only be formulated by the aid of language. Only language can formulate its own lawfulness. The lawfulness of human language is its *nomos*.

It is because of this *nomos* that we are capable of learning the language of our parents as a functioning means of communication. It is because of this *nomos* that it is obvious and clear to us when we are told by our teachers that the sentence *Nobody really seems to care about scientific ethics* is a good sentence and that *Scientibody abouts to notic realthics seem to care ely* isn't. Without *nomos* no meaningful speech exists. Language is the mirror of this *nomos*.

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Plädoyer gegen die generativen Tiefenoperationen. Kritik einer Scheinlehre*, in: Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, Braunschweig 1973; Niels Danielsen: *Бездна без глубины и без дна. Очная ставка с языковедческими искателями жемчуга нашего времени*, in: ZPSK '76/4, Berlin 1976; Niels Danielsen: *Richieste di chiarimenti epistemologici*, in: Problemi della ricostruzione linguistica, SLI, Rome 1976; Niels Danielsen: *Fokus på syntaksen*, in: Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tysklærerforening 55, Oct. 1974, Copenhagen/Horsens 1974; Niels Danielsen: *Zur Universalität der Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol 1. Heidelberg 1976; Peter Maher's two excellent reviews in *Historiographia Linguistica*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (pp. 399–405), Amsterdam 1974, and his article *The TG paradigm: against the MITniks*, in: Koerner's Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, Amsterdam 1976; Henning Andersen: *Lenition in Common Slavic*, in *Language*, Vol. 45, No. 3, September 1969 (pp. 572–73 (footnote): "After completion of the manuscript of this paper in the spring of 1968, Chomsky and Halle's *Sound pattern of English* (1968) appeared. In the final chapter of this book the authors present a discussion of 'the Slavic palatalizations' (420–30). Unfortunately, the set of correspondences they choose to account for is so radically simplified as to bear only a superficial resemblance to the Slavic data. Since they explicitly decline to deal with the facts that have been the subject of this article (cf. their p. 12, p. 421), their conclusions (which in part are at variance with the ones reached here) do not contribute to our understanding of the development of Slavic"); R. B. Noss: *The Ungrounded Transformer*, in: *Language Sciences* No. 23, Bloomington, Ind., 1972 (p. 8 and onwards); cf. Ernst Pulgram's open letter to the Linguistic Society of America (February 1974): "It is obvious to most regular participants of the annual LSA meetings that the quality of the papers one hears has been declining. Equally obvious is the reason for this: More and more papers are read by linguists lacking the knowledge, breadth of view, and experience necessary for high quality and originality. To this must be added the notion prevalent among some younger linguists, that what was written or said last week, is necessarily superior to, and supersedes, what was written or said last year, let alone forty years ago. This attitude, though it makes life easier for the fledgling, has led to a misunderstanding of what research is, to a deprecation of sources, and to the conviction that linguistics is not an empirical science with a long history and estimable literature, but an art to be practiced chiefly by reliance on one's personal ingenuity and "intuition". As a consequence, papers read at LSA meetings, and indeed published articles, report "discoveries" and "original contributions" that have been known for years or decades . . ."

CHAPTER ONE
Nomic Analysis

Any human sentence is the image of its own *nomos* or of its lack of allegiance to the law. The linguistic *nomos* is common to all languages and the highest and uppermost universal in human speech. The *nomos* of human language is the lawfulness according to which semantic entities are carried into effect in syntactic structures. The *nomos* of a given language is the semasiosyntactic lawfulness in accordance with which its sentences are structured. Any specific *nomos* is a particular instance of the universal *nomos*.

Now, let us consider a simple English sentence like

Patrick has written a letter.

Its Irish counterpart is

Tá litir scríte ag Pádraig.

The two sentences are to all intents and purposes equivalent in regard to meaning. Syntactically they are two images of one universal *nomos* which neither of them breaks because both of them express exactly the same semantic entity of communication in a lawful way. The English sentence represents one particular instance of the universal *nomos*, the Irish sentence represents another particular instance of the universal *nomos*. Either sentence is the particular syntactic image of a specific *nomos*. We say that the English *nomos* differs from the corresponding Irish one.

Both sentences, the English one and the Irish one, consist of three parts: 1) an *endonomic* part, 2) a *mesonomic* part, and 3) an *ectonomic* part. The *endonomic* part is the nucleus (English *has* / Irish *tá* (= "is")). The *mesonomic* part is the (verbal) predication (English *has written* / Irish *tá scríte* (= "is written")) and the so-called subject of the sentence (English *Patrick* / Irish *litir* (= "letter")). It follows that the *endonomic* part of the sentence is embedded in the *mesonomic* part of the sentence wherever its syntactic position. The *ectonomic* part of the sentence is what is left of the sentence, if anything, outside its *mesonomic* part (English *a letter* / Irish *ag Pádraig* (= "at Patrick")).

The German counterpart of the English sentence *Patrick has written a letter* and the Irish *tá litir scríte ag Pádraig* reflects a *nomos* which differs from the *nomos* of both the English and the Irish instances:

Patrick hat einen Brief geschrieben.

The German sentence and the corresponding English one have the endonomic part in common (*hat:has*). The syntactic furnishing of the mesonomic part differs from one language to the other (English *Patrick has written*: German *Patrick hat . . . geschrieben*). In the German sentence the ectonomic part (*einen Brief*) is placed between the endonomic part and the rest of the verbal predict.

The Finnish counterpart of our theme sentence *Patrick has written a letter* has the endonomic part of the sentence in common with the Irish equivalent:

Patrick on kirjoittanut kirjeen.

As in the Irish sentence the 3rd person singular in the present active of the verb 'to be' makes out the endonomic part of the sentence. But the Finnish *nomos* differs completely from the corresponding Irish one. Its syntactic structure is closer to English. The nucleus *on* (= "is") + *kirjoittanut* (= "written") have the exact semantic value of the English *has written*. So the mesonomic part of the sentence is *Patrick on kirjoittanut*, and the ectonomic part is *kirjeen* (a letter).

Latin has a more liberal *nomos* than English, Irish, German, and Finnish:

Patricius scripsit litteras.

Patricius litteras scripsit.

Both instances are possible in Latin without any difference in meaning. Both of the Latin syntagms differ from their English, Irish, German, and Finnish counterparts by the fact that they have no endonomic element. They consist of a mesonomic part (*Patricius (. . .) scripsit*) and an ectonomic part (*litteras*). The same is true of the corresponding Russian sentence:

Пэтрик написал письмо.

It should now be possible to undertake a purely linguistic analysis of our sentence considered as an example of linguistic lawfulness. Our sentence Σ consists of a mesonomic and an ectonomic part. In some languages an endonomic part is embedded in the mesonomic part. This endonomic part is then a verbal extract of a sentence generating \mathbf{A} or its syngenetic.¹ The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of a V (which is a finite nucleus² + a verbal determination in the shape of an operative verb), and an S with which it enters into an interdependence relation.² The ectonomic part of the sentence is dependent on the mesonomic part (there is a one-sided dependence relation $V \rightarrow \text{ektonomon}$), or they are contingent on each other.

Our universal analysis and definition of the theme *Patrick has written a letter* may seem to be peremptory. It turns out not to be. Its Welsh counterpart reveals its insufficiency:

Y mae Padraeg wedi ysgrifennu llythyr.

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Zu den Nucleus-Konstruktionen in der menschlichen Sprache. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Semasiosyntax*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 3, Heidelberg 1976 (-77); Niels Danielsen: *Zur Universalität der Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1, Heidelberg 1976; Niels Danielsen: *Fokus på syntaksen*, in: Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tysklærerforening 55, Copenhagen/Horsens 1974 (p. 41-48).

² Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen — und anderen Sprachen. Eine Vorstudie zu einer konstitutionellen Sprachtheorie*, in: Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung, Vol. 28/1 (p. 69), Berlin 1975.

This sentence has an endonomic part (*mae* = "is"). The rest of the predict is made up of the indicated nominal form of the verb "to write" (*ysgrifennu*). The indicator is *wedi* (= "after"). So the mesonomic part of the sentence is *Padraeg mae wedi ysgrifennu* and the ectonomic part is *llythyr*. The verbal determination [write] is nominalized and indicated; it thereby remains, as an indicated predicative, in the mesonomic part of the sentence. This is a shocking thing to an English, Irish, German, Finnish, Roman, or Russian brain. But it does in no way change anything in our linguistic definition of our theme sentence. It still consists of a *V*, an *S*, and an ectonomic part. Now, what needs an extra explanation is the initial element *y*. It is an extraordinarily interesting element. It indicates the linguistic polarisation of the sentence and the sentence status. It is the propositive counterpart of the recusative sign of polarisation *nid* (= "not") and indicates that the sentence is propositive and neutral/enuntiative (its counterpart in an interrogative sentence, for instance, would be *a*). It certainly isn't a meaningless particle, as certain Welsh grammarians would have it.¹

The Welsh sentence reflects an extraordinarily important semasiosyntactic universal. It is no doubt the most important universal among all universals. The universal of polarity is the crank of all meaning and syntax. You cannot possibly analyse a sentence without considering its semantic polarity (positive:negative) and its semasiosyntactic polarity (propositive:recusative).² We are now able to give all our sentences an exact notation. They are all semantically (and logically) positive (+). They are all semasiosyntactically propositive (p). And they are all neutral/enuntiative. Some of them are βZ -sentences and others are δX -sentences.³ (O stands for object and ind for indication).

English: Patrick has written a letter.	: + p NE βZ O
Irish: Tá litir scríte ag Pádraig.	: + p NE δX ind
German: Patrick hat einen Brief geschrieben.	: + p NE βZ O
Finnish: Patrick on kirjoittanut kirjeen.	: + p NE βZ O
Latin: Patricius litterās scrīpsit.	: + p NE βZ O
Russian: Пэтрик написал письмо.	: + p NE βZ O
Welsh: Y mae Padraeg wedi ysgrifennu llythyr.	: + p NE δX (ind +) O

So far we have got two sets of sentences each following one of the two specific semasiosyntactic *nomoi*: on one hand we have got + p NE βZ O-sentences, and on the other + p NE δX ind-sentences. From a universal point of view the syntactic situations βZ O and δX ind call for their mutual complementations:

¹ Cf. John T. Bowen & T. J. Rhys Jones: *Teach Yourself Welsh*, The English Universities Press Ltd., London 1960 (cf. page 15).

² Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Status und Polarität im Gotischen – im Lichte des Kymrischen dargestellt*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, Vol. 2, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Zum Wesen des Konditionalsatzes – nicht zuletzt im Indoeuropäischen*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, Vol. 1, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Die Frage. Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchung*, Kopenhagen 1972; Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderen Sprachen. Eine Vorstudie zu einer konstitutionellen Sprachtheorie*, in: Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung, Vol. 28/1, Berlin 1975.

³ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Zur Universalität der Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1, Heidelberg 1976; Niels Danielsen: *Fokus på syntaksen*, in: Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tysklærerforening 55, October 1974, Copenhagen/Horsens 1974 (cf. pp. 148–54 in this very book (βZ -sentences = 'verb after subject'-sentences, δX -sentences = 'subject after verb'-sentences)).

+ P NEβZ O	implies	+ P NEδX O
+ P NEδX ind	implies	+ P NEβZ ind

If these implications find the support of linguistic data, they put an end to generative transformations. No responsible scholar will be able to explain why he chooses which of the four given situations to generate the three others.

Arabic gives us the + P NEδX O-sentence:

Kataba Bātrik ar-risāla.

(*kataba* = “(he) wrote”, “(he) has written”; *ar-risāla* = “the letter”).

Japanese gives us the + P NEβZ ind-sentence:

Patsuriku wa tegami o kaita.

(The mesonomic part of the sentence is *Patsuriku wa . . . kaita*; the ectonomic part of the sentence is the indicated noun *tegami* (= “letter”) (the particle *o* is an indicator signaling the ‘patient’ of a transitive verb; as a rule, this indicator follows any direct object of a verb form in a Japanese sentence).¹

Our nine different syntactic manifestations of one and the same semantic theme may discourage a good deal of syntactic enterprise. They show that an enormous work lies ahead if you want to make linguistics worthy of being called a proper and orderly science. A proper and orderly science must be able to pronounce something in general about its own object. Linguistics cannot and will never be able to do so as long as it is only concerned with describing isolated instances of special syntax without taking any particular notice, if any, of semantics.

Let us look at our nine sentences again and ask ourselves: what do they convey, or what is the semantic content of the nine widely different syntactic manifestations we have in front of our eyes? We already know because from the very start we were looking for “the exact counterparts” of the English sentence *Patrick has written a letter* in eight other languages. The choice of the first six languages was purely incidental. As soon as we began to see a certain lawfulness in the material, we went out to find two languages which could supply us with complementary instances for two gaps in a simple system looming forth in our law-searching brains, and we found them. We found two sentences, an Arabic one and a Japanese one, which “meant” exactly the same thing as the differently structured counterparts in English, Irish, German, Finnish, Latin, Russian, and Welsh. That was our only concern: to find two

¹ Cf. Spanish where the preposition *a* indicates the direct object, 1) when this is a noun representing determinate, known persons, things personified, proper names of persons or demonstrative, interrogative, relative or adjective pronouns denoting persons, 2) before personal pronouns in the redundant construction or in contrast, 3) before words explaining an objective personal pronoun, 4) when the direct object of a verb is a geographical proper name, 5) sometimes even before an indefinite noun denoting person(s) or before nouns which denote animals regarded by the speaker as capable of reasoning, and 6) even before nouns denoting things when ambiguity would otherwise result: *yo mismo maté a los ladrones* (= “I myself killed the robbers”), *he visto a la señorita Jiménez* (= “I have seen Miss Jiménez”), *no conozco a nadie en esta ciudad* (= “I do not know anybody in this town”), *me olvida a mí cuando le ve a él* (= “she forgets me when she sees him”), *alcanzó al vapor el yate* (= “the yacht overtook the steamer”); *alcanzó el vapor al yate* (= “the steamer overtook the yacht”), and so forth; similar representations for the direct object are found in Rumanian, for instance; *1-am întâlnit pe profesor* (= “I met the teacher”), *pe cine crezi că păcălești?* (= “whom do you think you’re taking in?”), etc.

sentences with the same “meaning”. If we had been operating without this precise criterion of “meaning”, our searching would have been desultory and completely inadequate to any proper scientific investigation. What we found was a closed system of four predictable syntactic situations which proved the absolute nonsensicality of generative transformations. Syntax is never meaningful without semantics. A special syntax applied to one and only one language is non-scientific and futile because it does not say anything about the essence of human language. The essence of human language is its lawfulness or, if you like, its *constitution*. German or French syntax, for instance, are uninteresting if you do not consider them as specific instances of a universal *constitution*. They are predetermined to be so because they are misleading. Any special syntax must be considered as a particular case of universal constitution. The constitution of language is its grammatical/grammarless realization of semantic (constititional) elements in the shape of phonological and intonational structures of expression which are actualized according to a syntactic *nomos*.¹

Linguistics is unimaginable without semantics, and what is worse—it is meaningless without it, meaningless, nonsensical, fatuous, insipid, from a scientific point of view. It is so because it fails its own self in failing the meaning of the word. Even the most rabid phonologist must confess that his results would be utterly useless if he could not continually rest his phonemes on changes in “meaning”.

So let us consider the meaning of the nine syntactic manifestations of the one semantic theme which we left a couple of pages ago. Let us look at the nine examples once more:

- English: Patrick has written a letter.
 Irish: Tá litir scríte ag Pádraig.
 German: Patrick hat einen Brief geschrieben.
 Finnish: Patrick on kirjoittanut kirjeen.
 Latin: Patricius litterās scripsit.
 Russian: Пэтрик написал письмо.
 Welsh: Y mae Padraeg wedi ysgrifennu llythyr.
 Arabic: Kataba Bātrik risāla.
 Japanese: Patsuriku wa tegami o kakimashita.

The nine sentences have exactly the same communicative value. We put the semantic value of sentences and other linguistic elements into brackets []. The semantic value of our theme sentence is [is to the fore (*I*) a state (*K*) resulting from an action (*II*) of which Patrick (*A*) is the originator and a letter (*O*) is the end].

I stands for Greek γυγνόμενον (= “occurrence”)

K stands for Greek κατάστασις (= “state”)


¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderswo. Eine Vorstudie zu einer konstitutionellen Sprachtheorie*, in: *Språkliga Bidrag* vol. 6 n:r 27, Lund 1972 (page 103 (19): Language is 1) a) status and polarity; b) sentence semantics (modifiers, conjunctions), 2) constitutional elements (i.e. a) identificatives, **A**, and dispositionals, b) indicators, c) determinations), 3) grammar (categories in the third dimension, interpolations), 4) syntax (dependencies and interdependencies), 5) phonology, 6) intonation and intention). Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Fokus på syntaksen*, in: *Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tysklærerforening* 55, October 1974, Copenhagen/Horsens 1974.

Π stands for Greek *πράξις* (= “action”)

A stands for Greek *ἀρχηγός* (= “author”) or *αἰτία* (= “reason”)

O stands for Greek *ὄρος* (= “term”, “point of destination”)

By means of these purely symbolic signs we are now able to visualize the semantic structure of our theme sentence:



The circle encloses the content of the sentence. The topological order of the symbols inside the circle is absolutely arbitrary. It represents a minute cosmos of its own. Only by virtue of a syntactic *nomos* do our semantic units appear as expressive of a cosmos, *sub specie legalitatis*. Our main concern, now, must be to record the exact position of each semantic unit in the different syntactic instances given above in order to fix the relationship between the semantic content and the syntactic *nomos*. We thereby get the following account:

	mesonomic part				ectonomic part
	endo-nomic part				
English:	$\Gamma \rightarrow$	<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>O</i>
Irish:	<i>Γ</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>iA</i>
German:	$\Gamma \rightarrow$	<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>O</i>
Finnish:	<i>Γ</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>O</i>
Latin:		<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>O</i>
Russian:		<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>O</i>
Welsh:	<i>Γ</i>	<i>iΠ</i>		<i>A</i>	<i>O</i>
Arabic:		<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>O</i>
Japanese:		<i>K</i>	<i>Π</i>	<i>iA</i>	<i>iO</i>

This classification of sentence units according to their nomic installation is called the *semasiosyntactic index* of a sentence. (Our Welsh index shows us how an *i*(indicator) takes over the role of a *K*). Some languages do without a *I* ($I \rightarrow =$ emanence (nucleus "HAVE")) : *I* = non-emanence (nucleus "BE").

Correspondingly, the classification of sentence units according to their syntagmatic distribution is called the *syntactic nomos* of a sentence:

English:	Γ_2	mK_3 — Π_3	A_1	O_4	
Irish:	Γ_1	mK_3 — Π_3	iA_4	O_2	(<i>S?</i>)
German:	Γ_2	mK_4 — Π_4	A_6	O_3	
Finnish:	Γ_2	mK_3 — Π_3	A_1	O_4	(<i>m</i> stands for
Latin:		${}^mK_{2/3}$ — $\Pi_{2/3}$	A_1	$O_{3/2}$	morphematic
Russian:		mK_2 — Π_2	A_1	O_3	(or inflectional)
Welsh:	${}^p\Gamma_1$	$i\Pi_3$	A_2	O_4	unit)
Arabic:		mK_1 — Π_1	A_2	O_3	
Japanese:		mK_3 — Π_3	iA_1	iO_2	

We can now define a sentence as the product of its semasiosyntactic index and its syntactic nomos. The realization of semantic units in syntactic structures is an *uno actu* process which follows a specific *nomos*. The specific lawfulness is what the child learns to handle and what a person wanting to learn another language has to cope with, and certainly no "deep structures".

Now, if we consider the passive sentence

A letter is written by Patrick,

we get the following semasiosyntactic index:

	mesonomic				ectonomic
	part				part
endo- nomic part	Γ	K	Π	O	iA

and the following syntactic nomos:

Γ_2	K_3 — Π_3	O_1	iA_4
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The differences in alignment of units reflect the difference in meaning from the corresponding active sentence discussed above.

An analysis of the Chinese counterparts of our theme sentence in the active and passive voice will allow us to delve even further into the depths of semasiosyntactics. Let us start with the active statement *Patrick has written a letter*. Chinese has got at least four counterparts of this English sentence, each one of them differing

slightly from the other three with regard to communicative value. We shall start our considerations with the simplest of the four constructions:

1a) Pa-thez-liz hsiex yi-feng hsinz.¹

The mesonomic part of the sentence is Pa-thez-liz (the most adequate rendering of the Irish/English name Patrick) + *hsiex* (= write). The ectonomic part of the sentence is *yi-feng hsinz* (= [one seal letter] ɔ: a letter). The syntactic structure of the sentence gives no direct information of its relation to the category of time. Only the situation in which the sentence is uttered is decisive as to its temporal meaning. The modal particle *le*, which occupies the final position in a clause or sentence, may be used in connection with a changing situation to indicate completed action for the progress of narration:

1b) Pa-thez-liz hsiex yi-feng hsinz le.

The use of the sentence modifier *le* gives the sentence a slight perfective notation. A clear indication of time is obtained in one of three ways (2, 3, and 4):

2) Pa-thex-liz tshengv hsiex yi-feng hsinz (le).

The element *tshengv* is an adverb indicating 'past time'. Sometimes you can translate it by the English adverb 'already', but not always. It simply indicates that the action expressed in the operative verb *hsiex* has been fulfilled some time in the past. The adverb *tshengv* belongs to the ectonomic part of the sentence.

3) Pa-thez-liz hsiex-kuoz yi-feng hsinz (le).

In our third example the element *kuoz* has obviously been incorporated into the verbal hemisphere of the mesonomic section. A great deal of verb compounds in Chinese are formed by two elements one of which asserts the action (*II*) while the other indicates the result (*K*) of it. Such compounds are called "resultative compounds". The last component *kuoz* of our verb compound *hsiex-kuoz* in sentence 3 means originally 'consequence', 'effect', 'result', or 'the way in which a thing turns out to be'.

Now, let us look at the fourth way in which the sentence *Patrick has written a letter* may be expressed in Chinese:

4) Pa-thez-liz hsiex-chhengv yi-feng hsinz (le).

Again we have a sentence construction built on a resultative verb compound. The last component of the verb compound *hsiex-chhengv* is nothing less than the verb *chhengv*, the original meaning of which is 'to become', 'to result'. Its semantic value corresponds to that of the German nucleus *werden*. A verbal element of the nucleus

¹ The system of transcription used in our Chinese sentence material is O. B. Anderson's extremely convenient, simple and rigid "Simplified Wade" (cf. Olov Bertil Anderson: "A Concordance to Five Systems of Transcription for Standard Chinese", Studentlitteratur, Lund 1970).

group which has the specific function of indicating the result in a resultative verb compound we shall call a *nucleid*. Nucleids play a great role in the syntax of most isolating languages.

Sentence 3 emphasizes the fact that the writing of the letter has been fulfilled and needs no more concern; sentence 4 stresses the fact that the letter has reached the state of being written *now*.

Chinese avoids passive constructions, especially when the patiens of the sentence is an inanimate object. Our monstrous English sentence *a letter is written by Patrick* may be turned into Chinese in different ways, although most of them would hardly ever be used in ordinary speech. One might use the following nucleus constructions¹:

- 1) Yi-feng hsinz *shouz* Pa-thez-liz hsiex(-chhengv) (le).
- 2) Yi-feng hsinz *mengv* Pa-thez-liz hsiex(-chhengv) (le).
- 3) Yi-feng hsinz *peiz* Pa-thez-liz hsiex(-chhengv) (le).

The verb *shouz* in sentence 1 means 'to get', 'to receive' (compare English constructions with the nucleus *get* (he *got* killed) or German constructions with the nucleus *bekommen* (er *bekommt* ein Buch geschenkt) etc.). The verbs *mengv* (= "to be the recipient of") and *peiz* (= "to be covered by", "to be the object of") are its syngenetics. A very important nucleus of the same group *chienz* (= "to be sensible of") may also be used in passive constructions:

- 4) Yi-feng hsinz *chienz* Pa-thez-liz hsiex(-chhengv) (le).

The passive voice in Chinese may be expressed in a lot of other ways which are less important in this connection.¹ We may mention the constructions with the verbs *tsao* and *yuz* which both mean "to get into contact with something quite accidentally":

- 5) Yi-feng hsinz *tsao* Pa-thez-liz hsiex(-chhengv) (le).
- 6) Yi-feng hsinz *yuz* Pa-thez-liz hsiex(-chhengv) (le).

In the last two sentences *Pa-thez-liz hsiex(-chhengv)* (= "Patrick's writing") is the object of the verbs *tsao* and *yuz*, which can hardly be considered as nuclei.³

In Classical Chinese we find an often used passive construction with the nucleus *weiv* (= "is")²:

Yi-feng hsinz *weiv* Pa sox hsiex(-chhengv).

The word *sox* means "the place where", "the person who", "that which". In other words it is a bisemic relative of the locus zone which expands to the species and personal zones (cf. German: die, *wo* immer den Ton angeben). So the meaning of the sentence is, verbatim: "one-seal letter is Pa's that which he writes/(wrote)". *Our theme sentence has become two sentences!*


¹ Cf. Kao Ming-k'ai: *Han-yü yü-fa lun*, Shanghai 1948 (p. 396-98).

² Cf. Kao Ming-k'ai: *Han-yü yü-fa lun*, Shanghai 1948 (p. 395).

³ The question is, now, to which extent these Chinese sentences can be considered as passive at all! We shall return to this problem later on.

This interesting fact may be illustrated in the following simple way:

English: A letter is written by Patrick.

[=] CLASSICAL CHINESE: 

The symbol [=] indicates complete identity of meaning. The sentence from Classical Chinese *means* exactly the same thing as the corresponding English one. One might believe that it has become split up in order that one or more of its elements be specially emphasized, but this is certainly not the case. Compared with the English sentence *a letter is written by Patrick* it is astonishingly complicated. It obviously starts with a mesonomic sequence the last element of which (*sox*) switches into a satiating nomic sequence *de deuxième ordre* (of which the hook-and-eye *sox* is the ectonomic part: *sox* is evidently the grammatical object of *hsiex* (or *hsiex-chhengv*, respectively)). The poor Patrick has been reduced into an inhesive element¹ which stands in what you might call a reverse status constructus² relation to the clasp of the construction, the word *sox*. The classical Chinese sentence *yi-feng hsinz weiv Pa sox hsiex(-chhengv)* is an excellent example of what we shall call a “broken” sentence. A so-called *broken* sentence consists of two mesonomic parts of which the first one leads up to its own satiation made up by the second one; it is a type of its own which you often meet in languages which tend to use broken constructions³: the predicative of the first mesonomic part is the ectonomic part of the satiating second nomic sequence of the construction:

¹ There seems to exist a fixed universal relationship between the categories inhesion : inherence : adherence : denotation : annotation : pronotation – a semasiosyntactic relationship which is still waiting for its scientific disentanglement and the import of which ought not to be underestimated (cf. pp. 89–96):

Hebrew: Ка'n pæsæl <i>ha-ssôphâr ha-ggadöl</i> Maksim Gorĳkij.	(inhesion)
German: Hier ist das Denkmal <i>des grossen Dichters</i> Maxim Gorĳkij.	(inherence)
Russian: Вот памятник <i>великому писателю М. Горькому.</i>	(adherence)
English: Here is the monument <i>of the great writer</i> Maxim Gorĳkij.	(denotation)
Bulgarian: Това е паметникът <i>на великия писател Максим Горки.</i>	(annotation)
Danish: Her er mindesmærket <i>for den store digter</i> Maxim Gorĳkij.	(pronotation)

The fixed semasiosyntactic relationship between these categories is symptomatic of many oaths in all five or six continents, cf. Danish: *Pokkers også!* (inherence), French: *Du diable!* (denotation), *To hell!* (annotation), Danish: *For fanden!* (pronotation), and so on.

² In a normal status constructus the inhesive element *follows* the word to which it belongs, cf. Arabic: baytu-*l-kātib* (= “the writer’s house”).


³ Cf. similar sentence constructions from modern Danish:

Du er ikke den jeg elsker.

Han er den vi søger.

Og dette er så det af Jørgens, han sendte os forleden.

An investigation of such clasp constructions must obviously play an extremely important role in connection with any exploration of syntactic relativization.



The Classical Chinese sentence tells us a lot about the way in which human language functions. First of all, it tells us something about the universal law of word economy: the element *Pa* of the first syntactic beam is represented by zero in the second one; it is obvious that it is so closely connected with the clasp semene *sox* that it is hardly repeatable. Moreover, our sentence tells us something about the mesonomic arrangement of human sentences: obviously there are human sentences in which the mesonomic part consists of two sections, and others in which only one section of the mesonomic part is filled out. The latter type we shall call *heminomous sentences*. The second beam of our Classical Chinese sentence is a heminomous mesonomic part (*hsiex(-chhengv)*) + an ectonomic part (*sox*). – The nucleus *weiv* (= “is”) (the endonomic part of the sentence) is indicated by a circle around it.

Till now we have considered different illustrative linguistic manifestations of our theme sentence *Patrick has written a letter* (active): *A letter is written by Patrick* (passive), and our analysis has enabled us to record several interesting facts about the universal constitution of human language, and about its specific syntactic manifestations as well. And yet, a cardinal question which concerns all semasiosyntax still has neither been asked nor found its answer, and that question is: What is the difference between active and passive?

A quick jump from East Asia to the valleys of the Western Pyrenees will help us answer our question. Let us take a look at the Basque counterpart of the English sentence *Patrick has written a letter*:

Izkiribu bat izkiribatu du Bettirek.

The Basque sentence is passive. It must be. The subject of the English sentence becomes the agent complement of the Basque sentence, and, vice versa, the object of the English sentence becomes the subject of its contrastive Basque counterpart. This is always so. Verbatim the Basque sentence is structured as follows: Letter a/(one) written is-had-(with-regard-to-him) by-Bettiri. (-k indicates the so-called active case). It is the only counterpart of the English sentence *Patrick has written a letter*. The English sentence is active. The Basque sentence is passive. We repeat it because it is essential.

In Finnish, on the other hand, only the active construction is possible in sentences where the actant is mentioned:

Patrikki on kirjoittanut kirjeen.

The Finnish sentence translates both *Patrick has written a letter* and *A letter has been written by Patrick*. There is no specific passive construction in Finnish to match the English passive expression.

The consequences of this may come as a shock to many who are still endowed with the precious gift of being susceptible to wondrous surprises. The fact is that, for a moment, you turn dizzy if you try to grasp these last few instances in a synthetic glimpse. The reason why you feel dizzy is that your brain operates with categories based on Indoeuropean grammar from the last one hundred and fifty years and that your mind is baffled by the power inherent in the accepted order of Aristotelian logic, Scholastic lore or Cartesian de-generation.¹

Let us get one thing clear from the outset: We cannot use the terms subject and object any more in any sense which is adequate to the language spoken by the species which has so often named itself homo sapiens. We can use the terms subject and object as purely syntactic labels, but nothing more. What we can do when we want to analyse human language not only linearly, in terms of syntactic sequences, is to take refuge in our semantic symbols as they have been sketched above.

Let us look, once again, at the sentences we want to analyse and let us place them in a universal active/passive diagram:

active	passive
Patrikki on kirjoittanut kirjeen.	– 0 –
Patrick has written a letter. <i>Πατρόκλος γέγραφεν ἐπιστολήν.</i>	A letter has been written by Patrick. <i>Ἐπιστολή γέγραπται ὑπὸ Πατρόκλου.</i>
– 0 –	Izkiribu bat iskiribatu du Bettirek.
or in the present:	
active	passive
Patrikki kirjoittaa kirjettä.	– 0 –
Patrick writes a letter. <i>Πατρόκλος γράφει ἐπιστολήν.</i>	A letter is written by Patrick. <i>Ἐπιστολή γράφεται ὑπὸ Πατρόκλου.</i>
– 0 –	Izkiribu bat izkiribatzen du Bettirek.

We have agreed that the Finnish sentence means exactly the same thing as the Basque sentence. Furthermore, we have agreed that both English sentences correspond to one and only one (active) sentence in Finnish and to one and only one (passive) sentence in Basque.

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Das generative Abenteuer*, in: *Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung*, Heft 4–5/1973, Berlin 1973.

Common to all the sentences of our universal diagram are the following semantic facts: Two phenomena are *involved*, a person called Patrick and a letter. Patrick has written (or writes) a letter. The letter has been (or is) written. In this connection Patrick is the A (*ἀρχή* or agens, even actant¹) and the letter is the O (*ὄρος* or objective), A sentence may have more O's as in *he gave the man a book* ('the man': O_2 (omikron two); 'a book': O_1 (omikron one)). It may even have an Ω (omega) as in the German sentence *er erinnert sich der schönen Stadt* (sich: O_1 ; der schönen Stadt: Ω) or in the Greek sentence *Λεωνίδας τοῦ στρατοῦ ἐν ταῖς Θερμοπύλαις ἠγήσατο* (τοῦ στρατοῦ: Ω).

$A \rightarrow O$ -sentences we shall call *transversal relations*. Transversal relations are put into the passive in Basque, into the active in Finnish, and into either of the two in English. In English the opposition active: passive is exploited so as to set forth one and the same content from two slightly different points of view.

In other words: The Finnish nomos allows only transversal relations in the active, the Basque nomos allows only transversal relations in the passive, while the English nomos allows transversal relations both in the passive and in the active voice. From a universal point of view any discussion of so-called 'passive transformations' must henceforth be considered unscientific and time-wasting. In a specific grammar you may operate with transformational phantasms of the sort if you can feel an intellectual satisfaction in playing a game the rules of which you yourself are free to decide. By all means, the game is doomed to be of little linguistic relevance, as is any discussion about the hen and the egg. Such futile discussions will be the inevitable result of any serious consideration of the meaningless question whether the category A is the transformation of the category B or vice versa in a diagram of the following model:

	A	B
φ	O	X
χ	X	X
ψ	X	O

where X indicates realization of a given category and O means non-realization of a given category (in our case A vs. B). Let A stand for passive and let B stand for active: our simple diagram then describes the universal distribution of the categories 'active' and 'passive' in a peremptory way (row φ : Finnish; row χ : English; row ψ : Basque). No honest scholar will take upon himself the task of proving which category (A or B) is to be transformed from which other category (B or A).

Another excellent example of a nonsensical linguistic unilateralism resulting from a wrong evaluation of a simple binar A/B distribution of categories is the term 'negation'. There exists no such thing as a 'negation' in human language. The language of homo sapiens operates with the category of *polarity* (A: propositive; B: recusative):

¹ Cf. K. Heger: *Monem, Wort und Satz*, Tübingen 1971 (MWS).

	A	B
Latin:	Fēcī.	Nōn fēcī.
Welsh:	<i>Yr ydyw i wedi gwneud hynny.</i>	<i>Nid ydyw i wedi gwneud hynny.</i>
Kanarese:	Madīdenu.	Madenu.

Of course you may say that *nōn fēcī* is the recusativization of *fēcī* in Latin. A similar information about their counterparts in Welsh would be inadequate, and as far as Kanarese is concerned, it would be wrong, and even more so if you used the term 'negation'. Our universal polarity model may serve as a proto-example of an all too long miscomprehended binar A/B-relation in universal linguistics.¹

The purely semantic categories 'positive' and 'negative' are at right angles to the semasio-syntactic categories 'propositive' and 'recusative':

English:	I know.	I <i>don't</i> know.
Latin:	Sciō. (= Nōn nesciō.)	Nesciō.
Greenlandic:	Nalúngilara.	Naluvara.

The Greenlandic *nalúngilara* is the negative counterpart of *naluvara* which means 'I ignore it', and it is the semantic equivalent of the English *I know*.

We have indicated these simple facts in several other connections², and we shall not go into further details here as far as these extremely important nervous fibres of linguistics are concerned. Their import should hardly be underestimated by any linguist who wants to perform an orderly analysis of any given human sentence: they make up, so to speak, the basis of any semasiosyntactic analysis which keeps in view the indispensable prerequisite of being exhaustive.

An appropriate flashback to our semasiosyntactic analysis of linguistic universals will allow us to sum up the following momentous facts about the constitution of human sentences:

- I. All human sentences can be considered as being syntactically arranged according to a universal semasiosyntactic index which divides the sentence into mesonomic and ectonomic parts. The mesonomic part of a sentence may exhibit an endonomic part (a sentence nucleus):

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Semasiosyntaktische Universalien im Finnischen*, in: Ural-Altische Jahrbücher, Vol. 46 (p. 56–57), Wiesbaden 1974. Here Telugu is confronted with German (resp. Finnish) and Welsh: Telugu *chepputaavu* = Welsh *yr ydyw chi'n siarad* = German *ihr redet*; Telugu *cheppavu* = Welsh *nid ydyw chi'n siarad* = German *ihr redet nicht*.

² Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Status und Polarität im Gotischen – im Lichte des Kymrischen dargestellt*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, Vol. II, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Zum Wesen des Konditionalsatzes, nicht zuletzt im Indoeuropäischen*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, Vol. I, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Die Frage. Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchung*, Kopenhagen 1972; Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderswo*, in: Språkliga Bidrag Vol. 6, N:r 27, Lund 1972; Niels Danielsen: *Fokus på syntaksen*, in: Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tysklærerforening 55, Oktober 1974, Copenhagen/Horsens 1974; Niels Danielsen: *Zur Universalität der Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1, Heidelberg, 1976; Niels Danielsen: *Richieste di chiarimenti epistemologici*, in: Problemi della ricostruzione linguistica (SL1), Rome 1976.

- | | | |
|----|------------------------------|-----------|
| 1. | Patricius scripsit litteras. | (Latin) |
| | | |
| 2. | Patrick has written a letter | (English) |
| | ○ | |

There are three different kinds of nuclei:

- 1) **A**-nuclei¹
- 2) modal nuclei
- 3) polar nuclei

1. The **A**-nuclei are verbal extracts of universal sentence generating **A** and their syngenetics:

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| He <i>has</i> read the book. | (English) |
| Er <i>ist</i> mir begegnet. | (German) |
| He <i>was</i> killed. | (English) |
| He <i>got</i> killed. | (English) |
| Er <i>wurde</i> getötet. | (German) |
| Venne ammazzato (= he was killed). | (Italian) |
| Hann <i>varð</i> fyrir slysi. | (Icelandic) |
| Locutus <i>est</i> . | (Latin) |
| Ji ga fude de kaite <i>aru</i> . (= "the written character has been written with a writing brush") | (Japanese) |
| Ki no shita ni tatte <i>iru</i> . (= "he is standing under the tree") | (Japanese) |
| <i>Τίς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πεπεισμένος ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ῥήτορος λόγων;</i> (= who would not be convinced by the orator's words?) | (Greek) |
| La puerta <i>es</i> abierta. (= the door is opened) | (Spanish) |
| La puerta <i>está</i> abierta. (= the door is open) | (Spanish) |
| Il y <i>a</i> beaucoup de problèmes. | (French) |
| Es <i>gibt</i> viele Probleme. | (German) |
| There <i>are</i> many problems. | (English) |
| <i>Hay</i> muchos problemas. } (= there are many | (Spanish) |
| <i>Jest</i> wiele problemów. } problems) | (Polish) |
| Nie <i>ma</i> wielu problemów. (= there are not many problems) | (Polish) |
| Ni <i>was</i> im barne. (= they didn't have any children) | (Gothic) |

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Fokus på syntaksen*, in: Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tysklærerforening 55, October 1974; Copenhagen/Horsens 1974; Niels Danielsen: *Zur Universalität der Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1, Heidelberg 1976.

Minulla on kirja. (= I have a book)	(Finnish)
Büyük bir odam var. (= I have a big room)	(Turkish)
Büyük bir odam yok. (= I don't have a big room)	(Turkish)
Szükségem volna pénzre. (= [I have rather a need of money])	(Hungarian)
Er bleibt stehen.	(German)
Il va arriver.	(French)
The poor Turk took ill.	(English)
Давайте пить!	(Russian)
He grew mad.	(English)
He fell depressed.	(English)
He does love her.	(English)
Sto andando. (= I am coming)	(Italian)
Don't go saying anything to Peter!	(English)
He keeps whining.	(English)
Tiene escribida la carta.	(Spanish)
Én nem fogom látni. (= I shall not see it)	(Hungarian)
Er lässt ihn gehen.	(German)
Sie machte ihn weinen.	(German)
The galleries became filled with people.	(English)
He had him painted.	(English)
Han fik ham malet.	(Danish)
Pugnāre parāmus.	(Latin)
Han lod ham male.	(Danish)
He made him paint.	(English)
He let him paint.	(English), and so on. ¹

Sometimes **A**-nuclei are used with an operative verb (I don't want to come), sometimes not (he does me well).

2. The modal nuclei are a) modal determinations or b) modal functives:

- a. He can write.
I will ask him.
He shall be punished.
You may try it.
You must listen to her.
You need not come.
We ought to go there.

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Zu den Nucleuskonstruktionen in der menschlichen Sprache. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Semasiosyntax*, in: *Sprachwissenschaft*, Vol. 3, Heidelberg 1976(-77).

- He *daren't* ask.
 He *usedn't* to live there.
 He *might* have asked me.
 б. Отчего ж бы им вонять? ("why should they
 stink?") (Russian)
 Es *sei* denn, sie wären schon tot. (German)

Certain **A**-nuclei tend to become modal nuclei:

- Han *får* inte göra det. (Swedish)
 He *has* to be there tomorrow. (English)
 They alone *are* to be blamed. (English)
 Þú *verður* að gera þetta. (= you must do this) (Icelandic)
 They *were* nowhere to be found. (English)
Hay que esperar. (Spanish)
 Sein Vorschlag *ist* kaum ernst zu nehmen. (German)

Some **A**-nuclei and modal nuclei tend to become pure time markers:

- Vir *ā* muliere laudātus est. (Latin)
 Ἴππῆς ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ πεφασμένοι εἰσίη. (Greek)
 (= horsemen have turned up in the plain)
 Er *wird* uns benachrichtigen. (German)
Hei-de escrevê-lo. (= I have to write it) (Portuguese)
 Il nous donnera un coup de téléphone. (French)
 Ik *zal* morgen komen. (Dutch)
 Danas *ćemo* vam javiti. (= today we shall let
 you know) (Serbocroatian)
 Ashita ame ga furu *desho*. (= tomorrow it is
 probably going to rain) (Japanese)
 Do të djalin. (= they will leave) (Albanian)
 Они *будут* разговаривать. (= they will talk
 to each other) (Russian)
 He *will* tell us. (English)
 I *shall* be back tomorrow. (English)
 Se *va* întoarce miine. (= he will come back
 tomorrow) (Rumanian)
 Han *vil* være her ved femtiden. (Danish)
Θὰ γράψω αὔριον εἰς τὸν φίλον μου.
 (= I will write to my friend tomorrow) (Modern Greek)
 Той *ще* ти го даде. (= he will give it to you) (Bulgarian)
 İki üç sene sonra filemenkçeyi tamamile
 öğrenmiş *olacaksınız*. (= in two or three years
 you will have learnt Dutch to perfection) (Turkish)

time markers and modal markers	{	Ты <i>бы</i> подумал об этом раньше! (= you should have thought of that earlier) (Russian)
		Ей пора <i>бы</i> уже прийти). (= she ought to come by now) (Russian)
		Она писала <i>бы</i> ему часто, если <i>бы</i> не была так занята. (Russian)
		(= she would write to him often if she were not so occupied)

Diathesis is expressed in many languages by the help of **A**-nuclei:

He <i>was</i> killed.	(English)
Er <i>wurde</i> getötet.	(German)
Lui <i>venne</i> ammazzato.	(Italian)

3. Polar nuclei indicate polarity:

Hän <i>ei</i> puhu suomea. (= he doesn't speak Finnish)	(Finnish)
<i>Ettekö</i> halua kahvia? (= don't you want coffee?)	(Finnish)
<i>Eks</i> ymmärrä? (= don't you understand?)	(Finnish)
Veel <i>ei</i> ole hilja. (= it isn't late yet)	(Estonian)
Ma <i>ei võtnud</i> raamatut. (= I did not take the book)	(Estonian)
<i>Älä</i> köön ostako kirjaa! (= don't buy the book!)	(Finnish)

Polar nuclei are alien to a German, Chinese, or Arabic nomos. They are not found in many languages. In Finnish you must use a polar nucleus in the recusative polarisation: the recusative nucleus *e/-*, like any other verb, is conjugated in the present. Its meaning is 'not'. So you get the following model of a recusative Finnish sentence like *hän ei puhu suomea* (= "he doesn't speak Finnish"):

Hän ei puhu suomea.				
S	○	oV	Ω_2	oV = operative verb
= [he not-s speak of-Finnish]				Ω_2 = object in the partitive case ¹

A nucleus stands in a *monodynamic* position if it stands alone, without any operative verb, predicative, or object:

God <i>is</i> .
Það <i>varð</i> ekki. (Icelandic)
Er <i>blieb</i> .

¹ The symbol Ω stands for Greek *ᾠρα* (= "concern", "participation") and indicates any object in the genitive which is immediately related to a verb; Ω_1 and Ω_2 indicate partitive case forms in a subject/object position, respectively.

A nucleus stands in a *syndynamic* position if it is immediately connected with an operative verb (the *immediate connection* is to be taken in the semasiosyntactic sense of the term):

Ако на земята беше настъпил мир, хората биха живели щастливо. (= "if peace would advance on Earth, people would live happily")	(Bulgarian)
Еषо 'nayā krīḍann āsta. (= "he was sporting with her")	(Sanskrit)
Οἱ πολέμιοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων εἰς φυγὴν τετραχμμένοι εἰσίν. (= the enemies have been put to flight by the attackers)	
Τῷ νομοθέτῃ δίκαιοι νόμοι θετέοι εἰσίν. (= the legislator must give just laws)	
Templum dēlendum est.	
Puer ā puellā amātus est.	
Bet jo būta jau kitur išvažiūota. (= "but he had already gone to some other place")	(Lithuanian)
Kāna l-malik kataba r-risāla. (= "the king had written the letter")	(Arabic)
He <i>has</i> come back several days ago.	(English)
Er <i>ist</i> vor mehreren Tagen wieder zurück-	
gekommen.	(German)
Það <i>mun</i> fara illa fyrir honum.	(Icelandic)
Getið þér sagt mér hvar ég <i>muni geta</i> fengið hesta keypta?	(Icelandic)
Það <i>getur</i> oft tekið heila klukkustund að koma stórum laxi á land.	(Icelandic)
Talán látogatóba <i>fogunk</i> menni. (= perhaps we shall go and pay a visit)	(Hungarian)
Het <i>gaat</i> regenen.	(Dutch)
Hij <i>blijft</i> maar eten.	(Dutch)
Hij <i>ging</i> staan.	(Dutch)
<i>Gaat</i> u zitten.	(Dutch)
<i>Kom</i> hier zitten.	(Dutch)

A nucleus stands in a *diadynamic* position if it is separated from its operative verb by an indicator (the indicator and what is ruled by it belongs to the mesonomic part of the sentence):

Where am I to sit?	(English)
He <i>has</i> to pay that money. He <i>has got</i> to pay it.	(English)
Hij <i>kwam</i> te struikelen.	(Dutch)
Hij <i>ligt</i> te lezen.	(Dutch)
Hij <i>liep</i> te fluiten.	(Dutch)

<i>Zit</i> toch niet zo te zeuren !	(Dutch)
't Water <i>staat</i> te koken.	(Dutch)
't Goed <i>hangt</i> te drogen.	(Dutch)
Dies <i>wäre</i> zu ergänzen.	(German)
Y <i>mae</i> Padraeg wedi ysgrifennu llythyr.	(Welsh)
<i>He</i> de haberle visto en alguna parte.	(Spanish)
Hann <i>er</i> að leita að hestinum.	(Icelandic)
She <i>is going</i> to cry.	(English)
The Tanguts <i>got</i> to know about Islam through itinerant merchants.	(English)
You <i>ought</i> to leave her.	(English)
Þér <i>verðið</i> að vera rúmfastur í svo sem viku.	(Icelandic)
Ég <i>þarf</i> að hringja í bíl.	(Icelandic)
Þú <i>átt</i> að taka ofan fyrir kennara þínum.	(Icelandic)
<i>Eigum</i> við að fara inn og spyrja um bækurnar?	(Icelandic)
Þá <i>verð</i> ég að flýta mér.	(Icelandic)
Il <i>vient</i> d'arriver.	(French)

A nucleus stands in a *taxidynamic* position if its syntactic function is that of a copula (in connection with a predicative):

Die Tür <i>ist</i> geschlossen.
La puerta <i>está</i> abierta.
Englum drottins er fátt dulið.
Han <i>er</i> opvakt.
Niemand <i>ist</i> unentbehrlich.
Gott <i>er</i> að hafa þar kyndla.
He <i>was</i> overwhelmed.
He <i>was</i> sick. He <i>was</i> ill.
He <i>became</i> a rich man.
Er <i>bleibt</i> Professor.
Er <i>wurde</i> Regisseur.
Er <i>ist</i> Russe.
He <i>is</i> my brother.
She <i>is</i> Mrs. Ramsay.

In all other cases nuclei may be considered as *exodynamic*, ruling *O*'s or Ω 's in the economic part of the syntagm):

He <i>has</i> a beautiful wife.	(English)
Er <i>tut</i> Zucker in den Kaffee.	(German)
Han <i>kommer</i> hårvand i cognac'en.	(Danish)
Han <i>kan</i> sin lektie.	(Danish)
Čista dobrota ga <i>je</i> . (= pura bonitas "eum" est) (Slovenian)	
(= "he is pure goodness")	

Certain languages use exodynamic nuclei to indicate 'pure existence':

<i>Es gibt</i> einen Gott.	(German)
Heute <i>hatte</i> es viele Zuschauer.	(German)
Il y a beaucoup de monde dans les rues.	(French)
Juž nie <i>ma</i> pieniędzy. (= there isn't any more money)	(Polish)
<i>Hay</i> muchas mujeres en esta ciudad. (= there are many women in this town)	(Spanish)
Po vsêh pôtih jô <i>je</i> . (= in omnibus viis "eam" est)	(Slovenian) ¹
На мой адрес <i>има</i> колет. (= there is a parcel on my address)	(Bulgarian)
<i>Ima</i> li mnogo snega na pruzi? (= is there much snow on the railway track?)	(Serbocroatian)
Fangv-tsyx lix-thouv <i>youx</i> renv. [building inside has man]	(Chinese)
A <i>ka</i> hotel në Shqipëri? (= are there hotels in Albania?)	(Albanian)
<i>Habet</i> ibi silva.	(Late Latin)
<i>Habet</i> annos viginti ex quo ibi habitat.	(Late Latin)

Actually, constructions of this sort must imply a certain amount of passive counterpart constructions. In fact, we find such passive syntagms in some languages:

Fi l-madrassa <i>yūjad</i> mudir. (= "in the school there is a director")	(Arabic)
Tabellionum non <i>habetur</i> penuria.	(Late Latin)
Det <i>finns</i> många vackra blommor i denna parken.	(Swedish)

All these instances, and many more of the same semantic value, seem to be of the utmost importance to anyone who distinctly proposes to himself the lofty goal of analysing the language of homo sapiens. No Aristotelian logic will be of any help to the linguist who dares to tackle this inspiring task. The greatest shock is the Slovenian construction with an exodynamic form of the nucleus 'to BE' to indicate 'pure existence' (po vsêh pôtih jô *je* = [on all roads her there-is] = "she is to be found on all roads") with the accusative *jô* (= "her"). The second shock is the Late Latin construction *habet ibi silva* with the apparent nominative *silva* which may turn out, on cooler reflection, to be what it ought to be, namely an accusative alternative. The most interesting of our existential constructions is the Chinese one where the nucleus *yux* evades exact semantic interpretation as to its precise dynamic value. The French constructions with *il y a* turn out to be of the utmost importance to our universal analysis

¹ Cf. M. Ravnikar: *Zgodbe svetega pisma*, Ljubljana 1815–1816 (part I, p. 278).

of existential nucleus constructions. The French tournure points to the fact that human language tends to set up nucleus indications of existence with some slight foreshadowing of 'place'. The slight indication of place is found in many existential nucleus constructions with a monodynamic finite:

<i>There is</i> a hole in the bucket.	(English)
<i>Der er</i> mange tilskuere i aften.	(Danish)
<i>Er zijn</i> veel ramen in het huis.	(Dutch)
<i>Da ist</i> eine Ziege auf dem Berg.	(German)
<i>Ci sono</i> tanti ladroni in questo mondo. (= there are so many rascals in this world)	(Italian)
Was willst du machen, wenn ich nicht mehr <i>da bin</i> ?	(German)
Нѣ <i>мы</i> за то опітемья. (= there is no penance for that)	(Old Russian)
Подобного у них <i>нету</i> . (= there is nothing like it with them)	(Russian)
У кого <i>нет</i> хоть капли надежды? (= with whom isn't there just a mince drop of hope?)	(Russian)
O Magdaleni <i>niti duha niti sluha</i> . (= there was no trace whatsoever of M.)	(Croatian)
Spriijeda leže stanja, kojima konca <i>nit</i> . (= in front are situations to which there is no end)	(Croatian)
Слїду <i>нїму</i> . (= there is no trace (of them))	(White Russian)

We see how the Russian, Slovenian, Croatian, and White Russian constructions have developed from nucleusless constructions into constructions with specific recusative/(negative) existential nuclei. Such specific recusative nuclei of existence are found rather often among human languages in opposition to specific propositive counterparts:

Bugün sinemalarda <i>temsil var</i> . (= today there is a film show in the cinema)	(Turkish)
Bugün sinemalarda <i>temsil yok</i> . (= today there is not a film show in the cinema)	(Turkish)
Szép érett alma <i>van</i> . (= there are nice ripe apples)	(Hungarian)
Szép érett alma <i>nincs</i> . (= there aren't (any) nice ripe apples)	(Hungarian)
Âb-e-k̂hob <i>hast</i> . (= there is good water)	(Persian)
Âb-e-k̂hob <i>nist</i> . (= there is no good water)	(Persian)
Zde <i>jest</i> pravítko. (= there is a ruler here)	(Czech)
Zde <i>není</i> pravítko. (= there is no ruler here)	(Czech)

- Tá* buidéal ansan. (= there is a bottle there) (Irish)
Níl buidéal ansan. (= there isn't a bottle there) (Irish)
Y mae tebot ar y bwrdd. (= there is a teapot on the table) (Welsh)
Nid oes tebot ar y bwrdd. (= there isn't a teapot on the table) (Welsh)
Yra mano jauna dukrelė. = [is my young daughter] (= "I have a young daughter") (Lithuanian)
Nėra mano jaunios dukrelės. (= [not-is my young daughter] (= "I do not have a young daughter") (Lithuanian)
Tur *ir* tilts. (= there is a bridge there) (Lettish)
Tur *nav* tilta. (= there is not a bridge there) (Lettish)
Ima li vremena da idemo u čekaonicu? (= [is time that we go to the waiting room]) (Serbocroatian)
Nema li vremena da idemo u čekaonicu? (= [not-is time that we go to the waiting room]) (Serbocroatian)
У меня *есть* деньги. (= [with me is money]) (Russian)
У меня *нет* денег. (= [with me not-is money])

and so on and so forth. Other languages use (or may use) one and only one monodynamic nucleus of existence which is common to both polarisations, and which is normally not accompanied by any sort of slight local indication:

- Es *war* einmal ein König. (German)
Sunt hominēs quī multum corrumpunt. (Latin)
Nuk *është* njeri. (= there is nobody) (Albanian)
O sinoch *ňe bolo* aňi chíru aňi slichu. (Slovak)
(= there was nothing to be seen or heard of the sons)
Jiného nápoje ne *bylo*. (= there wasn't any other beverage) (Czech)
Δέν εἶναι μωρόδ σ'αύτην τήν οἰκογένειαν.
(= there isn't any child in this family) (Modern Greek)

In a lot of languages this simple system is found only outside the present tense (in the present, then, polar counterparts are used, cf. Russian, Czech, Serbocroatian, Polish, Lithuanian, and many other languages).

In some languages the existential nucleus calls for an extra subject of the sentence:

<i>Það eru reglulegar flugferðir milli helztu kaupstaðanna.</i> (= there is regular air service between the most important towns)	(Icelandic)
<i>Es waren einmal zwei Königskinder.</i>	(German)
<i>Det fanns inte sprit i hela stan.</i> (= there wasn't any liquor in the whole city)	(Swedish)

In some languages, diadynamic nuclei tend to join up with one or two indicators, thereby assuming special shades of function and meaning:

<i>Du kommer til at tage dig lidt mere sammen.</i>	(Danish)
<i>Det er ikke til at holde ud.</i>	(Danish)
<i>Du får ham ikke til at gøre det.</i>	(Danish)
<i>Bliv ved med at tro på det!</i>	(Danish)
<i>Dom höll på med at sjunga.</i>	(Swedish)
<i>Han lader til at forstå det.</i>	(Danish)
<i>Han er ved at rense sin pibe.</i>	(Danish)
<i>Han kom til at vælte kaffen.</i>	(Danish)

In different languages diadynamic nuclei are followed by subordinate neutral status syntagms:

<i>Τὸ μωρὸ δὲν <u>μπορεῖ</u> / <u>νὰ</u> πάη με τὰ πόδια.</i> (= the child cannot walk)	(Modern Greek)
<i><u>Πρέπει</u> / <u>νὰ</u> τρέχεις.</i> (= you must run)	(Modern Greek)
<i><u>Hay</u> / <u>que</u> trabajar.</i> (= it is necessary to work)	(Spanish)
<i>Trebuie / <u>să</u> plecați.</i> (= you must go)	(Rumanian)
<i>Kad <u>treba</u> / <u>da</u> stigne voz iz Sarajeva?</i> (= when is the train from Sarajevo to arrive?)	(Serbocroatian)
<i>Ne <u>mogu</u> / <u>da</u> čekam.</i> (= I can't wait)	(Serbocroatian)
<i>Može li / <u>da</u> se dobije čaša piva?</i> (= is it possible to get a glass of beer?)	(Serbocroatian)
<i>Hteo <u>bih</u> / <u>da</u> predam jedno preporučeno pismo.</i> (= I would like to deliver a registered letter)	(Serbocroatian)
<i>Moramo / <u>da</u> idemo.</i> (= we must go)	(Serbocroatian)
<i>Në <u>deç</u> / <u>me</u> të bartë kalë, <u>duhet</u> / <u>me</u> i dhânë të ngrânë.</i> (= "if you want the horse to carry (you), you must give it (something) to eat")	(Albanian)
<i>Колко време <u>мога</u> / <u>да</u> задържа книгата?</i> (= how long time can I keep the book?)	(Bulgarian)
<i>Бихме искали / <u>да</u> гледаме цветен худо-</i>	

- жествен филм. (= we would like to see a
coloured artistic film) (Bulgarian)
- От кого трябва / да получим разрешението
да използваме архивия фонд. (= from whom
do we have to obtain the permission to
use the fund of the archive?) (Bulgarian)

The exploration of nuclear universals, so overwhelmingly rich in semasiosyntactic items, is a fascinating field within modern linguistics. For too many years the main interest of linguistic syndicates has been concentrated on phonology and syntactic structures rather than language itself which can never be studied properly without due consideration for semantics. Such considerations for semantics may be carried too far, as was the excessive interest shown by our parents in phonetics and grammatical paradigms. But they should never be underestimated by anyone who dares to call himself a linguist. And nobody should engage upon the most subtle instrument of human communication without being fully aware of the immense import of the hitherto practically unmapped semasiosyntactic neuroskeleton which is the system of universal nuclei.

We must stop our reflections on linguistic nuclei for the time being – otherwise this chapter is going to overflow its banks. But the sketch we have outlined should not remain unexploited. Let us take a look at some of the most concise nuclear constructions we have been considering above, and let us see what these utterly simple syntactic constructions tell us about the way in which the language of humanity works syntactically.

A rapid look at our nuclear sentence material will show us that we do not get very far in our analysis if we apply Aristotelian or any other philosophical criteria for the basic sentence models we want to operate with. If we want to describe all our sentences without a single exception we are cast upon purely linguistic devices. One such linguistic course of proceeding is a nomic analysis.


If we consider the mesonomic order (or *arrangement*) of our nucleus constructions we shall be able to set up the following main structures of simple human sentences:

- I. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of a 'subject' (S) and a nucleus (indicated by the sign ○):

- a) Zde jest pravítko. (= [here is ruler]) (Czech)



- b) Bütün sinemalarda temsil var. (Turkish)



(= [today in-cinemas performance is])

- II. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of a 'subject' (S):

Honak fih maqâm. (= [there in-it holy place]) (Arabic)

x x

S

- III. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of a nucleus:

a) Po vsêh pôtih jô je. (= [on all roads her is]) (Slovenian)

x O₁

O

b) Habet annos viginti. (Late Latin)

O

 O₁

[= there are twenty years]

(= "it is ten years ago")

c) У меня нет денег. (= [with me not-is money]) (Russian)

x

O

 Ω

- IV. The mesonomic part of the sentence is vacuous:

Like father like son.

x x

- V. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of two subjects and one nucleus:

a) Wir waren es. (German)

S ₂	O	S ₁
----------------	---	----------------

b) Wart ihr es? (German)

O	S ₂	S ₁
---	----------------	----------------

c) Кто это был? (= [who it was?]) (Russian)

S ₂	S ₁	O
----------------	----------------	---

- VI. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of two nuclei (with or without P (= predicative)) and one S:

a) Ne olur olmaz? (Turkish)

S	O	O
---	---	---

(= [what is-going-to-be not-is-going-to-be]: "one never knows what is going to happen")

- b) ЖИЛ-БЫЛ МУЖИК. (Russian)



(= [lived-was peasant])
 (= "once upon a time there lived a peasant")

- c) Tha shiz pu-shiz chung-kuov-renv? (Chinese)



= [he is not-is Chinaman]
 (= "is he Chinese?")

VII. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of two S:

Esse quam vidēri. (Latin)



VIII. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of two nuclei (with or without predicative):

- a) She dooinney creeney ta onneragh. (Manx)



(= [is man wise is honest]: "a wise man is honest")


- b) Oldu olacak. (Turkish)



(= [(it)-has-come-to-be (it)-will-be]: "now that the calamity has happened we've got to live with it")

IX. The mesonomic part of the sentence consists of a nucleus section the subject of which is another nucleus section:

É agradável estarmos juntos na sala de visitas. (Portuguese)



(= it is nice that we are gathered in the reception room)

These are the linguistic facts. These simple basic sentence models are, in fact, to be considered as the evidence given by human language itself of its own syntactic way of functioning. Facts may be unpleasant. These facts are indispensable prerequisites for anyone who wishes to keep aloof from dealing wantonly with the evidence

of language itself. This established truth will certainly be unpleasant to those many logical visionaries who, for almost two decades, have borne the name of linguists.

The antagonists, agile and nimble as they may be, seem to have the odds against them in the long run. They can do, and they actually do, one out of two. They will say: we don't care. It is a firm attitude, but it is certainly not an upright carriage, and it leads to poor scientific results. Or they may say: some of your examples are "irrelevant", or even: "rare". The word "irrelevant" has served as an excuse for many a self-willed theory, and as far as linguistic statistics is concerned, every sensible scholar ought to keep watch and ward: nothing is rare if it is useable, or, at any rate, it is linguistically *irrelevant*, in the true sense of this term, to label anything usable as "rare". Linguistics do not deal with barren statistic considerations used as the inevitably misleading basis of a normative description of language. On the contrary, its main questions must be: what is possible, why is it possible, what is actually used, why is it actually used, what is impossible, and what gives us the right to call it impossible, or even unacceptable? You may look upon this last question as an eternally imperative one which you cannot ever shake off, or you may treat it with levity.¹ Or you may simply not care, because that is always the easiest solution. Never in the history of mankind have the two latter attitudes led the children of women one step further towards the knowledge of truth. They may have their time, but truth and knowledge will always unveil their futile results. *Πολλές χαρές ἔχει ὁ κόσμος ἐτοῦτος – γυναῖκες, φρούτα, ιδέες*, "many pleasures does this world of ours possess – women, fruits, ideas," says Nikos Kazantzakis in his renowned novel about Zorbas the Greek. Certainly, these pleasures are manifold, and manifold are the dawdlers who do their best to embroil those precious pleasures¹.

Human language has the structure of a universe. It is a realm of unlimited semantic δύναμις (power) which is materialized in specific phonological shapes and a set of syntactic patterns arranged according to particular grammatical rules. This nomos is, thank Heaven, no more logical than any other universe of its kind.

We can illustrate this simple fact by considering a simple sentence. Let us look, for a moment, at a few materializations of the semantic content [Φ : 1st person singular – P – E: thirst] (Φ stands for *φέρων* = "the one who carries (suffers)" and E stands for *ἔξις* = "state", "demeanour"; P stands for *ῥῆμα* "word" (= verbum)):

German:	Ich bin durstig.	(a)
	Ich habe Durst.	(b)
	Es durstet mich.	(c)
	Mich dürstet.	(d)
	Ich durste.	(e)
	Ich dürste.	(f)

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Бездна без глубины и без дна. Очная ставка с языковедческими искателями жемчуга нашего времени*, in: *Scando-Slavica*, Vol. 1976; Niels Danielsen: *Tod vor dem Sterben. Gedanken über sprachpolitische Durchschnittlichkeit und Minoritätentod*, in: *Sprachen und Staaten*, I, Festschrift Heinz Kloss, Hamburg 1976.

Finnish:	Minun on jano.	(g)
Hungarian:	Szomjas vagyok.	(h)
Russian:	Я хочу пить.	(i)
Spanish:	Tengo sed.	(j)
Turkish:	Susadım.	(k)
Lettish:	Man slapst.	(l)
Greek:	Διψῶ.	(m)
Rumanian:	Mi-e sete.	(n)
Arabic:	'Ana ǧatshān.	(o)
Welsh:	Y mae syched arnaf.	(p)
Hausa:	Ƙishiruwa nike ji.	(q)
	Inā jin ƙishiruwa.	(r)
Greenlandic:	Imerusugpunga.	(s)
		⋮

Our paradigm shows us a lot of interesting things. First of all, let us get one thing clear from the outset: any logic applied to this extremely simple sentence material is foredoomed to become absolutely nonsensical, and what is worse: boring. It will be so because it will be able to tell us nothing new whatsoever about our sentences. Our motley bunch of syntactic realizations of one and the same semantic content will prevent any searcher of deep structures from saying anything in general about the mechanism called 'human language'. It will do so because every single one of its flowers will force a logic analysis to submission – and certainly not vice versa. Any logic analysis of our sentence material (which must be considered as the modest beginning of an enormously long row of syntagm instances representing the same meaning) will result in 19 poor photographs (deep structures) of 19 living sentences. The poor photographs will all show the Aristotelian absolutes NP (an excuse for 'subject') and VP (an even worse excuse for 'predicate'), or NS (noun syntagm) and VS (verb syntagm) as some pseudolinguistic modernists will have it.¹ But language doesn't care about those two absolutes where its own turn is to be served.

Secondly, a superficial glance at our nineteen sentences gives us quite a few hints about the specific phonological shapes which they are each the deficient reflection of. It is common knowledge that the Arabic phoneme /ǧ/ and the Turkish phoneme /ɫ/ are not allowed by the specific English or German nomoi. On the other hand, the German phoneme /ç/ and the Hungarian phoneme /ʌ/ are unallowed in Turkish and Arabic.

Thirdly, a nomic analysis of our sentence syntagms leads to the recording of the following syntactic patterns represented by those syntagms:

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Fokus på syntaksen*, in: Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tysklærerforening 55, October 1974, Copenhagen/Horsens 1974 (p. 31).

- I.

S	○	P
---	---	---

 (valid for instance a)
- II.

S	○
---	---

 |

O ₁

 (valid for instance b)
- III.

S	fV
---	----

 (valid for instances e and f)
- IV.

(S)	P	○
-----	---	---

 (valid for instance h)
- V.

(S)	○
-----	---

 |

O ₁

 (valid for instance j)
- VI.

(S)	fV
-----	----

 (valid for instances k, m, and s)
- VII.

S	P
---	---

 (valid for instance o)
- VIII.

S	○	oV
---	---	----

 (valid for instance i)
- IX. a.

S	fV
---	----

 |

O ₁

 (valid for instances c and r)
- IX. b.

O ₁

 |

S	fV
---	----

 (valid for instance q)
- X.

O ₁

 |

fV	
----	--

 (valid for instance d)
- XI.

O ₂

 |

○	S
---	---

 (valid for instance n)
- XII.

O ₂

 |

fV	
----	--

 (valid for instance l)
- XIII.

Ω

 |

○	S
---	---

 (valid for instance g)
- XIV.

+/p	○	S
-----	---	---

 |

adv

 (valid for instance p)

This preliminary analysis allows us to draw several important conclusions:

- 1) The evidence before us may operate with a nucleus, but does not always do so.

- 2) It may operate with a subject, or it may do without it ((*S*) indicates 'insertable subject'); in some instances there is not the faintest idea of a subject, or, in other words, no subject whatsoever is insertable (cf. instances d and l). Some languages use indefinite subjects (cf. c).
- 3) Some of the constructions operate with an O_1 ('direct object'), some operate with an O_2 ('indirect object'), and one even operates with an Ω ('ectonomic genitive') (cf. instance g).
- 4) Some constructions operate with a finite verb (fV) which is not a nucleus (cf. instances q and r).
- 5) The [$\Phi = \varphi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\nu$] may be expressed in the form of an S, an O_1 , an O_2 , an Ω , an S suggested by the ending of the verb of the sentence, or an indication (cf. p).
- 6) The [E] may be expressed by a P(= predicative), an O_1 , an fV, an S, or an entire predication (cf. instance i).
- 7) Not all languages indicate the propositive polarisation of a neutral/enunniative status. As a matter of fact, only our instance p does. A universal analysis must, of course, consider all syntactic nomoi which do not indicate this specific polarisation *deficient* or *semipolar*. An exhaustive universal analysis of a sentence should start with a clear notation of its status and polarisation.

All this leads to the conclusion that one and the same semantic content may be expressed with or without a finite sentence verb (nucleus or fV) and with or without a subject, and that what is subject in one such syntagm may be an O_1 , an O_2 , an Ω , an S, an fV, an indication, or an entire predication in its *synsemantic counterparts*.

Moreover, our nomic operation seems to have taught us once and for all that *in a casual syntactic materialization of a given semantic content the positions and the mutual distribution of S and non-S are to all intents unpredictable*. This means that *their position and distribution in an immediate syntagm can never be subjected to metalinguistic prescriptions*. Likewise, *the sequential order of syntactical representations of semantic entities is absolutely unpredictable*. Linguists who take such pseudopredictions seriously are comparable to the alchemists of yore.

Our Turkish example (instance k) shows that a form in the *past tense* of one casual syntagmatical instance may have the exact communicative value of corresponding elements in the *present tense* of its synsemantic counterparts. (This corresponds to our statement above with regard to the fluctuating categorial manifestations of the Φ and the *E*).

Grammatical categories are purely semantic phenomena which are in no way susceptible to a unilateral syntactic analysis. Several languages do without any grammar at all. The study of grammar is the study of sentence semantical relations in such languages which indicate such relations. The alternating play between a specific grammar and a specific syntax is the semasiosyntactics of a given language. A specific

grammar plays the role of an explicating semantic succour of communicative entities to a specific syntax. A syntax without grammar (Pidgin English, for instance) must serve as a means of communication without this extra semantic succour, and it works. It doesn't work too well, but it works: syntax alone is decisive of meaning. Without the meaning it would not be a human language.

Therefore, *syntax without semantics is fireworks and bogus*.

We can easily illustrate this by confronting some of our varying materializations of the theme "I am thirsty". Let us look, once again, at some of our instances from above. Our nomic analysis told us that our sentence pattern IXa

S	fV	O ₁
---	----	----------------

was valid for both of the instances c and r:

Es durstet mich.
Inā jin ƙishiruwa.

Which is true without telling the truth. The German O₁ ("mich") corresponds semantically to the Hausa subject *ina* (= engl. "I"). And what is expressed in the Hausa sentence in the form of a whole predication (*jin ƙishiruwa* = "feel thirst") appears in the German sentence as an fV: *durstet*. The German syntagm tends to operate with an 'indefinite subject' (or better: an indefinite dispositional¹); as a matter of fact, this specific instance cannot do without it.

In other words: what is subject in the Hausa sentence is semantically represented in the O₁ of the German sentence. We call such sentences *contrastive pairs*. We have met them before:

Patrikki on kirjoittanut kirjeen.
Izkiribu bat izkiribatu du Bettirek.

The "letter" is the subject of the Basque sentence and the O₁ of the Finnish sentence. The two sentences have exactly the same meaning. Contrastive pairs can be brought down to one common formula:

$$[\Sigma]: \frac{S}{[O/\Phi]} \quad @ \quad \frac{O_1}{[O/\Phi]}$$

The formula reads: One and the same semantic content is expressed in two different sentence syntagms of which the [O/Φ] is expressed in the subject of the first one and in the object of the second one. The two sentences may belong to the same or to different specific nomoi.

Contrastive pairs are innumerable as the sands of the desert. (*They must have exactly the same meaning*):

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderen Sprachen, in: Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung, Vol. 28/1, 1975, Berlin 1975 (p. 72).

Ich dürste. @ Mich dürstet. (German)
 Ich durste. @ Es durstet mich. (German)
 I have met him. @ Er ist mir begegnet. (English/German)

The last sentence couple vindicates a small addition to our formula. Not only does the German *er* (subject) match the English *him* (O_1), but the English *I* equally counterbalances the German *mir* (O_2):

$$[\Sigma]: \frac{S}{[O/\Phi]} \quad @ \quad \frac{O_{1,2}}{[O/\Phi]}$$

We may give a few more examples from different languages:

She kept *the house* going. @ Ею дом держался.
 He was sorry to part with his pleasant guest. @
 Жаль было ему расстаться с любезным его постояльцем.
 He will soon succeed in getting rid of the uninvited visitor. @
 Удается ему скоро избавиться от непрошенного гостя.
 Über dem Berg sah *man* viele Wolken. @
 Al di sopra del monte si vedevano *molte nuvole*. (Italian)
 He was taken to the village. @ Его свезли в село.
 Le berger appelle *le chien*. @ Chakurra deitzen du artzainak. (Basque)
 I would like to eat a bit of hot bread with onion. @
 Мне хочется съесть горячего хлеба с луком.
 I dreamed *a nice dream*. @ Pekný sen sa me sníval. (Slovak)
 She is on all roads. @ Po vsêh pôtih jô je. (Slovenian)
 The next day *the hussar* was worse. @ На другой день *гусару* стало хуже.
 I am hungry. @ Minun on nälkä. (Finnish)

This sentence couple calls for still another addition to our formula:

$$[\Sigma]: \frac{S}{[O/\Phi]} \quad @ \quad \frac{O_{1,2}; \Omega}{[O/\Phi]}$$

Compare:

Dunya was neither on the porch nor in the churchyard. @
 Дуни не было ни на паперти, ни в ограде.
 The book was not there. @ Tas gramatas tur nav. (Lettish)
 and: They had no children. @ Ni was im barne. (Gothic)
 @ У них детей не было. (Russian)

This triple instance of the same semantic content justifies a last addition to our contrastive pair formula:

$$[\Sigma]: \frac{S}{[O/\Phi]} \quad @ \quad \frac{O_{1,2}, \Omega, \text{ind}}{[O/\Phi]}$$

Compare:

I have friends among the respectable class of stationmasters. @

Есть у *меня* приятели из почтенного сословия смотрителей.

Our contrastive pairs, again, show us a great many of the cardinal problems with which any good linguist should be concerned when treading the often treacherous path of syntax. They show us, first of all, and once again, that there is no such absolute as a subject, neither in the semantic nor in the syntactic sense of the term. They show us that a sentence may or may not have a subject. If it has a subject, this subject is matched in its contrastive counterpart by an O_1 , an O_2 , an Ω , or even an indication. A special kind of subject calls for a comment: the so-called 'indefinite subjects' which have for so many years puzzled language philosophers. Let us look at some German constructions with such a subject, and let us confront them with their contrastive counterparts in Danish:

Es dürstet mich.	@	Jeg tørster.
Es hungert mich.	@	Jeg sulter.
Es friert mich.	@	Jeg fryser.
Es fröstelt mich.	@	Jeg har kuldegysninger.
Es gelüstet mich.	@	Jeg er lysten.
Es jammert mich.	@	Jeg ynkes.
Es wurmt mich.	@	Jeg nages.
Es reut mich.	@	Jeg fortryder.
Es bangt mir.	@	Jeg er bange.
Es graut mir/(mich).	@	Jeg gruer.
Es gruselt mir/mich.	@	Jeg gyser.
Es juckt mich.	@	Jeg har kløe.
Es schwindelt mir.	@	Jeg bliver svimmel.
Es brennt mich.	@	Jeg har svie.
Es schwitzt mich.	@	Jeg sveder.
Es schwindet mir.	@	Jeg besvimer.

How come that in all these examples the Danish subject *jeg* (= "I") is matched by German O_1 's or O_2 's? The answer is: all the German constructions are satiated transversal relations, most of the Danish ones are not. The Danish nomos demands S-fV constructions, or nucleus constructions in some instances, whereas the German nomos submits what is subject in Danish to the ectonomic part of the sentence (as an O_1 or O_2). What is left is in Danish a finite verb or a nuclear predication, in German

a corresponding finite verb which lacks a concise subject. The subject function is left to the only A ($\alpha\lambda\tau\lambda\alpha$) possible: the sum and substance of the E ($\xi\xi\iota\zeta$) expressed in the fV. So the notion of the $\xi\xi\iota\zeta$ itself becomes the subject of the German transversal relations: the Φ is expressed in the O_1 (O_2) and the E is expressed in the subject (containing the idea of the $\xi\xi\iota\zeta$) whereby the verb (fV) phrases the actual occurrence of that $\xi\xi\iota\zeta$.

This means that we get the following semasiosyntactic situations:

- 1) Ich bin durstig.
[Φ] [E]
- 2) Ich habe Durst.
[Φ] [E]
- 3) Es dürstet mich.
[$E \rightarrow A$] E [$\Phi \rightarrow O$]

We see how the E of construction 1 concretes into an A in construction 3. Construction 3 is a plain transversal relation. It can lose its subject if this is replaced by the [Φ/O] *mich* in a pure semantic Φ -function.

If we look upon our 16 German sentences as one paradigm, we can consider any of its members a specific materialization of the following semasiosyntactic model:

S	fV	O_1 or O_2
integer (conception) of $\xi\xi\iota\zeta$ (A)	specific occurrence (manifestation) of $\xi\xi\iota\zeta$	Φ ($\varphi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\nu$) ([O])

An $A \rightarrow O$ -sentence (a transversal relation) implies its own passive $O \leftarrow A$ -counterpart (likewise a transversal relation). Such counterparts are not actualized in German. Of extreme interest in this connection are the Danish passive constructions:

Jeg nages.
Jeg ynkes.
Jeg græmmes.

In these Danish instances the *integer* is not expressed. The $\varphi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\nu$ is the subject of the sentence (semantically the [O] = $\theta\rho\omicron\varsigma$). The integer, whose prospective syntactic representation would be that of an indicated determination after the verb, is not materialized. It can only be registered through perturbations (the passive verb forms).

Another instance, this time from classical Greek, may help us to throw further light on the entity 'indefinite subject':

Μεταμέλει μοι τοῦ ἀμαρτήματος.

A confrontation with its German contrastive counterpart looks like this:

Mein Vergehen reut mich. @ *Μεταμέλει μοι τοῦ ἀμαρτήματος.*

The subject of the German sentence is represented by an Ω in the Greek sentence. A greek O_2 matches the German O_1 . The actual (or specific) occurrence of the $\xi\xi\iota\varsigma$ is represented in both languages by the fV (finite verb). What strikes us most is that there is obviously no subject in the Greek construction.

An older German counterpart of the Greek sentence *μεταμέλει μοῦ ἁμαρτήματος* would be:

Es reut mich meines Vergehens.

This German sentence comes closer to the Greek construction. It, too, has an Ω -representation of the *αἰτία*. What happens in the modern German construction is that the concretized A *αἰτία* ‘Vergehen’ takes over the role of the integer A $\xi\xi\iota\varsigma$ as the subject of the sentence. This is impossible in a Greek mind. The German sentence *mein Vergehen reut mich* is an outright transversal relation (A: *mein Vergehen*, O_1 : *mich*). The Greek sentence is no such transversal relation. This fact is stressed by the fact that its O is an O_2 . *The Greek sentence has no traceable subject whatsoever*. Or rather, its subject is the second *det* in the sentence I heard a Danish boy saying the other day:

Overtro, det går ud på, at *det* ikke kan bevises. (= “superstition, that amounts to the fact that *it* cannot be proved”)

which is no meaningful subject – that’s why we laugh when we hear the sentence.


An equally striking feature of the Greek sentence is the fact that it may be actualized in the imperative:

Μεταμελησάτω μοι τοῦ ἁμαρτήματος.
 (= “I (do have to) repent the sin!”)
Ἐμῶν μεταμελησάτω τοῦ ἁμαρτήματος.
 (= “repent (you, plur.) the sin!”).

The address of the command expressed in these affective status syntagms is represented in the O_2 . The Greek imperative constructions of this kind may, to all intents and purposes, be considered ideal: the address of the command is explicitated in all persons in the form of an O_2 , and the actual verbal unit of affect is materialized in the form of an absolutely impersonal imperative without the faintest idea of any insertable subject.

CHAPTER TWO
Transversal Relations

We can now say a good deal more about the character of a so-called transversal relation. It must comply with the following condition:



To express it humanly: it must have something ‘at the other end’. For those who think this formulation is too human, we can give the following definition: A transversal relation is a sentence with a subject which is faced by a countervailing (maybe two, rarely three countervailing) [A]- or [O]-units ($A = \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}, \acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha, O = \delta\acute{\rho}\omicron\varsigma$). These units can be represented by different case forms in the syntactic cursus. The ‘case’ called ‘partitive’ in several languages is no case like the others. It is a proportional entity, first of all, which fulfills its special function independent of its syntactic position, cf. Finnish:

Ihmisiä kokoontuu torille. (= “(some) people gather at the market-place”)
 $\Omega_1 : S$

Olemme tottumattomia jalankulkijoita. (= “we are unaccustomed walkers”)
 $\Omega_1 : P$

Merimies osoitti harvinaista kylmäverisyyttä. (= “the sailor displayed a rare cold-bloodedness”)
 $\Omega_2 : O_1$

Meitä oli vain suomalaisia laivassa. (= “we were only Finns on the boat”)
 $\Omega_1 : S$ $\Omega_1 : P$

Sotilashenkilöitä on työtä johtamassa. (= “military persons are leading the work”).
 $\Omega_1 : S$ $\Omega_2 : O_1$

Consequently, any partitive found in a subject position is to be considered as the grammatical subject of the sentence in which it stands.

Two constructions with exactly the same meaning but differing syntactically to the effect that one of them is devoid of a subject which is actualized in the other we shall call *contrastive counterparts*:

Danish:		Russian:
<i>Jeg savnede Dem meget i går.</i>	@	Мне вас очень не хватало вчера.
English:		German:
<i>I feel cold.</i>	@	Mir ist kalt.
English:		Spanish:
<i>He got killed.</i>	@	Se le ha muerto.
Dutch:		German:
<i>Ik werd opgedaan.</i>	@	Mir wurde aufgemacht.
German:		Greek:
<i>Man darf nicht schreien.</i>	@	Οὐ δεῖ βοᾶν.
English:		Greek:
<i>Everybody must obey the law.</i>	@	Χρὴ ἕκαστον τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι.
German:		Finnish:
<i>Wir hatten nicht gegessen.</i>	@	Ei oltu syöty.
English:		Danish:
<i>We need a firm hand.</i>	@	Der trænges til en fast hånd.
German:		Old Icelandic:
<i>Hier beginnt die Sage.</i>	@	Her hefr up sögu.
English:		Middle High German:
<i>I am fed up (with it).</i>	@	Mich bevilt.
English:		Polish:
<i>I feel like it.</i>	@	Chce mi się tego.
English:		Irish:
<i>I am praised.</i>	@	Moltar mé.
<i>The oats is threshed with a flail.</i>	@	Buailtear an coirce le súiste.
<i>A new road is being made.</i>	@	Táthar ag déanamh bóthair nua.
<i>People go there every Sunday.</i>	@	Téitear ann gach Domhnach.
German:		Turkish:
<i>Man muß alles wissen.</i>	@	Her şeyi bilmeli.
<i>Man befand sich in einer schwierigen Lage.</i>	@	Müşkül bir vaziyette bulunuldu.

Latin:		Urdu:
Ab eō <i>equus percussus est.</i>	@	Ws ne ghoṛe ko mara.
Latin:		Russian:
Ā mē <i>sociī nōn adductī sunt.</i>	@	У меня дружины не приведено.
Latin:		Narrinyeri: (Australia) ¹
Ā mē <i>fit corbis.</i>	@	Ñāte lak-in kōye.
Latin:		Khasi:
<i>Hoc ā rege sc̄iptum est.</i>	@	La thop ia kata da u s̄im.

Our last four instances from Urdu, White Russian, Khasi, and Narrinyeri are likely to reduce any linguist to despair who still believes in Aristotelian analysis. Together with the Irish material immediately preceding them they seem to abolish all grammatical and syntactical rules crammed into our brains by the scholars of the last many centuries. They display a semasiosyntactic arrangement often met with in several languages and representing the rule in passive constructions of a great many human idioms. The passive verb has no subject; the [O] (*ὄρος*) which is in so many Indoeuropean languages the syntactic subject of a passive sentence is ruled by the verb and materialized in the form of an O₁; if an [A] (*αἰτία/ἀρχή*) is effectuable in the passive syntagm it is put into an active case (instrumental or other cases of a like kind) or it is the rectum of an indication. We shall call this specific kind of transversal relation *an ectonomic* or *a subjected transversal relation*:

Khasia:

La thop ia kata da u s̄im. (= "this has been written by the king")

x	fV	0 ₁	ind
---	----	----------------	-----

(*la* = "before": indicates an aoristic preterite, *thop* = "write"; *ia*: 'accusative', *kata* = "this"; *da*: 'instrumental', "by", *u* = "him", definite article, *s̄im* = "king").

Russian:

У меня дружины не приведено.

ind	Ω	÷/r	∅ P
-----	---	-----	-----

(= [by me companions not (has) been brought]) "I haven't taken my friends with me")

¹ Narrinyeri, or the language of the "Encounter Bay", "is the language spoken by the aborigines inhabiting the shores of Lake Alexandrina . . .", cf. Fr. Müller: *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft*, II. 1. 47, Wien 1882.

Urdu:

Ws ne ghoṛe ko mara.

instr. O ₁	V
-----------------------	---

(= "the horse has been struck by him") [ab eo equum percussus est]

Narrinyeri:

Ñāte lak-in kōye.

instr.	fV	O ₁
--------	----	----------------

(= "I made a basket", verbatim: [by-me is-made basket], or German: [durch-mich wird-gemacht den Korb])

Semasiosyntactically related to these constructions are the *autonomous* or *indefinite* syntagms found in many languages; these autonomous constructions allow no [A] ($\alpha\iota\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$) to be expressed in the form of an indication or an active case in the ectonomic part of the sentence, but as for the rest they are structured like the subjectless sentence constructions we have just discussed:

Irish:

Moltar mé. (= [is praised me] \varnothing : "I am praised")¹

V	O ₁
---	----------------

Polish:

Zmuszono go do otwołania jego nauk.

\emptyset V	O ₁	ind
---------------	----------------	-----

(= "he was forced to revoke his sciences")²

An ideal language for the study of passive syntagms is Welsh. In Welsh you find all the types of passive sentence constructions which you need to give an appropriate sketch of the main patterns of this semasiosyntactic category from a universal point of view:

¹ Cf. Magne Oftedal: *The Gaelic of Leurbost (Isle of Lewis)*, in: Norsk Tidsskrift for Sprogvidenskap, Suppl. Bind IV, Oslo 1956 (p. 232–233).

² Cf. V. Falkenhahn, J. Kotyczka, P. Haas and B. Tichek: *Język polski*, I, page 247 (Berlin 1963): "Es gibt in Wahrheit keine "subjektlosen Sätze", da das Wesen eines Satzes ja darin besteht, dass von einem Subjekt etwas ausgesagt wird. Es sind daher nur Sätze, in denen das Subjekt nicht durch ein besonderes Wort zum Ausdruck gebracht ist." It is amazing to find this statement in a Polish grammar. Our considerations with regard to the nature of a transversal relation seem to supersede any further discussion of this pseudoproblem.

I. *Autonomous construction:*

Eir i'r capel ar ddydd Sul. (= "one goes to chapel on Sundays")

fV	ind	ind
----	-----	-----

cf. Irish:

Téitear ann gach Domhnach. (= "people go there every Sunday")

fV	adv	adv
----	-----	-----

II. *Ectonomic transversal relation:*

Fe'm gwelir gan y bobl. (= "I am seen by the people")

+/p	O ₁	fV	ind
-----	----------------	----	-----

III. *Dianomic transversal relation:*

Gwelir fi gan y bobl. (= "I am seen by the people")

fV	S	ind
----	---	-----

IV. *Periphrases (circumlocutions):*

a) Caf fy ngweld gan y bobl. [I get my seeing by the people]

fV	O ₁	ind
----	----------------	-----

b) Yr wyf i'n cael fy ngweld gan y bobl.

+/p	O	S	iP	O ₁	ind
-----	---	---	----	----------------	-----

[+/p am I /ind/ getting my seeing by the people]

IVb is a nucleus construction of a circumlocution. Plain passive nucleus constructions like English *I am seen*, *he got killed*, German *er wird getötet*, *er wurde gesehen*, French *il fut tué* and the like are alien to the Welsh nomos. The finite verb in a passive construction of the Welsh type IVa can be symbolized by the notation

(fV) : a nucleus is manifest in the form of a finite verb requiring an object such as for instance an O₁, an O₂, or an Ω.

In all the instances II, III, and IV the i[A] (αἰτία) (*gan y bobl* = "by the people") is deletable. Our five Welsh passive syntagms are to be considered as possible Welsh sentences:

Fe'm gwelir. (= "I am seen")

Gwelir fi. (= "I am seen")

Caf fy ngweld. (= "I shall be seen")

Yr wyf i'n cael fy ngweld. (= "I am being seen")

These are the naked passive representations we remember from the paradigms of our Latin and Greek school grammars (*amor*, *videor*, *ponor*, *audior*, *παιδεύομαι*, *εἶθην* etc.). Considered as sentences we call them *unsatiated transversal relations*.

Our analysis of passive sentences allows us to set up the following universal survey of passive syntagm patterns:

- I. Unsatiated passive transversal relations:
- | | |
|----------------|--|
| (S) ○ oV | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — <i>I am admired</i> — <i>ich werde verhöhnt</i> — <i>il fut tué</i> — <i>viene ammazzato</i> — <i>jeg bliver eftertragtet etc.</i> |
| (S) fV | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — <i>amor</i> — <i>φιλοῦμαι</i> — <i>dviṣyate</i> (Sanskrit: "I am hated") — <i>jeg frygtes etc.</i> <p>(cf. армия его разбита
квартира освободилась
<i>eso se hará facilmente</i>)</p> |

II. Satiated 'passive' transversal relations:

1) Ectonomic transversal relations:

Ws ne ghoṛe ko mara.	(Urdu)
La thop ia kata da u sim.	(Khasi)
Ñāte lak-in kōye.	(Narinyeri)
Fe'm gwelir gan y bobl.	(Welsh)
У меня дружины не приведено.	(Russian)

(cf. pp. 47, 55)

2) Dianomic transversal relations:

Den Schuldige wurde von den Behörden bestraft.	(German)
The young man was killed by a rhinoceros.	(English)
El fuerte fué tomado por el enemigo. (= the fort was taken by the enemy)	(Spanish)
Gwelir fi gan y bobl. (= I am seen by the people)	(Welsh)
Tulā mūṣikair bhakṣitā. (= the balance has been eaten up by mice)	(Sanskrit)
Они улучшались нашими инженерами. (= they have been improved by our engineers)	(Russian)
Ā mē sociī nōn adductī sunt.	(Latin)
Ξέρξης ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐνικήθη. (= Xerxes was defeated by the Greeks)	(Greek) etc.

III. Satiated passive transversal relations without any syntagmatic S representing the [A] ($\alpha\iota\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$):

Eī resistētur.	(Latin)
Ihm wurde geholfen.	(German)
Se les condenó a muerte. (= they were condemned to death)	(Spanish)
Buailtear an coirce le súiste.	(Irish)

(cf. pp. 46, 48 and pp. 80, 101)

IV. Autonomous passive constructions:

Sic itur ad astra.	(Latin)
Eir i'r capel ar ddydd Sul.	(Welsh)
Táthar ag déanamh bóthair nua.	(Irish)
Der trænges til en fastere skattepolitik.	(Danish)
Diū et acriter pugnātum est.	(Latin)
Téitear ann gach Domhnach.	(Irish)
Der blev skændtes bravt.	(Danish)
Der er blevet malet siden sidst.	(Danish)

(cf. p. 46 and p. 78)

V. Pseudopassive periphrases:

Yr wyf i'n cael fy ngweld gan y bobl.	} (= I am seen by the people)	(Welsh)
Caf fy ngweld gan y bobl.		
Yi-feng hsinz shouz Pa-thez-liz hsiex-chhengv le. (= a letter has been written by Patrick)		(Chinese)

The Chinese construction is as little passive as its Welsh counterparts (although it is referred to as 'passive' by orthodox Chinese grammarians). The nucleus *shouz* (= Welsh *cael* = English *get*) is used in a purely O_1 -ruling function (*Pa-thez-liz hsiex-chhengv*: "Patrick's writing" being its object). The same is valid for all the six Chinese constructions mentioned on page 17. The Classical Chinese 'passive' constructions are to be considered as rarely used and cumbersome rewritings of their active counterparts. They correspond semantically to what is expressed in a passive mood in such languages which have a genuine passive (a passive paradigm or specific passive nucleus + oV-constructions).

Our reflections on the nature of the passive voice and its materializations in human language make it possible to analyse passive sentences in Japanese in a reasonable way. Let us consider a couple of passive constructions as they are used by any Japanese however much he may be averse to using the passive construction on the whole:


Watashi wa suri ni tokei o suraremashita. (= "I have been robbed of my watch by a pick-pocket").

Khasi and Japanese are brilliant instances of languages which do not care very much about the diathesis of the finite sentence verb. Khasi never cares, Japanese may do it. English does. But the fact that English does, in no way justifies any meta-linguistic description of the English passive as a mere transformation of the English active. Language is far too pelagic an apparatus to be handled that superficially.

The Japanese sentence we have just considered displays a syntactical situation where active and passive meet in the sense that the diathesis between the two categories is completely abolished. This may be difficult to understand for an Indoeuropean brain, but this, of course, changes nothing with regard to the substantial character of the Japanese sentence which is representative of legions of Japanese sentences.

This seems to be the type of sentence that any universal analysis of syntagms has to use as its starting point if it wants to describe human sentences with a primary finite component whether this be in the active or in the passive, or in neither. Any language might be structured syntactically without subjects. Khasi is an excellent example of how this would work. But you can hardly imagine any human idiom without constituents of transversal relations. The semantic elements which constitute simple transversal relations quasi ad infinitum are the transitive verbs without which language would be lifeless. This by no means implies that you cannot express transversal relations without using any finite component at all in a given syntagm: this may be done (*and Peter outs with his knife!*), but it does not work in a remunerative way. Moreover it is irksome and terribly restringent to a communicative mind. The pyramids in Egypt, Colombus' trip to America, and the recent Saturn flights to the moon would have been unimaginable without transversal relations.

There are three main types of transversal relations. Obviously, we must use the simplest of these types as our point of departure if we want to describe the two others in the most adequate way, i.e. according to the principle of simplicity, or following a procedure which allows us to observe, in each case, the least mesonomic relations. The simplest imaginable type is the one offered by Khasi or Japanese:



(Ω for Greek $\omega\pi\eta\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ = instrumental complement or active indication)

or:

Ω	fV	O_1
O_1	fV	Ω


or even more economical for the student and the printer:

$$\text{TR-Q: } \mathcal{Q} \sim \text{fV} \sim \text{O}_1$$

where \sim indicates complete arbitrariness as to specific syntagmatical distributions of the three members of our model (fV, O_1 , and \mathcal{Q}): wherever a transversal relation Q is met with in human language, the consecutive order of its members is decided by a given nomos.

Thus, the Japanese nomos calls for the consecutive order \mathcal{Q} , O_1 , fV in a transversal relation of the Q type, the Khasi nomos demands the consecutive order fV, O_1 , \mathcal{Q} , the Welsh nomos displays the order O_1 , fV, \mathcal{Q} , the Narrinyeri nomos will have it the other way round: \mathcal{Q} , fV, O_1 , and so on and so forth. In German you find the order \mathcal{Q} , O_1 , V under special circumstances with an operative verb (but never with a finite verb):

Ich lasse mir vom Kellner zwei Glas Bier bringen.



This German example shows better than any the creative value of the universal Q type of transversal relations: in a glimpse we see quite clearly how a German mind follows exactly the same basic rules of sentence construction as a Khasi or a Narrinyeri intellect. This way of analysing a complicated German sentence structure will find a good many adversaries, to be sure, whatever their reasons may be. But it seems to have one great indisputable advantage: it inevitably makes our analysis simpler. Any specific syntax is extremely clear and simple if it is considered in the light of universal conquests. And vice versa, any linguist who prefers to make a short cut from a special syntax to what he believes to be a universal one is inevitably going to entangle his own subject.¹ The road to a universal syntax is not an easy one, but once you have trodden it, the great alluring object never loses its hold of one's entelechy, and the ultimate result is immensely rewarding.²

Some Q types of transversal relations are structured as nucleus constructions:

¹ Cf. Noam Chomsky: *Syntactic Structures*, (Mouton) the Hague 1957, fifth edition 1965, p. 11: "The ultimate outcome of these investigations should be a theory of linguistic structure in which the descriptive devices utilized in particular grammars are presented and studied abstractly with no specific reference to particular languages".

² Cf. Karl R. Popper: *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London 1969, p. 121: "Thus I regard the comparison of the empirical content of two statements as equivalent to the comparison of their degrees of falsification. This makes our methodological rule that those theories should be given preference which can be most severely tested equivalent to a rule favouring theories with the highest possible empirical content".

Τὸν πατέρα σοι τιμητέον ἐστίν. (Greek) (= [father by-you to-be-honoured is])

(O ₂ :)	οP ○
O ₁ Ω	

(οP = operative predicative (in this case a ‘verbal adjective’))

Bellō ūtendum est nobīs. (Latin¹) (= “we must employ war”)

O ₃	οP ○	(O ₂ :)
		Ω

Honum var vikið af framkvæmdastjóranum.

O ₂	○ οV	ind:Ω
----------------	---------	-------

(= “he was fired by the administrative director”) (Icelandic)

Разумно бысть Саулу свѣтъ ихъ. (Old Slavonic)

οP ○	(O ₂ :)	O ₁
	Ω	

(= [known was by-Saul plot-their])

Besides constructions with an ESSE-nucleus you find constructions without any such nucleus:

Ἐμοὶ ἀσκητέον τὴν ἀρετὴν. (Greek) (= [by me to-(be)-exercise(d) virtue])

(O ₂ :)Ω	οP	O ₁
---------------------	----	----------------

Τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ποιητέον. (Greek) (= [that by-us to-(be)-do(ne)])

O ₁ (O ₁ :)	οP
Ω	

Ἀπαλλακτέον ἡμῖν τοῦ σώματος. (Greek)

οP	(O ₂ :)	Ω
	Ω	

(= [to-(be)-free(d) by-us from the body]) (= “we must free ourselves from the body”)

У меня дружины не приведено. (Russian)

ind	Ω	÷/r	οP
-----	---	-----	----

(= [with me companions not brought]: “I have not brought my companions with me”)

¹ Cf. W. W. Goodwin: *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*, London, Melbourne, Toronto 1965 (§ 924 and § 926, p. 369).

Paczkę dostarczono mnie przez gońca. (Polish)

O ₁	oP	O ₂	(ind:) Q
----------------	----	----------------	-------------

(= “the packet was handed to me through (the offices of) the lift-boy”)

From what precedes it will be seen that our type Q of transversal relations is an ideal sentence with an extremely economic and serviceable mesonomic arrangement: the mesonomic part of the sentence consists of the fV (finite verb) or an oP (operative predicate) with or without a nucleus. The fV (or the oP) is unrestrained and independent with regard to diathesis: its relation to its immediate constituent is that of an active verb, and its relation to its Q is that of a passive verb. Therefore, it is both passive and active, or neither of the two. The fV of a transversal relation Q does not need to bother about the distinction active/passive. Its economy and independence makes it take up a key-position in any attempt to describe transversal relations.

A quick glance at a transversal relation from New Testament Greek will bring forth an interesting complex of problems:

Οὐδὲν ἄξιον θανάτου ἐστὶ πεπραγμένον αὐτῷ. (Luke 23, 15)

O ₁ ?	○	oP?	(O ₂ :) Q
S?		oV?	

(= “nothing worthy of death *is having been done* by him”)

Obviously the sentence has the structure of a transversal relation Q, and yet we all know that any Greek grammarian will protest if we plead for such an analysis. He will tell us that the sentence has a *subject*. Why? Because the Greek nomos requires a subject in sentences of this kind. Our universal transversal relation Q turns into a Greek transversal relation R (in the passive). The only thing that justifies this analysis in advantage of the R type is a set of reflections on the Greek nomos.

We must put up with the fact that a universal analysis of Luke 23, 15 will come to the result that this sentence is either a Q-relation or an R-relation. Only certain grammatical sensations attached to one’s knowledge of a specific syntax, or the feeling of how things ought to be in a given language, in the present case Greek, allows you to make a decision in favour of an R-relation if you are contented with that solution. In an R-relation (a transversal relation R) the basic constituent is the S of the sentence:

No crime has been committed by him.

S	○	○ ²	oV	ind:Q
---	---	----------------	----	-------

A letter has been written by Patrick.

S	○	○ ²	oV	ind:Q
---	---	----------------	----	-------

Peter is hit by the ball.

S	○	oV	ind:Q
---	---	----	-------

Accordingly, in an S-relation (a transversal relation S) the basic constituent is the O₁ of the sentence:

He has committed no crime.

S	○	oV	O ₁
---	---	----	----------------

Patrick has written a letter.

S	○	oV	O ₁
---	---	----	----------------

Paul hits Peter.

S	fV	O ₁
---	----	----------------

In some languages all three transversal relations are used (whereby slightly different intentional leverages of the same communicative content are obtained). This is the case in Kanarese, for instance:

Q: Bared kāgada Patrikaniṁda.

fV	O ₁	Q
----	----------------	---

R: Patrikaniṁda kāgadavu bareyalpattitu.

Q	S	fV
---	---	----

S: Patrikanu kāgada baredanu.

S	O ₁	fV
---	----------------	----

(Q = 'write letter by-Patrick', R = 'by-Patrick letter has-been-written', S = 'Patrick letter has-written').

These three sentence types (TR-Q (= transversal relation Q), TR-R (= transversal relation R), and TR-S (= transversal relation S)) are the fundament of any universal syntax. One of them (TR-Q) has got no subject. In a TR-Q both of the involved, the O₁ and the Q are to be found in the ectonomic part of the sentence: the relation between O₁ and Q is *ectonomic*. In an R-relation the [O]-entity basis is introduced into the mesonomic part of the sentence, whereas in an S-relation the [A]-basis is introduced into the mesonomic part of the sentence: in a TR-R and a TR-S the relation between the basic constituent ([A]) and the S, or the O₁, respectively, is *dianomic*.

Of the three simple transversal relations the Finnish nomos allows only S-relations:

Patrikki on kirjoittanut kirjeen. (TR-S)

S	○	oV	O ₁
---	---	----	----------------

The Basque nomos allows only R-relations:

Izkiribu bat izkiribatu du Batirek. (TR-R)

S	oV	○	∅
---	----	---	---

The English nomos allows both S- and R-relations:

Patrick has written a letter. (TR-S)

S	○	oV	O ₁
---	---	----	----------------

A letter has been written by Patrick. (TR-R)

S	○	○ ²	oV	ind:∅
---	---	----------------	----	-------

The Kanarese nomos allows both Q-, R-, and S-relations:

Bared kāgada Patrikanidam. (TR-Q)

fV	O ₁	∅
----	----------------	---

Patrikanimda kāgadavu bareyalpattitu. (TR-R)

∅	S	fV
---	---	----

Patrikanu kāgada baredanu. (TR-S)

S	O ₁	fV
---	----------------	----

The same thing applies to Scottish-Gaelic:

Sgrìobhadh le Pàdhraic litir. (TR-Q)

fV	ind:∅	O ₁
----	-------	----------------

Tha litir air a sgrìobhadh le Pàdhraic. (TR-R)

○	S	indicated verb noun (= P)	∅
---	---	------------------------------	---

Tha Pàdhraic air sgrìobhadh litir. (TR-S)

○	S	indicated verb noun (= P)	O ₁ (→ ∅)
---	---	------------------------------	----------------------

Some languages tend to use only Q-relations, as Urdu, for example; in Aghulian they are the norm:

Patrik ne cyṭṭhi ko pəṛha. (TR-Q) ([Patrick by the letter read]) (Urdu)

Q	O ₁	oP(V)
---	----------------	-------

Bylli ne pərinde ko pakra. (= "the cat caught the bird") (Urdu)

ind:Q	ind:O ₁	oP(V)
-------	--------------------	-------

Парҭала гьурҭал акьуне. (= "the hen laid an egg") (Aghulian)

Q	O ₁	V
---	----------------	---

The Narrinyeri nomos allows only Q- and S|R-relations:

Ñāte lak-in kōye. (TR-Q) ("through-me is-made basket (acc.)")

Q	fV	O ₁
---	----	----------------

Ñāpe lagel-in kōy-il. (TRS) ([I make by-basket] (an S|R-relation starting as a TR-S and ending as a TR-R) = "I make a basket")

S	fV	Q
---	----	---

Under special conditions, the Polish nomos may allow both Q-, R-, and S-relations:

Q: Paczkę doręczono mnie przez gońca.

[packet handed to-me by lift-boy]
(acc.)

R: Paczka mnie została doręczona przez gońca.

[packet to-me was handed by lift-boy]

S: Gонец doręczył mnie paczkę.

[lift-boy handed to-me packet]

The Q-construction is extremely interesting: it implies an unknown X as the primus motor of the action expressed in the sentence. The lift-boy's handing over was the medium of this unknown Mr. X who is the person wanting to reach me with his packet for me. This is really a riddle for anyone who is looking for strict or true subjects in sentences where there seems to be none.

Mixed transversal relations are found in some languages. A brilliant example of an RQ-relation is offered by Japanese:

Watakushi wa tegami o haha ni yomareta. (TR-RQ) (= "my letter was read by mother")

S	O ₁	Q	fV
---	----------------	---	----

- II.

S	fV	O_2
---	----	-------

᾽Ο βασιλεὺς ἀμύνει τῷ νόμῳ. (= the king guards the law) (Greek)
Mulier nūbit virō. (Latin)
Он изменил своим убеждениям. (= he changed his conviction) (Russian)
Der Student schmeichelte dem Professor. (German)
Kāmāya spr̥hayaty ātmā. (= "the soul longs for love") (Sanskrit)
- III.

S	fV	O_3
---	----	-------

Multi deōrum nostrā patientiā abūtuntur. (Latin)
- IV.

S	fV	Ω
---	----	----------

᾽Ο δικαστῆς τοῦ κακοῦργοῦ κατέκρινεν. (= the judge condemned the evil-doer) (Greek)
Animus meminit praeteritōrum. (Latin)
Это предложение заслуживает внимания. (= this proposition deserves attention) (Russian)
Ein militärisches Genie spottet der Kriegsregeln. (German)
- V.

S	fV	Ω
---	----	----------

Шофёр управляет машиной. (= the driver drives the car) (Russian)
Ñāpe lagel-in kōy-il. (= "I make a basket") (Narrinyeri)
- VI.

S	fV	ind:O ₁
---	----	--------------------

Takeo san wa hon o yonde imasu. (= Mr. Takeo is reading a book) (Japanese)
La muchacha ama a su hermano. (= the girl loves her brother) (Spanish)

B. Human language offers us the following main patterns of simple transversal R-relations (our diagrams are purely abstract):

- I.

S	fV ((O +) oV)	Ω
---	------------------	----------

Tena kathānakaṃ prārabdham. (= "by-him a story was begun") (Sanskrit)
Vyādhena jālaṃ vistīraṃam. (= "by the hunter a net was spread") (Sanskrit)
Задача решается учеником. (= the exercise is solved by the student) (Russian)

II.	S	fV ((O +) oV)	ind: \mathcal{Q}
-----	---	------------------	--------------------

Ἡ ὀ ποταμὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ ἐξέγυγντο. (= the river was bridged
by the infantry)

Plēbs ā cōnsule plācātur.

Der Junge wird von dem Lehrer gelobt.

C. Human language offers us the following main patterns of simple transversal Q-relations (our diagrams, again, are purely abstract):

I.	fV ((O +) oV)	O ₁	O ₁ : \mathcal{Q}
----	------------------	----------------	--------------------------------

Τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ποιητέον. (= we must do this)

II.	fV ((O +) oV)	O ₁	O ₂ : \mathcal{Q}
-----	------------------	----------------	--------------------------------

Ἀρετὰς ἡμῖν διωκτέον. (= we must strive for virtue)

III.	fV ((O +) oV)	O ₁	\mathcal{Q}
------	------------------	----------------	---------------

Ñāte lak-in kōye. (= I make a basket)

IV.	fV ((O +) oV)	O ₂	O ₁ : \mathcal{Q}
-----	------------------	----------------	--------------------------------

Βοηθητέον τοῖς πράγμασιν ἡμᾶς. (= we must see to it)

V.	fV ((O +) oV)	O ₂	O ₂ : \mathcal{Q}
----	------------------	----------------	--------------------------------

Βοηθητέον τοῖς πράγμασιν ἡμῖν. (= we must see to it)

VI.	fV ((O +) oV)	O ₂	\mathcal{Q}
-----	------------------	----------------	---------------

Bhayapaṭṭanu samūhakke arasaniṁda. (= [feared the
people by the king])

(Kanarese)

and so on and so forth. From a purely theoretical point of view there is no limit to the combinatory distributions of semasiosyntactic O and \mathcal{Q} markers in the ectonomic

part of a transversal Q-relation. We have already met with several of these further potentialities:

VIII.	$\begin{array}{c} \text{fV} \\ ((\text{O} +) \text{oV}) \end{array}$	O_3	$\text{O}_2 : \text{Q}$	
⋮				
		Bellō ūtendum est nōbīs.		(Latin)
X.	$\begin{array}{c} \text{fV} \\ ((\text{O} +) \text{oV}) \end{array}$	Ω	$\text{O}_1 : \text{Q}$	
		᾿Απαλλακτέον τοῦ σώματος ἡμᾶς. (= we must deliver ourselves of the body)		(Greek)
XI.	$\begin{array}{c} \text{fV} \\ ((\text{O} +) \text{oV}) \end{array}$	Ω	$\text{O}_2 : \text{Q}$	
		᾿Απαλλακτέον τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν. (= we must deliver ourselves of the body)		(Greek)
XVI.	$\begin{array}{c} \text{fV} \\ ((\text{O} +) \text{oV}) \end{array}$	O_1	ind : Q	
		Fe'm gwelir gan y bobl. (= I am seen by the people)		(Welsh)
XIX.	$\begin{array}{c} \text{fV} \\ ((\text{O} +) \text{oV}) \end{array}$	Ω	ind : Q	
		У меня дружины не приведено. (= I haven't brought my companions with me)		(Russian)
XXVI.	$\begin{array}{c} \text{fV} \\ ((\text{O} +) \text{oV}) \end{array}$	ind : O_1	ind : Q	
		La thop ia kata da u sim. (= this has been written by the King)		(Khasi)
XXVIII.	$\begin{array}{c} \text{fV} \\ ((\text{O} +) \text{oV}) \end{array}$	ind : Q	ind : O_3	
		Admi ne larkhi se pwcha. (= the man asked the girl)		(Urdu)

The last example offered in Urdu may seem strange to an English or a Danish speaking linguist. This is due to the fact that this specific transversal Q-relation is not allowed by his peculiar nomos. From a universal point of view there is nothing strange whatsoever about the Urdu construction. As we shall see later, it turns out

to be the natural and harmonious counterpart of its diametrical opposite: the sentence type equipped with two subjects strictly related to the same predicate (cf. Japanese: *watakushi wa hon ga arimasu* (= “I book existing-is” ρ: “I have a book”); Arabic: *ana hūwa at-tājir* (“I he the merchant” ρ: “I am the merchant”); Kanarese: *nāvu bareda kāgadavu sēritu* (= “we written letter has-arrived” ρ: “the letter that we wrote has arrived”; Lelemi: *ntu bɔ kɔ ɔdza* (= “water it climbs fire” ρ: “the water is hot”); Persian: *tō manzelat in ast?* (= “you house-your this is?” ρ: “is this your house?”), etc.).

Through introducing an S (a subject) into the mesonomic part of a transversal relation Q human language acquires an extremely efficient RS-relation:

Ξέρξης ὑπὸ Θεμιστοκλέους τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἠττήθη.

Our Greek sentence is an outstanding example of an RS-relation: it is the syntactic combination of an R-relation:

Ξέρξης ὑπὸ Θεμιστοκλέους ἠττήθη. (TR-R)
(= “Xerxes was defeated by Themistokles”)

and an S-relation:

Ξέρξης τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἠττήθη. (TR-S)
(= “Xerxes lost the sea-battle”)

Or in other words:

<i>Ξέρξης ὑπὸ Θεμιστοκλέους ἠττήθη.</i>	TR-R					
<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">S</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">Q</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">fV</td> </tr> </table>	S	Q	fV	+		
S	Q	fV				
+						
<i>Ξέρξης τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἠττήθη.</i>	TR-S					
<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">S</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">O₁</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">fV</td> </tr> </table>	S	O ₁	fV			
S	O ₁	fV				
= <i>Ξέρξης ὑπὸ Θεμιστοκλέους τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἠττήθη.</i>	= TR-RS					
<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">S</td> <td colspan="2" style="padding: 5px;">Q</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">O₁</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">fV</td> </tr> </table>	S	Q		O ₁	fV	
S	Q		O ₁	fV		
Q						
(= “Xerxes was defeated by Themistokles in the sea-battle”)						

TR-R + TR-S = TR-RS (= TR-Q + subject). This formula tells us a good deal about the extremely productive transversal R- and S-relations which have for centuries played the role of stable suppliers of raw material for syntactic deliberation. All our three Greek representations (TR-R, TR-S, and TR-RS) have obviously got one important thing in common: the two chamber arrangements of the mesonomic part of the sentence. What takes place, in fact, is that one of the involved O/Q-components is *stabilized*. Q-relations are unstable transversal relations as opposed to the R and S-relations

which are *stabilized transversal relations*. The grammatical category of stabilization is the nominative (in some languages matched by an ergative). The relation between the stabilized element of the sentence and the fV is an *interdependence relation*. Nothing of general value can be said concerning the diathesis of the fV in an R or S-relation. The fV of an S-relation may be in the passive voice:

Οἶδε οἱ γονεῖς ἀληθινῶς τῶν παιδῶν ἄριστα ἐπεμελήθησαν.

(= "these parents really took care of (their) children in an excellent way")

or in the active voice (as it is in the vast majority of cases):

Οἱ πολέμιοι τὴν πόλιν ἔπρησαν. (= "the enemies burned down the city")

S	O ₁	fV
---	----------------	----

Equally, the fV of an R-relation may be in the passive voice:

Litterae scribuntur ā Patriciō.

S fV ind : \mathcal{Q}

or in the active voice:

Corbis fit ā Patriciō.

S fV ind : \mathcal{Q}

What constitutes a TR-R or a TR-S is merely the relation [A] → [O] and the semantic value of the transversal mediator (the verbal constituent (Π^1)). Human language tends to use the passive voice in R-relations and the active voice in S-relations. In an enormous lot of languages this functional distribution has become a fixed rule.

A transversal Q-relation is an *autocratic* relation: the fV alone dominates the [A] and the [O].

A transversal R-relation is an *idiocratic* relation: the mesonomic part of the sentence is a rounded off syntactic interior with an accompanying \mathcal{Q} .

A transversal S-relation is a *heterocratic* relation: the mesonomic part of the sentence (the fV and the stabilized S) dominates the [O].

The stabilized S of a transversal R or S-relation is named the *stasis* of the sentence. In an S-relation the [A] is the stasis of the sentence. In an R-relation the [O] is the stasis of the sentence. A given stasis is expressive of the *synopsis* of the sentence of which it is the subject. In the sentence *Peter is punished by Matthew* Peter is the stasis. Correspondingly, in the sentence *Matthew punishes Peter* Matthew is the stasis. The two sentences are the syntactic images of two different synopses of one and the same semantic theme.

In the following we shall deal with three important types of transversal relations which can now be described in a much simpler way than before:


¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Das Satzverbal (II) und die Kasus*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1, 3, Heidelberg 1976.

- 1) Extended transversal relations
- 2) Reduced transversal relations
- 3) Synthetic transversal relations.


1. An *extended transversal relation* is a *II*-relation between a stasis and an O_1 + an O_2 , an O_3 , or an Ω (whereby O_2 , O_3 , and Ω are considered as the *extensions*):

Der Junge gab <i>dem Vater</i> einen Kuss.	(German)
Er erinnerte sich <i>seiner Kindheit</i> .	(German)
Brūtus <i>dominātū rēgiō</i> rem pūblicam liberāvit.	(Latin)
Man hat ihn <i>des Diebstahls</i> bezichtigt.	(German)

Graphically an extended TR-S may be represented in the following way:



as opposed to an SS-relation:



as for instance: He asked me something.	(English)
Er lehrt mich Englisch.	(German)
<i>Ἡ μήτηρ τὸν παῖδα ἀμφιέννυσι τὴν ἐσθῆτα.</i>	
(= the mother attired the boy in his clothing)	(Greek)

By applying these simple models on more capricious sentence types we shall be able to distinguish different *combined* transversal RQ-relations as for instance:

He was asked a question by his teacher.	(a TR-RQ)
Er wurde von den Behörden des Diebstahls bezichtigt.	(a TR-RQ)
He was offered a glass of beer by his companion.	(a TR-RQ)

2. A *reduced transversal relation* is a TR in which either the stasis or the O_1 (or the Ω), or even both of them are elided:

Ti amo. (= "I love you")	(Italian)
I know. (= "det ved jeg godt")	(Danish)
Sciō. (= "I know (it)")	(Latin)
Denne fisk spises. [= this fish is eaten]	(Danish)

3. A *synthetic transversal relation* is an alloyage of the [A], the *II*, and the [O] of the sentence. It is used in many languages:

Szeretlek. (= "I love you")	(Hungarian)
Naluvara. (= "je l'ignore" ὧ: "I don't know")	(Eskimo)
Gχataws. (= "he paints you")	(Georgian)

Pi·ta·w.	(= "he brings it")	(Menomini)
Pi·ta·wan.	(= "the other brings it")	(Menomini)
Pi·ta·wak.	(= "they bring it")	(Menomini)
Kepi·to·nan.	(= "thou bringest them")	(Menomini)
Nepi·to·n.	(= "I bring it")	(Menomini)
Nepi·to·menaw.	(= "we bring it") (exclusively)	(Menomini)
Pi·to·nan.	(= "they are brought")	(Menomini)
Kepi·to·q.	(= "we bring it") (inclusively)	(Menomini)

Before we delve deeper into the analysis of human sentences, we must consider the *II* of our transversal relations a little more closely than has been done by traditional grammarians (including the various transformational schools which are so fashionable at the moment). Living language shows us that any *II* may be considered in one of two ways, both of which are of the utmost importance for our further analysis of the sentences of homo sapiens. There are other rules, but as they are of lesser importance they are not taken into consideration here. Two rules should be always remembered:

- 1) Any [*II*] is equal to the **A**-nucleus 'do' + its own nominalization (= π):

$$[II] = \left[\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{\mathbf{A}} \\ \text{'do'} \end{array} + \pi \right]$$

(Cf. English [harm] = [do harm], Danish [skade] = [gøre skade], and the innumerable verb constructions in Turkish (and other languages) built up

on the pattern $\left[\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{\mathbf{A}} \\ \text{'do'} \end{array} + \text{noun} \right]$: teşekkür etmek = to thank (= [do thank]),

hareket etmek = to act (= [do action]), devam etmek = to continue (= [do continuation]), hücum etmek = to attack (= [do attack]), etc.

Cf. Urdu: jaldi kærna = [do haste]

maf kærna = [do forgiveness]

kam kærna = [do work]

Cf. Persian: rahbari kardan = [do guidance]

baz kardan = [do opening]

ta'lim kardan = [do teaching]

Cf. Japanese: haishaku suru = [do borrowing] = to borrow;

yunyū suru = [do import] = to import;

zotto suru = [do agreeableness] = to be natural and pleasant;

tokusho suru = [do reading] = to read;

yakusoku suru = [do promise] = to promise, etc.

- 2) Any [*II*] may be considered as equal to its own verbal content + its own nominalization as an [O]:

$$[II] = [V + O^1 (= \pi)]$$

(Cf. Classical Arabic: $\frac{\text{Kataba}}{\text{fV}} \text{ B. ar-risālat}^a \frac{\text{kitābat}^a}{\text{O}^1(=\pi)} = \text{B. has written a letter}.$
 $[\text{wrote B. the letter writing}]$

These two important observations, concerning the semantic structure of the *II* in a transversal relation, will allow us to analyse human sentences by following non-metaphysical devices according to purely linguistic criteria. Let us summarize our two rules in a basic semantic formula of universal value:

$$[II] = \left[\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{\Lambda} \\ \text{'do'} \end{array} + \pi \right] = \left[V + \pi (O^1) \right]$$

This formula allows us to accomplish analyses of human sentences by regarding unexpressed $\pi (= O^1)$ as semantically internalized into a given *II*. A sentence *II* may or may not contain an internalized O^1 . In the latter case it is a nucleus. Simple English sentences show us how this works in practice:

He has harmed him. =
 He has done him harm.

Cf. Danish:

Han har skadet ham. =
 Han har gjort ham skade.

In the German sentence

Er schadet ihm.

the *II* contains an internalized $O^1(\pi)$ which justifies the O_2 (*ihm*). The internalized π is *active*.¹ These considerations lead to a much more profound and subtle analysis of the transversal relation than we have been able to offer before. We shall now be able to describe all transversal relations in the form of extremely simple diagrams each representing a fundamental universal sentence model (the first two or three of these models have already been treated above in other connections):

TR-model I:



(In a simple TR we introduce the term *epistasis* for the counterpart of the stasis).

Examples: *Patrick* has written *a letter*.
 (stasis) (epistasis).
Les patriotes aiment *leur patrie*.
Der Hund beisst *den Affen*.

¹ *active* as opposed to *inactive*. We say that a sentence like *Peter droht ihm* (S + fV + O_2) has got an active π , whereas a sentence like *Peter schlägt ihn* (S + fV + O_1) has got an inactive π .

Imperātor vincit urbem.

A letter has been written by Patrick.

Der Affe wird von dem Hund gebissen.


Urbs vincitur ab imperātōre.

Книгопечатание было изобретено Гутенбергом.

(= the art of printing was invented by Gutenberg)

(A TR-Q has $2 \times$ epistasis and is without any stasis whatsoever, cf. pp. 73–74).

A *hypostasis* may be introduced into our TR-model I in some languages:



Examples: $\frac{\text{Məyŋ}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{ne bəḡhəi se}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{sənduq}}{\text{S}}$ bənvaya. (= “I had a box made by the carpenter”) (Urdu)

epistasis hypostasis

(\mathcal{Q})

= [by-me carpenter-through box having-got-made]

$\frac{\text{Məyŋ}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{ne bəḡhəi se}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{mez}}{\text{S}}$ bənvayi. (= “I had a table made by the carpenter”) (Urdu)

epistasis hypostasis

(\mathcal{Q})

= [by-me carpenter-through table having-got-made]

$\frac{\text{Moci ne}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{hərkare se}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{karḡ}}{\text{S}}$ lykhvaya. (= “the cobbler had a card written by the postman”) (Urdu)

epistasis hypostasis

(\mathcal{Q})

= [cobbler-by postman-through card having-got-written]

$\frac{\text{Moci ne}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{hərkare se}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{cyḡḡhi}}{\text{S}}$ lykhvayi. (= “the cobbler had a letter written by the postman”) (Urdu)

epistasis hypostasis

(\mathcal{Q})

= [cobbler-by postman-through letter having-got-written]


$\frac{\text{Ototo ni}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{isha o}}{\text{ind:}}$ yobaseta. (= “he made his younger brother call a doctor”) (Japanese)

hypostasis epistasis

$\frac{\text{Ashi o}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\frac{\text{inu ni}}{\text{ind:}}$ $\text{kuitsukaremashita.}$ (= “I have had my leg bitten by a dog”) (Japanese)

epistasis hypostasis

TR-model II:



Examples: *He teaches me German.*

He struck him a blow.

Er hat mich etwas gefragt.

They named him Peter the Great.

He was asked a question by his mother.

Οἱ παλαιοὶ τοὺς πεσόντας τὰ ὄπλα ἐξέδδον.

(= the old divested the fallen (warriors) of their weapons)


Caesar Haeduōs frūmentum flāgitāvit.

Devān papracchur enaṃ Kuruputraḥ.

(= "the sons of Kuru inquired him about the Gods")

(Sanskrit)

TR-model III:



The semasiosyntactic term *diastasis* is introduced for the O_2 ('the dative object').

Examples: *He gave him a book.*

Κῦρος τὰ δῶρα τοῖς φίλοις διεδίδου.

(= Cyrus gave the gifts to the friends)

Er gab ihm ein Buch.

Il lui donna un livre.

Pārthivo mayaṃ pustakaṃ dadau.

(= "the prince has given me the book")

(Sanskrit)

Māter dedit filiō librum.

Я учу детеѣ русскому языку.

(= I teach the children the Russian language)

The distribution of the diastasis and the epistasis follows the rules of particular nomoi:

Er schenkte *ihm* das Buch. Er schenkte *dem Mann* das Buch.

Er überliess *dem Jungen* die Schreibmaschine.

Er überliess *die Schreibmaschine* dem Jungen.

Er stellte *ihn dem Herrn Direktor* vor.

Er gab *es ihm*.

If the epistasis (= O_1) is internalized in the *II* we get the following model (viz. an *autonomous diastasis*):



Examples: *Es ruft mir aus der Zweige Wehen.* (Körner)

Er schmeichelt mir.

Sie helfen uns.

Je lui répondrai.

Faber fabrō invidet.

Οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς Ἑλλησι πολεμοῦσιν.

(= the Persians are making war against the Greeks)

Вся обстановка ему благоприятствовала.

(= the whole situation favoured him)

2 × diastasis may occur in some languages:

Ðau svöruðu mér engu. (= “they answered me nothing”) (Icelandic)
O₂ O₂

An internalized diastasis is the basic essence of constructions in the medium voice and in the ‘subjective’: ‘objective’ versions:

Nagaram ajeṣṭhaḥ. (= “you conquered the town”) (Sanskrit)

Vedam adhīte. (= “he studies the Veda”) (Sanskrit)

Nāśvaṃ na rathaṃ jīrno bhuñkte na ca striyam. (= “an old decrepit does not enjoy either a horse or a war chariot, neither does he a woman”)

(Sanskrit)

Οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐν τοῖς ψύχεσιν ἱμάτια ἤμφιέννυντο.

(= the Greeks put on clothes when it was cold)

Οἱ δῆμοι ἀγαθοὺς νόμους τιθέσθων.

(= the peoples have to give good laws)

Θησεὺς Ἀριάδην γυναῖκα ἠγάγετο.

(= Theseus took Ariadne home with him as his wife)

Me avišeneb saχls. (= “I shall build (me) a house”) (Georgian)

Dedam šeukera tavis kališvils ṭanisamosi.

(= “the mother has sewn clothes for her daughter”) (Georgian)

TR-model IV:



(The semasiosyntactic term *metastasis* is introduced for the Ω).

Examples: *Ich erinnere mich dieses furchtbaren Geschehens.*

Man hat ihn des Diebstahls bezichtigt.

*Er versicherte den Angestellten seines Wohlwollens.
Man würdigte ihn keiner Antwort.*

Jūdīcēs senātōrem pecūlātūs damnāvērunt.

Он лишил меня удобного случая.

(= he deprived me of a favourable occasion)

‘Ο ῥήτωρ καλοκἀγαθίαν τῶν κτημάτων προτίθησιν.

(= the orator prefers virtue to money)

Εὔθε δ θεὸς μεταστήσαι σε τῆς νόσου.

(= may God free you of the disease)

Pitā tasya brūyāt sadā priyam. (= “the father shall always say nice things to him”) (Sanskrit)

If the epistasis is internalized into the *II* we get the following type of TR (with an *autonomous metastasis*):

Er bedarf eurer Hilfe.

Wir achten nicht des Weges.

Ich lache seiner leeren Drohungen.

Ihre Kleinlichkeit spottet jeder Beschreibung.

Er gedenkt seiner Ahnen.

Er pflegt der Ruhe.

Um Guts zu tun, braucht’s keiner Überlegung.

Animus meminit praeteritōrum.

‘Ο Ἕλληγν μετέχει τῆς αὐτῆς παιδεύσεως.

(= the Greek participates in his own education)

Страна жаждала покоя. (= the country was thirsting for peace)

Я жду не дождусь отпуска. (= I am waiting and waiting for leave)

Even 2 × metastasis may occur:

Hann mátti $\frac{sín}{\Omega}$ $\frac{mikils}{\Omega}$. (= he was the owner of great properties”) (Icelandic)

The epistasis may be internalized in the *II* and a diastasis may be introduced:

ἸΑεὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀγαθῶν μετεδίδομεν τοῖς πένησιν.

(= we always let the poor partake of our goods)

Я желаю вам всего хорошего. (= I wish you all the best)


The metastasis may precede the diastasis:

Þeir árna $\frac{heilla}{\Omega}$ $\frac{konungum sínum}{O_2}$. (Icelandic)

An epistasis, a diastasis and a metastasis may occur in the same sentence:

Er wusste $\frac{ihm}{O_2}$ $\frac{dessen}{\Omega}$ $\frac{Dank}{O_1}$.

TR-model V:

(The semasiosyntactic term *apostasis* is introduced for all O_3).Examples: *Senātōrēs sē abstinēbant iniūriā.**Marcus nūdāvit turrim dēfensōribus.**Brūtus dominātū rēgiō rem pūblicam liberāvit.**Немецкие студенты его зовут Павлом.*

(= the German students call him Paul)

Назначили его членом комиссии.

(= they appointed him a member of the commission)

If the epistasis is internalized into the Π you get the following type of sentences (with an *autonomous* apostasis):

ablative	{	<i>Tū abūteris patientiā nostrā.</i>
		<i>Senātor periculō dēfunctus est.</i>
		<i>Pater nōn gaudet incommodō filiī.</i>
instru- mental	{	<i>Brahmaṇaḥ śarīreṇa viyuḥyate.</i> (= “the Brahman releases himself from his body”) (Sanskrit)
		<i>Наши солдаты пренебрегают опасностью.</i> (= our soldiers disdain danger)
		<i>Он владеет её сердцем</i> (= he rules her heart).
		<i>Композитор дирижирует оркестром.</i> (= the composer directs the orchestra)
locative	{	<i>Gurū śiṣyayoḥ krudhyataḥ.</i> (= “the two gurus are angry with the two pupils)
		<i>Vaṇijaḥ sutā vipady āpannā.</i> (= “the merchant’s daughter has got into trouble”) (Sanskrit)
		<i>Dhīro nendriyārtheṣu sajate.</i> (= “a wise man does not pay attention to matters of the material world”) (Sanskrit)

The epistasis may be internalized in the Π and a diastasis may be introduced:*Senātus cōnsulī aquā et ignī interdixit.*

TR-model VI:



This is a simple transversal Q-relation (a TR-Q):

Τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ποιητέον. (= we must do this)

As shown above (pp. 62–63) either of the two epistases may be replaced by a diastasis, a metastasis, or an apostasis. This total anarchy is characteristic of the transversal Q-relation.

(A metastasis, a diastasis, or an apostasis may replace the epistasis 1 as the result of an internalization of the epistasis ($\rightarrow \pi$) into the *II*).

$\frac{\text{Μοροζομ}}{\Omega} \text{τρονυλο} \frac{\text{λυστῆς.}}{O_1}$ (= the leaves have been spoilt by the frost) (Russian)

$\frac{\text{Baka no hoka ni}}{\text{ind:}\Omega} \frac{\text{sō iu koto o iwanai.}}{\text{ind:}O_1}$ (= “nobody but a fool would say such a thing”) (Japanese)

$\frac{\text{Bubadi}}{\Omega} \frac{\text{ktab}}{O_1} \text{καῆχῆνα.}$ (= father took the book) (Lesginian)

$\frac{\text{ΠαΓαλα}}{\Omega} \frac{\text{γῆυργῆαλ}}{O_1} \text{ακῆυνε.}$ (= the hen laid an egg) (Aghulian)

$\frac{\text{Tenāraṅyam}}{\Omega} \frac{\text{upāgantavyam.}}{O_1}$ (= “he must reach the deserted woodlands”) (Sanskrit)

$\text{Παιδευτέον} \frac{\text{τὸν παιῖδα}}{O_1} \frac{\text{ὑμῖν.}}{O_2}$ (= we must educate the boy) (Greek)

$\text{Πολεμητέον} \frac{\text{τοῖς Πέρσαις}}{O_2} \frac{\text{ἡμῖν.}}{O_2}$ (= we must make a war against the Persians) (Greek)

$\text{Ἀπαλλακτέον} \frac{\text{τοῦ σώματος}}{\Omega} \frac{\text{ἡμᾶς.}}{O_1}$ (= we must release ourselves from our body)

$\frac{\text{Ēr nora}}{\Omega} \frac{\text{hraman aṙeal.}}{O_1}$ (= “he had received the decree”) (Classical Armenian)

$\frac{\text{Teidän on saatava}}{\Omega} \frac{\text{asia kuntoon.}}{O_1}$ (= you must get the thing settled) (Finnish)

$\text{Πολεμητέον} \frac{\text{τοῖς Πέρσαις}}{O_2} \frac{\text{ἡμᾶς.}}{O_1}$ (= we must go to a war against the Persians)

$\text{Bared kāgada} \frac{\text{Patrikanimda.}}{O_1} \frac{\text{}}{\Omega}$ (= Patrick has written a letter) (Kanarese)

$\text{Sgrìobhadh le Pàdhraic} \frac{\text{an litir.}}{\text{ind:}\Omega} \frac{\text{}}{O_1}$ (= Patrick has written the letter) (Scottish-Gaelic)

$\frac{\text{Bellō}}{O_3}$ $\frac{\text{ūtendum est nōbīs. (= we must use war)}}{O_2}$

$\frac{\text{Ihm}}{O_2}$ wurde von $\frac{\text{seinem Bruder}}{i \text{ indicatum}}$ geholfen.
(ind:Q)

$\frac{\text{Mörgum togaraskipstjórum}}{O_2}$ hefur verið vikið af $\frac{\text{útgerðarfélögnum.}}{i \text{ indicatum}}$
(ind:Q) (Icelandic)

and so on and so forth. All sorts of combinations are imaginable.

The Kanarese, the Scottish-Gaelic, and the Icelandic examples are especially important for our analysis of human language. Kanarese, Scottish-Gaelic, and Icelandic belong to those languages in which all three transversal relations, Q, R, and S, are used (or *may* be used) as the syntactic investment of one and the same semantic theme. This means that our three sentences from Kanarese, Scottish-Gaelic, and modern Icelandic, all three Q-relations, may be turned into corresponding R- and S-relations. If we do this with our Icelandic sentence we get:

R: $\frac{\text{Margir togaraskipstjórar}}{O_1}$ hafa verið reknir af $\frac{\text{útgerðarfélögnum.}}{i \text{ indicatum}}$
(= “many trawler captains have been fired by the shipping companies”)

S: $\frac{\text{Útgerðarfélögin}}{O_1}$ hafa vikið $\frac{\text{mörgum togaraskipstjórum.}}{O_2}$
(= “the shipping companies have fired many trawler captains”).

Two important things are obvious if we look at these sentences. Firstly, it is evident that the sentence *II* has an internalized [π] (= O_1). This is the reason why all Icelanders prefer the operative verb *reknir* in the R-relation. Secondly, it is clear to the observer that one and only one of the epistases of the Q-relation, to wit the epistasis 1, turns into the stasis of the R-relation and into the epistasis of the S-relation. This element in a Q-relation we shall call its *scopos* (or its ‘objective’). The *scopos* of a Q-relation = the *stasis* of the corresponding R-relation = the *epistasis* of the corresponding S-relation; we shall call it the *basis* of a given semantic TR theme.

Further examples of Q-relations:

$\frac{\text{Məyŋ ne əwrət ko}}{\text{ind:Q}}$ dekha. (= I saw the woman) (Urdu)

Kono samaye $\frac{\text{ek nekeṛe-bāgh-ke}}{O_1/O_2}$ $\frac{\text{kukure}}{Q}$ kāmāṛāiyāchila.
(= once a dog had bitten a hyena) (Bengali)

Kyā tum ne in laṛkioṅ ko nahīṅ dekhā hai?

ind:Q ind:O₁

(= haven't you seen these girls?)

(Hindustani)

If only the basis of a Q-relation is expressed and the second epistasis is subdued we get the following sort of construction:

Ihm wurde geholfen.

Ihm wurde gehorcht.

If the second epistasis is retained we get sentences like this:

Ihm wurde von *seinem Bruder* geholfen.

This German Q-relation cannot be turned into a German R-relation. The reason for this is that the scopos is a π . In Dutch it has got a perfect R-counterpart:

Hij werd door *zijn broer* geholpen.

Many languages, including English and Danish, have corresponding R-investments of this semantic theme:

He was helped by his brother.

Han blev hjulpet af sin broder.

In German the Q-relation *ihm wurde von seinem Bruder geholfen* can only be matched by a corresponding S-relation:

Sein Bruder hat ihm geholfen.

If both the scopos and the other epistasis in a German Q-relation are suppressed we get the following sentence structures:

Da ward scharf gekämpft.

Hier wird gegessen.

Hier wird gehorcht.

Von diesem Apfel ist abgebissen worden.

In other instances we may see the following syntactic representations:

Es wird *der Verstorbenen* gedacht.

Es wird *den Gastgebern* gedankt.

These German constructions leave you aghast, as the explorer must have been who was the first European to see the sources of the Nile. The role played by the 'impersonal *es*' in these sentences is astonishing and seems to explain the important function of this syntactic element, an enigma that for centuries has been pendulating between the practitioners of rationalistic structuralism and the believers in ethereal metaphysics. The *es* initiating our last two constructions is obviously an externalized

π . Any verb containing an internalized π is entitled to externalize it if convenient. The *es* is obviously externalized in Q-relations which contain an excuse for a scopos in the form of an O_2 or an Ω . It is externalized in its capacity of an O_1 immanent in the II of a Q-relation. It is utilized as such in a Q-relation. Its syntactic surroundings automatically switch it into the subject of an RQ-relation – the nearest alternative to the missing R-relation!

An even more convincing example is this one:

Es wurde in zitternder Angst *sich* verkrochen.

In this construction the scopos of the Q-relation is the tight reflexive element *sich*. No other scopos is imaginable as the O_1 of the verb in this sentence. The O_1 *sich*, being a tight reflexive identifier, cannot by any means be turned into the stasis of a corresponding R-relation. The S-relation of our semantic theme uses *man* for a subject:

Man verkroch *sich* in zitternder Angst.

This *man* is not expressed in the Q-relation where its role would be that of the second epistasis.

By externalizing the π *es* of the Q-relation and utilizing it as a subject you achieve two things: firstly, you get a QR-relation in compensation for the missing R-relation. Secondly, you obtain a completely neutral subject identifier *es* of the TR-RQ to match the corresponding element *man* of the TR-S. The ‘impersonal *es*’ discloses its own nature in this sort of construction: the ‘impersonal *es*’ (such as the impersonal *it*) may be explained as the externalized $[\pi] \rightarrow O_1$ in a TR-Q \rightarrow S (stasis) in TR-RQ and other transversal relations which lack a subject.

Darüber lacht *sich*’s am besten.

Es wird *sich* ausgeruht.

Es gibt *keinen Whisky*.

Dazu braucht es noch viel Zeit.

Es bleibt noch vieles zu lösen übrig.

S

S

The fact that the ‘impersonal German ‘*es*’ is really nothing but the externalized π of the sentence II , is most convincingly demonstrated by the confrontation of a couple of extremely simple TR pairs. If we consider the sentence:

Man singt ein Lied. (or: Man singt *es*.)


nobody will deny that the R counterpart of this S-relation is:

Ein Lied wird gesungen. (or: *Es* wird gesungen.)

Now, if we internalize the II of the S-relation we get:

Man singt. (the basis of the TR is now the internalized π).

The graphical representation of this sentence is the following diagram:



In the corresponding R-relation the basis (π) is externalized and it turns into the stasis, according to the rules outlined above:

Es wird gesungen. (= "people sing", "somebody is singing").
 (the element *man* disappears, as it is inexpressible in the form of an Ω).
 (This operation is valid for all *obtuse* transversal relations, cf. pp. 108–110).

The externalized π is only utilized to *open* a reflexive construction of the kind we have just discussed:

Es wird *sich* beklagt.
 Es wird *sich* abgeknutscht.
 Es wurde *sich* angemotzt.

but:

Vergriffen wird *sich* immer an den Kleinsten. (TR-Q·)
 In diesem Geschäft wird *sich* nie geirrt. (TR-Q·)

In these two Q-relations the second epistasis is not expressed. We have indicated this with a dot after the notation TR-Q. If both epistases of a Q-relation are unexpressed we get the following type of construction:

Da ward scharf gekämpft. (TR-Q··)
 Hier wird gegessen. (TR-Q··)
 Nun wird getrunken. (TR-Q··)
 Im Haus nebenan wurde öfters geboren und gestorben. (TR-Q··)

And with an externalized π at the beginning of the sentence:

Es wurde scharf gekämpft. (TR-RQ··)
 Es wird gegessen. (TR-TQ··)
 Es wird getrunken. (TR-TQ··)

If the *es* in the last two constructions refers to something concrete (such as for instance pork and vodka) the two sentences are TR-R·-constructions, of course. This is an example of the precise way in which we should be able to analyse human sentences both semantically and syntactically.

The externalized German *es* extends to non-transitive constructions, too. Let us look at a very interesting example:

Es regnet. = Turkish: Yağmur yağıyor.
 (= rain rains).

In both examples, the German one and the Turkish one, the externalized π is the subject. (Or are they the O_1 (the scopos) of a TR-Q?)

Our reflections concerning the externalized π of a Q-relation utilized as a stasis in other sentence types needing a subject give us a completely new means of analysing human propositions which are characterized by the use of this element.

This again leads us to another interesting confrontation of sentences:

Nun ist <i>es</i> abgeschlossen (worden).	(German)
= Now <i>it</i> is finished.	(English)
= Nú er <i>því</i> lokið.	(Icelandic)

These three sentences from three different languages may have exactly the same meaning. The English and the German sentences are TR-R $\cdot\cdot$ -relations (with an unexpressed epistasis). The Icelandic translation of these sentences is a TR-Q $\cdot\cdot$ -relation (with an unexpressed 2nd epistasis): *því* is the dative of *það* because the verb *loka* 'governs' the dative! In the Icelandic sentence *því* is the diastasis of the Q-relation.

Passive paradigms in traditional grammars turn out to be *nude* R-relations:

amor	(TR-R $\cdot\cdot$)
amāris	(TR-R $\cdot\cdot$)
amātur	(TR-R $\cdot\cdot$)
amāmur	(TR-R $\cdot\cdot$)
amāmini	(TR-R $\cdot\cdot$)
amantur	(TR-R $\cdot\cdot$)

Corresponding active paradigms are nude TR-S:

amō	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)	capiō	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)
amās	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)	capis	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)
amat	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)	capit	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)
amāmus	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)	capimus	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)
amātis	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)	capitis	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)
amant	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)	capiant	(TR-S $\cdot\cdot$)

Or they are – whether passive or active – transversal *semirelations*:

<i>jeg</i> elsker = <i>ich</i> werde geliebt	= <i>I</i> am loved	(TR-R \cdot)
<i>du</i> elsker = <i>du</i> wirst geliebt	= <i>you</i> are loved	(TR-T \cdot)
<i>han</i> elsker = <i>er</i> wird geliebt	= <i>he</i> is loved	(TR-R \cdot)
<i>vi</i> elsker = <i>wir</i> werden geliebt	= <i>we</i> are loved	(TR-R \cdot)
<i>I</i> elsker = <i>ihr</i> werdet geliebt	= <i>you</i> are loved	(TR-R \cdot)
<i>de</i> elsker = <i>sie</i> werden geliebt	= <i>they</i> are loved	(TR-R \cdot)
<i>jeg</i> elsker = <i>ich</i> liebe	= <i>I</i> love	(TR-S \cdot)
<i>du</i> elsker = <i>du</i> liebster	= <i>you</i> love	(TR-S \cdot)
<i>han</i> elsker = <i>er</i> liebt	= <i>he</i> loves	(TR-S \cdot)

<i>vi</i> elsker	=	<i>wir</i> lieben	=	<i>we</i> love	(TR-S·)
<i>I</i> elsker	=	<i>ihr</i> liebt	=	<i>you</i> love	(TR-S·)
<i>de</i> elsker	=	<i>sie</i> lieben	=	<i>they</i> love	(TR-S·)

Our paradigms may be characterized as *unsatiated* transversal relations. As we have seen above, Q-relations, too, are often unsatiated (only the scopos is expressed):

ihm wird geholfen

In some languages Q-relations are always unsatiated (i.e. semi-relations):

Avattiin $\frac{\text{ikkuna.}}{O_1}$ (= "the window was opened") (Finnish)

Vikaa ei keksitty $\frac{\text{heti.}}{\Omega_2:O_1}$ (= "the mistake wasn't discovered at once") (Finnish)

Chonaictheas $\frac{\text{na daoine.}}{O_1}$ (= "the people were seen") (Irish)

Níor hóladh $\frac{\text{é.}}{O_1}$ (= "it was not drunk") (Irish)

Deintear $\frac{\text{bróga}}{O_1}$ de leathar. (= "shoes are made of leather") (Irish)

Otrzymano od podróżnika $\frac{\text{jedną jedyną depeszę.}}{O_1}$
(= "(people) received one single telegram from the explorer") (Polish)

Diastases, apostases, and metastases may be introduced into such constructions:

Zamieniono $\frac{\text{mu}}{O_2} \frac{\text{więzienie}}{O_1}$ na przymusowy pobyt w willi. (Polish)

(= "his imprisonment was changed into a compulsory sojourn in a villa")

Nie wrócono $\frac{\text{mu}}{O_2} \frac{\text{wolności.}}{\Omega}$ (= "freedom wasn't given back to him") (Polish)

W epoce Odrodzenia interesowano $\frac{\text{się}}{O_1} \frac{\text{starożytnymi księgami.}}{O_3}$

(= "in the epoch of the renaissance people took an interest in ancient books")

An indication is used in some languages to represent the scopos:

Wayyuggad le-Ribqah 'et dibre 'Esaw. (Moses I, 27, 42)

i ind

:O₁

(= “and Esau’s words were announced to Rebecca”)

(Hebrew)

Wayyiwalled la-H⁹nokh 'et 'Irada. (Moses I, 4, 18)

i ind

:O₁

(= “and Irad was born to Henokh”)

(Hebrew)

This indicated scopos is matched in transversal S-relations by ind(ication) for (:)
epistasis:

B⁹-re'šit bara' 'elohim 'et ha-ššamayyim w⁹-'et ha-'areš. (Moses I, 1)

S i ind i ind

:O₁

:O₁

(= “in the beginning God created Heaven and Earth”)

Such indicated representations of the epistasis in an S-(or Q-)relation are used
in several languages:

Nora bereal ē zna. (= “he carried him along”) (Classical Armenian)

Ω repr:O₁

Profesorul întreabă pe studenți. (= “the teacher asks the students”)

S i ind

(Rumanian)

:O₁

Cesar venció a Pompeyo. (= “Caesar defeated Pompey”)

(Spanish)

S i ind

:O₁

El adjetivo califica al substantivo. (= “the adjective qualifies
the noun”)

(Spanish)

S i ind

:O₁

Si Patrick naka sulat sang sulat. (= “Patrick has written a
letter”)

(Ilongo)*

S i ind

:O₁

Paturiku ga tegami o kaite imasu. (= “Patrick is writing
a letter”)

(Japanese)

ind i ind i

:S

:O₁

* A lot of interesting information on human language is given by this sentence from Ilongo (spoken on the island of Negros in the Philippines). The initial particle *si* is a marker of determinations from the zone of persons. It occurs in stasis position. *naka* denotes ‘past / transversal S-relation’ and stands in front of the verb. The indicator *sa + ang > sang*, *ang* being the marker of determinations of the zone of species.

I bambini si sono dimenticati di quella sera.
 S O₁ i ind
 (= "the children have forgotten that evening") (Italian)

He is always boasting of his own strength.
 S i ind

Il s'est débarrassé de son adversaire.
 S O₁ i ind

Faites-moi grâce de vos observations!
 (S) i ind

Sipatani na mtu huyu.
 i ind
 (= "I don't get on with this man") (Swahili)

Han forskånede mig for denne forsmædelse
 S i ind
 (= "he spared me this ignominy") (Danish)

Han mosler enormt med sine lektier. (= "he is working really
 S i ind hard at the books") (Danish)

The epistasis of an R-relation is represented by an indication in an enormous number of languages. Each language has one specific Q indication, or two at the most:

He was strangled by his wife.
 S i ind

Tá Maighréad ag féachaint ar na fearaibh.
 i ind
 (= "Margaret is looking at the men") (Irish)

Il fut tué par les allemands.
 S i ind

Ang sulat guin sulat ni Patrick. (= "the letter was written by
 S i ind Patrick") (Ilongo)

Lo svedese venne svegliato dal frastuono della strada.
 S i ind
 (= "the Swede was wakened by the noise from the street") (Italian)

Los discípulos aplicados son alabados por el profesor.
 S i ind
 (= "the diligent students are praised by the professor") (Spanish)

Er wird von seiner Mutter verhätschelt.
S i ind

Oi νεανίσκοι ὑπὸ διδασκάλων παιδεύονται. (= the young men are
S i ind educated by teachers)

Książka została sprzedana przez księgarza.
S i ind

(= "the book was sold by the bookseller")

(Polish)

Litterae ā servō scriptae sunt.
S i ind

This use is extremely common in human languages: the epistasis of an R-relation is represented by an indication. For this purpose each language employing the procedure in question utilizes one (rarely two) indicators which are assigned the role of a fixed TR-R epistasis marker. (Other languages use TR-R epistasis cases, cf. Russian: *Здоровыми матерями дети рождаются легче, чем больными* (instrumental) (= "children are born more easily by healthy mothers than by sick ones"), Sanskrit: *Tena kathānakam prārabdham* (= "a story was begun by him") (instrumental again) etc. This is obviously one of the basic functions of the instrumental case: to express the epistasis of a transversal R-relation).

The result of all this is that we get the following set of syntactical tools to express or to underline the grammatical functions of those nominal elements which are most closely related to the sentence II:

nominative as expressive of the stasis
 ergative as expressive of the epistasis 2 in a TR-Q
 instrumental (if any) as expressive of a TR-R epistasis (and TR-Q epistasis 2)
 accusative (if any) as expressive of the epistasis in a TR-S
 dative (if any) as expressive of the diastasis
 genitive (if any) as expressive of the metastasis
 ablative (if any) as expressive of the apostasis

These are the basic roles of the cases concerned here. Some promiscuity seems to arise in many languages. This is due to the fact that the grammatical meanings of genitives and datives often collide or even overlap, as is evidently the case with the ablative and the instrumental. If one of the cases dies out in a language one of the others will normally take over its role. This is the case in Latin, for instance, where the ablative (or even the dative) has taken over the role of the instrumental. In Greek the dative has taken over the role of the ablative and the instrumental (to different extents) and so on. From a universal point of view both stasis, epistasis, diastasis, metastasis, and apostasis may be represented by a functional marker (i.e. an indicator). This is especially characteristic of the apostasis whose housekeeper,

the ablative, is extremely negligent and unstable. A lot of other cases may replace it¹ (cf. page 85, footnote), and innumerable are the indicated constructions which take over its duties. The apostasis is expressive of *transaction* just as the dative is expressive of *contingence* and the genitive of *integration* (cf. p. 89 ff.). To illustrate this, let us look at some indicated constructions in different languages:

Jeg har besluttet mig for en dametaske. (Danish)
 S O₁ i ind

Věřím v Boha. (= "I believe in God") (Czech)
 (S) i ind

Skipzt var á smájólagjöfum. (Icelandic)
 i ind
 (= "small Christmas gifts were exchanged")

He is suffering from a hopeless disease.
 S i ind

Ich bin von seiner Unschuld überzeugt worden.
 S i ind

On l'a chargé de cette tâche de haute confiance.
 S O₁ i ind

He has forgotten about it.
 S i ind

Er bat ihn (darum) zu gehen.
 S O₁ O₃ (ind)

Er forderte ihn (dazu) auf, zu gehen.
 S O₁ i ind
 (O₃)

Sa'ima l-wafdu l-miṣriyyu mina l-ḥawādithi l-'akhīrati.
 S i ind
 (= "the Egyptian delegation was disgusted *with* the last event") (Arabic)

¹ Some languages tend to use special case forms to express an apostasis, e.g. Finnish: *Mistä puhutte?* (= "what are you talking about?"): the elative case. Saanko kysyä *Teiltä erästä asiasta?* (= "may I ask you something?"): ablative and elative. Ihmiset kutsuivat häntä "*professoriksi*" (= "people called him the "professor"): translative. Pidin häntä *hauskana seuraimisenä* (= I considered him a fine man in society): essive. (cf. Sanskrit: *virama karmaṇo 'smāt* (= "desist from this action"): ablative; *brāhmaṇeṣu dattam* (= "it has been given to brahmins"): locative; *śarīrena viyuḥyate* (= "he releases himself from the body"): instrumental. Russian: Я часто страдаю *годовыми болями* (= "I often suffer from headaches"): instrumental, and so on.

Yu'minu l-muslimu bi-llahi wa-yaumi l-qiyāmati.
 S i ind

(= “the Muslim believes *in* God and the day of
 Resurrection”)

(Arabic)

Militēs Rōmāni Britannōs ab hostibus dēfendēbant.
 S O₁ i ind

Oī Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τοὺς Κορινθίους σπονδὰς ποιοῦνται.
 S i ind O₂

Ws ne hynduoṅ əwr mwsəlmanoṅ donoṅ pər ylzam ləgaya.
 ind:Q ind i

(= “he blamed both Hindus and Mohammedans”)

(Urdu)

Han undså sig ikke for en spydig bemærkning.
 S O₁ i ind

(Danish)

He is waiting on the next table.
 S i ind

Pambanua baina ya vitu vifaavyo kwa mbolea na vitu visivyofaa!
 i ind ind

(= “distinguish between things which are useful for manure
 and things which are not”)

(Swahili)

He is waiting for his girlfriend.
 S i ind

Düşman ile kim mücadele ettik. (= we fought (against) the enemy”) (Turkish)
 ind i

Senin ile kim görüştü? (= “who has talked to (with) you?”) (Turkish)
 ind i S

Hann vildi ná í hann. (= “he wanted to get hold of him”) (Icelandic)
 i ind

Nú búazt þau til brúðkaups.
 i ind

(= “now they prepare for marriage”)

(Old Norse)

Pādes^hāhī bā glohāmī dar kashtī neshast.
 i ind

(= “a king embarked in a ship with a slave”)

(Persian)

Si shkojnë nxënësit mi mësimet?

i ind

(= “how do the pupils get on with their lessons?”)

(Albanian)

Senātor nōn sē abstinet (ab) iniūriā.

S O₁ (i) (ind) (O₃)

Senātor nōn dēsistit (dē)/(ā) sentiā.

S (i) (ind) (O₃)

All these constructions are expressive of *transactions*. Not all of them are ablative transactions, some of them are. The two last examples from Latin show us how ablative O₃-constructions tend towards indicated constructions. Some transactions are O₃-transactions, others are indicated transactions. In some languages, like Finnish, Hungarian, and Tabassarian, most transactions are expressed by the way of specific cases. Latin, for instance, knows only one case of transaction: the ablative case. Sanskrit has three: ablative, instrumental, and, in some instances, locative. English, German, Danish, Italian, French, Portuguese, and Dutch, and many, many others, know only of corresponding indicated expressions of transaction, as illustrated by the above sentence material. Such constructions we shall call *suspended transversal relations*. The indicated elements in our different sentences are as fV-related as their O₃-counterparts, but syntactically the indicatum has been cut off from the fV by the indicator. The transversal relation is “broken”, its value as transversal relation has been suspended. A *suspension* appears on the syntactic level when a transaction is indicated, as is the case in very many languages (cf. English, German, Danish, French, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Chinese, Malay, and many many others).

A transaction is any apostasis of a given $\Pi (= \left[\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{A} \\ \text{'do'} \end{array} + \pi \right] = [V + \pi])$. It may

be materialized in the form of a special O₃-case or in the form of a suspension. (Many languages, such as Finnish, Hungarian, Tabassarian, Basque, Hurqili, Lakh. and so forth have several cases of transaction or O₃-cases).

A suspension is, as shown above, an indicated transaction.

Any indication representing a stasis or an epistasis we shall simply call a *re-presentation*:

1) in S-relations:

Watashi wa sashimi o tabenai. (= “I don’t eat raw fish”)

(Japanese)

repr: S repr: O₁

2) in R-relations:

Ano hito wa dare ni demo homerarete orimasu.

repr: s repr: Q


(= “that man is praised by everyone”)

(Japanese)

3) in Q-relations:

Ws ne kytaboŋ ko pəṛha. (= "he read the books") (Urdu)
repr: Ω repr: O_1

A diastasis indication and a metastasis indication we shall call *expanding transactions*, according to the following diagram:



Let us consider a German sentence such as:

Er erinnert sich an seine Kindheit.
S O_1 i ind

This sentence may be compensated by:

Er erinnert sich seiner Kindheit.

which shows that *an seine Kindheit* in the first example is the special sort of indication which we call an expanding transaction. In the corresponding French sentence

Il se souvient de son enfance.
S O_1 i ind

de son enfance is a transaction (a so-called expanding transaction) as compared to its German counterpart:

Er erinnert sich seiner Kindheit.
S O_1 Ω

and a *transactional* indication as compared to:

Il se rappelle son enfance.
S O_2 O_1

and:

Han mindes sin barndom.
S O_1

The field in our diagram above which arises from the overlapping of ind: diastasis and ind: metastasis indicates a semasiosyntactic *domain of coherence* (or *interference*). The *field of coherence* comprises, in full, all linguistic categories of contingency and integration (diastasis/metastasis, denotation/annotation, inherence/adherence, ‘dative’/‘genitive’). In a lot of languages the dative functions for the genitive, and vice versa:

$$\frac{\text{Äiti}}{\text{S}} \text{ antoi } \frac{\text{lapsien}}{\Omega:O_2} \text{ leikkiä. (= "the mother let the children play")}$$
(Finnish)


Finnish has 15 cases – but no dative. Its cousin Hungarian has 24 cases, – but no genitive. Instead of the genitive it uses the dative:

Azoknak a tanulóknak a könyvei érdekelnek a magyarokat. (Hungarian)
 (= “these students’ books interest the Hungarians”)

Dem Vater sein Haus liegt ausserhalb der Stadt. (Austrian dialect)
 La maison est à lui. = The house is his.

The genitive and the dative are *convergent* cases. The chapter on the genitive and the dative has not yet been written. It is a fascinating problem which we cannot examine here lest this book is to exceed the boundaries of our imagination.

In this connection, however, we feel induced to give a short summary of the categories entering into this intricate semasiosyntactic subject:



Examples:

I. 1. METASTASIS:

Er erinnert sich *des Geschehens*.

(—————→ diastasis: Dehi valkalaṃ *mama!* (= “give me a bast robe!”)
(Sanskrit)

—————| apostasis: Bibhīmas *tava*. (= “we are afraid of thee”) (Sanskrit)
Jis vyresnis *brolio*.¹ (Lithuanian)

—————→ epistasis in an R-relation: Bhartā *tava* neyaḥ. (= “your spouse
must be taken away by you”) (Sanskrit)
Viskas buvo *jū pačią* daroma. (= “everything was made by them
themselves”) (Lithuanian)

—————÷/r→ epistasis in an S-relation (—————| partitive): Pelėda neišperi
vanagėlio raibojo. (= “the owl doesn’t hatch a grey-flecked hawk”)
(Lithuanian)

На улицах ни души не встретишь.

(= “in the streets you won’t meet a soul”)

Он не сделал *сочинения*.

(= “he hasn’t written his composition”) (Russian)

—————→ epistasis: *Kieno* čia buta? – Čia *Jono* buta. (= “who has been
here?” – “John has been here”) (actually: “by whom here having-
been been?” – “here by John having-been been”) (Lithuanian)
Здесь *никого* нет. (= “there is nobody here”) (Russian)
(existential epistasis) (cf. p. 113)

Jo esama gero žmogaus. (= “his being good man’s”, or: “by him
being-been by-good-man” а: “he is a good man”) (cf. p. 105, note).

Any genitive which trespasses into the domain of the stasis domain seems to change into a partitive. Unless, of course, it is the relic of an inherential construction (cf. Danish: *Petersens har været her* (= “the Petersen family has been here”).

¹ In the following we shall describe the extensions of the genitive and the dative by using the symbols —————→ (= “overlapping”/“functions as”), —————| (= “having affinity to”) and —————→→ (“changes into”). The semantic zones referred to are the ones previously used as a model for the constitutional analysis of human language (cf. Niels Danielsen: “Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderswo”, in: *Språkliga Bidrag*, vol. 6 n:r 27, Lund 1972 (pp. 107–112) and in: *Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung*, Heft 28/1 ’75, Berlin 1975. (The notation ÷/r denotes “logically negative” and “linguistically recusative” as opposed to +/p which denotes “logically positive” and “linguistically propositive”).

According to the greatest Lithuanianist of our time, Alfred Senn, the construction with a genitive after a comparative (jis vyresnis brolio = “he is older than his brother”) should be considered as incorrect in our days (cf. A. Senn: *Litauische Sprachlehre*, Heidelberg 1929 (lesson 15, § 9b)). Incorrect forms are always especially interesting because they may turn into what some call the norm in the future, and because they are often expressive of highly interesting manifestations of linguistic evolution. (Compare the situation in Russian and Greek, for example. Russian: Она моложе *меня*. (= “she is younger than me”). Greek: *Ἄσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι*. (= “it is worse to do injustice than to suffer injustice”).

—————→→ partitive epistasis in an S-relation:

Aš turiu *naujų* ir *senų* *knygų*. (= “I have got new and old books”)
(Lithuanian)

Daj mnie *chleba!* (= “give me (some) bread”) (as opposed to:

Daj mnie chleb! (= “give me the bread *or* a loaf of bread!”))

(Polish)

—————→ stasis —————→→ partitive:

Garliavos miestelyje gyvena ir *žydų* ir *lietuvių* ir *vokiečių*.

(= “in the village of G. live both Jews and Lithuanians and Germans”)

(I. 2.) The formula $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Aputrasya gṛhaṃ śūnyam=} \\ \text{=} \end{array} \right.$ $\left. \begin{array}{l} 1) \text{ Dem Kinderlosen ist das Haus leer} \\ \text{(cf. ich wasche mir die Hände).} \\ 2) \text{ Das Haus des Kinderlosen ist leer} \\ \text{(cf. ich wasche meine Hände).} \end{array} \right]$

leads to II. 2 (see below).

2. INHERENCE:

Dostum^u e^şyas^t iki sandık ve bir şemsiyeden ibarettir. (= “my friend’s luggage consists of two small suitcases and an umbrella”) (Turkish)

(The inherential element in this sentence is *dostum* (“friend”) which implies the use of its syndiotic possessive suffix (in this case *-st*) with the determination of the possessum).

Her camininⁱ minaresi vardır. (= [every mosque’s minaret-its is-there] ∩: “all mosques have a minaret”) (Turkish)

Petro labai gera atmintis. (= “Peter has a very good memory”) (Lithuanian)

Nṛpasya senā jitāḥ. (= “the army of the prince has been conquered”)

(“subjective genitive”) (Sanskrit)

Kanyāyāḥ śokaḥ hātavyaḥ. (= “grief for a girl must be avoided”)

(“objective genitive”) (Sanskrit)

Das Haus *des reichen Kommunisten* ist wieder neu eingerichtet worden.

Yakūnu daw’u š-šamsi šadīdun ba’ida z-zuhri. (= “the heat of the sun is strong after noon”) (Classical Arabic)

—————→ “status constructus” (juxtaposition)

Apa nama *hotèl saudara?* (= “what is the name of your hotel?”) (Indonesian)

Yakūn daw’u š-šams šadīd ba’ida z-zuhr. (Colloquial Arabic)

cf. Welsh: Y mae het gan *dad y bachgen* (= “there is a hat with the the boy’s father” : “the boy’s father has a hat”)

Y mae Cymru yn *wlad beirdd*. (= “Wales is a country of poets”)

cf. Türk bayrağı nasıldır? (= “what colour is the flag of Turks?”) (Turkish)

(in the Turkish juxtaposition the syndiotic possessive suffix is withheld with the possessum)

cf. *Kārūn nām-è-rūdkhāné ist.* (= “K. is the name of a river”) (ezāfa construction) (Persian)

Kieno troba yra kaime? (= “whose house is in the village?”) (Lithuanian).

Kieno šitos knygeles su paveikslėliais? – Šitos knygeles yra mano broliuko ir sesutes. (= “whose is this booklet with the cute little pictures?” – “This small book is my (sweet little) brother’s and (my sweet little) sister’s”) (Lithuanian).

(As demonstrated by this example, the **A** KIENO is requesting for members of both predicative and non-predicative zones. It is no wonder, therefore, that inherential elements are used both attributively and predicatively:

———→——— attributes (zones of designation and quality):

Šiandien yra *melų* diena. (= “today is lies’ day”: “today is the day of lies” (the 1st of April)) (Lithuanian)

Gramatika yra *kalbos* mokslas, teologija yra *Dievo* mokslas. (= “grammar is the science of language, theology is the science of God”) (Lithuanian)

Mano *mokslo* draugas yra *mokslo* vyras. (= “my fellow student is a learned man”) (Lithuanian)

D’fhágadar bosca *adhmaid* ar an urlár. (= “they left a wooden box on the floor”) (Irish)

Me vçer *okros* kálmít. (= “I write with a golden pen”) (Georgian)

———→——— predicatives (zone of predicatives):

Jonas *mažos sveikatos*. (= “John is feeble”, or “John has poor health”) (Lithuanian)

Petra *geros galvos*. (= “Peter is quick-headed”: “Peter has a quick brain”) (Lithuanian)

Ji *geros širdies*. (= “she is good-hearted”, “she has a good heart”)

Jis *geros ausies*. (= “he has a good ear (for music)”) (Lithuanian)

The partitive genitive shows affinity with the inherential constructions of possession:

———→→——— partition: partitive (the partitive zone):

Ten buvo *aukso, sidabro* ir *kitų daiktų* daugybė. (= “there was gold’s, silver’s and other things’ multitude” ३: “there was much gold, silver and many other things there”) (Lithuanian)

Medineje knygyne lentynoje yra daugybė *gerų knygų*. (= “in the wooden book-case there are many good books”).

dūram pathaḥ = a long stretch of the road (Sanskrit)

Kiek tu turi *knygų*? (= “how many books do you have?”)
(Lithuanian)

— ÷/τ → adverb of time (zone of duration, zone of frequency, zone of times).

Aš čia nē *vienos dienos* nebūčiau. (= “I wouldn’t stay here one day”) (Lithuanian).

Jis nē *sykio* nesuklupo. (= “he didn’t stumble one single time”) (Lithuanian).

Nē *dviejų dienų* nedirbau. (= “I do not even work for two days”) (Lithuanian).

————— → zone of direction:

Nagarasya mārgaḥ paruṣaḥ. (= “the road to the city is uneven”) (Sanskrit)

————— → other adverbial elements (zone of mode, zone of time, zone of place, etc.).

Er liebte es, *des Abends* lange zu arbeiten.

Eine Familie dieses Namens ist *hiesigen Ortes* nicht ansässig.

Er kommt *des öfteren* hier.

Unverrichteter Dinge ging er *seines Weges*.

3. DENOTATION (INNOTATION):

La mère *de la jeune femme* est anglaise.

Der Wein *von diesem Gebiet* ist ausserordentlich süß.

De inwoners *van deze stad* zijn erg gezellig. (Dutch)

Quem tem o livro *de Maria*? (Portuguese)

What’s *the name of your brother’s dog*?

Hovedstaden *i Frankrig* hedder Paris. (= “the capital of France is called Paris”) (Danish)

(—————| inessive: *Pöydässä* on neljä jalkaa. (= “the table has four legs”) (Finnish).

CONTENSION: *Ma‘ak felūs*? (= “have you got any money with (= on) you?”)
(Colloquial Arabic).

Radu este frate *cu Ana*. (= “R. is Ana’s brother”) (Rumanian)

II. 1. DIASTASIS:

Er gab *dem Jungen* ein Buch. | *Tvayā prahṛṣṭayā bhāvyam*. (= “you must be in a good mood”) (Sanskrit)

————— → epistasis 2: *Bellō ütendum est nōbīs*.

—————| apostasis:

Μακάριοι οί πτωχοί τῷ πνεύματι.

(= “blessed are the poor in spirit”).

- | inherence:
 Nèra *man* motinelès. (= not-is for-me mother ə: “I have no mother”) (Lithuanian)
- zone of purpose:
Phalebhyo gacchati. (= “he goes out for some fruit”) (Sanskrit).
 Laghūnām api saṃśrayo *rakṣāyai* bhavati. (= “the connection with weak people redounds to protection”) (Sanskrit)
- zone of direction (+ purpose):
Vanāya pratiṣṭhati. (= “he set out for the forest”) (Sanskrit)
- zone of place:
Khayakhamidšin šad mard gar havakhovadz. (= “in the centre of the city many people were gathered”) (Armenian)
- zone of time:
 žamA hinkin. (= at five o'clock) (Armenian)
- zone of measure:
miyevnoyn darikhi badaninèr. (= young people of the same age) (Armenian)
- zone of cause:
Sasdig vaχoum šəphothetsav. (= “because of great fear he was confused”) (Armenian)
- zone of price:
 Kravadžarrə hink hadorA *yerèsoun markhov* dzaχèts. (= “the librarian sold the five volumes for 30 marks”) (Armenian)

2. ADHERENCE:

- Kinek* van csomagja? (= “to-whom (“whose”) is his (:the) packet?”) (Hungarian)
- Me најде брат *ми*. (= “my brother found me”) (Macedonian)
- Большим нечистым пальцем он щекотал *мальчику* шею.
 (= with his big dirty finger he tickled the boy's neck)
- Тогда он положил тяжёлую голову на плечо *женщине*.
 (= then he put his heavy head on the woman's shoulder)
- Es nolauzu *tēvam* cirvi. (= “I broke father's axe”). (Lettish)
- Nagyapámnak* születési helye Miskolc. (= “my grandfather's birthplace is Miskolc”) (Hungarian)
- Dem Vater sein* Motorrad ist gestohlen worden. (= “Father's motor-bike has been stolen”) (Austria).
- Dem Heng säi* Papp as vum Lämmes gebass. (= “Henry's father is crazy”) (Luxemburgish)
- Hann hvatti til toppfundar beggja aðila um leiðir til lausnar *fiskveiðideilunni*. (Icelandic)

Er ist *ihm* auf den Fersen.
Ihm zur Seite standen Rick und Ruck.

3. ANNOTATION:

Hadhā l-baytu l-ġamilu *li-r-raġuli l-kaṣlāni*. (= “that is the lazy man’s beautiful house”) (Arabic)

Se *le* murió el hijo *a Domingo*. (= “Domingo’s son died”) (Spanish)

La maison est *à lui*. (French)

‘*Andak* felūs? (= “have you got any money?”) (Arabic)

Приятелят *на Никола* е лекар. (= “Nikola’s friend is a doctor”) (Bulgarian)

Jeg kender ikke navnet *på fyren*.

Nan var lige i hælene *på forbryderen*.

Mere pas ek mākam hāy. (= “at me there is a house”) (Urdu)

Один раз *у него* улетел рой. (= “once his swarm flew away”)

Кто-то чиркнул спичкой за спиной *у Маши*. (= “someone struck a match behind M.’s back”)

Земля всё время меняется *у вас* под крылом. (= “the land under your wings is constantly changing”)

Теперь буду всё замечать, запоминать и беречь *у себя* на сердце. (= “I’ll notice everything, remember and treasure everything in my heart”) (Russian)

(—————| adessive: *Minulla* on talo. (= “I have a house”) (Finnish)

—————| allative: *Tämä* on muistomerkki *venälaiselle kirjailijalle Maksim Gorkille* (= “this is the monument of the Russian poet Maxim Gorjkij”) (Finnish)

III. 1. Prostatic diastasis (= hyperstasis):

Es kalebi *ḡeraven* bavšvebistvis *ṭanisamoss*. (= “diese Frauen nähern Kleider Y für die Kinder”)

Is asḡams čais sṭumristvis. (= “er schenkt Y für den Gast Tee ein”)

Me vatbob sačmels mamastvis. (= “ich wärme das Essen Y für den Vater”)

Er schrieb *seinem Vater* einen Brief. (= “he wrote a letter for his father”)

Parsinešiau kelis svarus mėsos *pietums*. (= “I have brought some pounds of meat for the dinner”) (Lithuanian)

Rusų laikais studentai gaudavo teisę grįžti *atostogoms* tiktai į savo gubernija. (= “during the Russian period the students only acquired the right to return to their own government for the vacations”) (Lithuanian)

2. PROHERENCE:

Vistvis aris es *ḡerili*? (= “for whom is this letter?”) (Georgian)

3. PRONOTATION:

Dette er mindesmærket for den russiske digter Maxim Gorjkij. (Danish)

Плету помаленьку. Вентеря, корзины под колхозную картошку, кошёлки, (= "I do a bit of weaving now and then. Fishpots, baskets for the collective farm, bags, and so on") (Russian)

Ich bin für niemanden zu sprechen.

Our brief analysis of the "genitive" and the "dative" in human language has shown us a couple of extremely interesting things: 1) The semasiosyntactic interrelation between the categories of integration, contingency, and pro-destination stares you in the face. 2) The "genitive" is an enormously expanding case, whereas the "dative" is relatively much less extensive. 3) The dative seems to represent the pro-destination everywhere in a human sentence where the latter plays the role of a function in a transversal relation (only the proherence has its specific form in some languages, cf. Georgian). 4) The relationship between the genitive and the dative is that of a metastasis/diastasis contension, whereas the relationship between the dative and the genitive is that of a diastasis → inherence contension.

After this digression we shall return to our transversal relations.

Our latest reflections on cases and representations of cases, on cases as functions of transversal relations and the role they play as establishers of transactions, as well as of integration and contingency, will allow us to confront and analyse human sentences in a new way, that is: according to semasio-syntactic criteria which tell us fundamental (because universal) things about the most subtle tool of human entelechy, the language spoken not by machines, but by man, and man alone.

Let us confront six different expressions of one and the same semantic theme and look a little more closely at the inter-relationship.

Er lachte seiner.	(German)
Hän nauroi häntä.	(Finnish)
He laughed at him.	(English)
Il rit de lui.	(French)
Er lachte ihn aus.	(German)
Ő nevetett rajta.	(Hungarian)

The German sentence *er lachte seiner* is a transversal relation of the following structure:



Our Finnish counterpart *hän nauroi häntä* is a plain transversal S-relation with the epistasis in the more-than-functional case of disposition, i.e. the partitive (the un-case among cases because of its semantic rather than functional value):

In Hungarian we shall have to use a construction with a pure transaction case (the superessive): *ő nevetett rajta* (= "he laughed upon (= at) him"). The Hungarian sentence is an apostasis construction. The case used in the apostasis, the so-called superessive, is expressive of adhesion (cf. the annotation in the corresponding English sentence). This new way of handling sentences shows us that many completely different syntactic realizations of one and the same semantic theme are far more closely related to each other than traditional grammar (including generative transformationalism) has ever been capable of showing.¹

Let us start anew with the basic sentence we used as our starting-point at the commencement of our reflections on the nature of human sentences:

Patrick has written a letter.

It is a good English sentence with all that a teacher of preliminary English grammar could dream of: it has got a subject and a verb split up into two elements equally easy to handle, and it has got a simple object. In other words: it has a stasis (*Patrick*), a nucleus (*has*), an operative verb (*written*), and an epistasis (or an O_1) (*a letter*). It is a plain transversal S-relation built on the *II* [write], a so-called transitive verb (according to traditional grammar a transitive verb is a verb which takes an object).

Now, if you ask Menomini Indians to translate our English sentence, the unanimous answer will be:

Patri·k kesotsá'ts^hekew. (= "Patrick has written a letter").

If you ask the post-master at Neopit, Wisc., though, he will tell you that you may choose a translation with the word *mese·nahikon* (= "(any) written document") as an object:

Patri·k kesotsá'ts^hekew mese·nahikon.

The Menomini Indians have no specific word for letter. The verb *tsa'ts^hekew* in itself implies the idea of writing a letter. The longer construction with an epistasis is considered extremely heavy and clumsy by the native speakers in the woods and in the villages.

¹ The various instances of universal lawfulness which are treated in this connection turn out to be traceable within the same language or language community. An excellent example is the German theme *ich habe meinen Schirm vergessen*:

Ich habe meinen Schirm vergessen. (S-relation with *meinen Schirm* as the epistasis.)

Ich habe auf meinen Schirm vergessen. (suspended S-relation with *meinen Schirm* indicated by *auf* expressing sublative adhesion) (Austria, Bavaria, Baden, Zweibrücken).

Ich habe an meinen Hut vergessen. (suspended S-relation with *meinen Hut* as the indicatum of an annotation) (Jewish (Austria, Fulda, Mainz, Darmstadt)).

Der Mutter darfst du nicht vergessen,

damit du nicht *auf Gott* vergisst. (writes the lyric poet Albert Träger from Augsburg; notice the meta-stasis and sublative indication side by side in connection with the *II vergessen*).

(cf. Paul Kretschmer: *Wortgeographie der hochdeutschen Umgangssprache*, 2nd edition, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen 1969 (p. 7)).

Equally, if you ask a native speaker of, say, Ilongo in the island of Negros (Philippines) to translate our English sentence *Patrick has written a letter*, he will immediately give you one and only one natural solution:

Patrick naka sulat. (= “Patrick has written a letter”).

Only if you beg him will he give you the translation:

Patrick naka sulat sang sulat.

In the last example the π of the *II* has obviously become externalized. The native speakers find this procedure superfluous. The verb *sulat* simply means “to write (a letter)”, and normally nobody would dream of “repeating” the element *sulat*.

Our two examples from Menomini and Ilongo are extremely interesting and tell us something very important about the structure of a human sentence generator and about the impact of this structure on the materialization of human sentences.

The Menomini construction *Patri·k kesotsá'ts'ekew* and the corresponding Ilongo syntagm *Patrick naka sulat* both render the English theme *Patrick has written a letter* in a satisfactory and exhaustive way. The English construction is ‘transitive’, the Menomini and Ilongo constructions are ‘intransitive’, in the traditional meaning of those two terms. The traditional terminology ‘transitive’/‘intransitive’ seems to be rather confusing and turns out to have no universal value if it is not defined in a new and more precise way than the one accepted by our forefathers.

Very few verbs, if any at all, are absolutely intransitive. This does not prevent them from behaving intransitively in a given syntactic situation, or even from being only to a very limited degree susceptible to transitivity. Some languages, like Tibetan,¹ have almost no transitive verbs:

Nas-kho-la-rdun (= “I beat him”).
 $\underbrace{\quad}_{O_1} \quad \underbrace{\quad}_{O_2} \quad \underbrace{\quad}_{fV}$

From a universal point of view, however, every meaningful verb is provided with a certain amount of transitivity. Thus you will see that verbs which are in some languages characterized as intransitive do occasionally (and sometimes very often) take an epistasis (an O_1):

Er geht.

Er geht den sauren Weg in den Knast.

(cf. Sanskrit:

Grāmān nagaraṃ jagāma. (= “he went (has gone) from the village to the town”)

Kanyayor preṣyā śālāṃ jagāma. (= the two girls’ servant has gone to the hall”)

Rājā bhikṣum upāgāt. (= “the king reached the beggar monk”)

¹ Cf. Jäschke: *Tibetan Grammar* (Addenda by A. H. Francke assisted by W. Simon), Berlin/Leipzig 1929 (s. 137).

and Latin:

Rōmam iit.).

Er kommt.

Er kommt mir einen Halben.

Han kommer sukker i kaffen.

Er steht.

Er steht den Sprung sehr schön.

Sie stehen brav ihren Mann.

Even the verbs 'to be' and 'to become' may be used transitively in philosophical treatises and elsewhere:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1) Das Werden wird das Werden.
Das Wesen ist das Sein. | 2) Khahanan $\frac{\text{yegèyètsin e.}}{O_1}$
(= "the priest is in the church") (Armenian)
Այճիգա $\frac{\text{badouhann e.}}{O_1}$
(= "the girl is at the window") (Armenian) |
|---|--|

The two verbs 'to be' and 'to become' are the least transitive verbs of all. Some nuclei are rarely transitive. No possible verb is completely devoid of transitivity as long as it has a meaning. Its own internalized π will always be its potential O_1 .

This turns out to be the case with predicative constructions, as well. From a universal point of view predicative constructions behave like potentially object governing constructions of the type we have hitherto discussed. Some of them always have an object (1), some of them may or may not have an object (2), and some of them normally do not take any object (3):

- 1) Jetzt bin ich ihn los.
 Wie werde ich ihn los? (epistasis)
 Bleibe ich ihn wohl los?
 Ich bin seiner eingedenk. (metastasis)
 Er ist ihm abhold. (diastasis)
 Er ist versessen auf die Witwe.
 Er ist erpicht auf sie. (suspension)
- 2) Jetzt bin ich satt.
 Jetzt bin ich seinen ewigen Quatsch satt. (epistasis)
 Jetzt bin ich müde.
 Jetzt bin ich seiner ewigen Ausreden müde. (metastasis)
 Er ist treu. Er ist ihr treu. (diastasis)
 Они больные. Они больны сыпным тифом. (apostasis)
 Er ist stolz. Er ist stolz auf sie. (transactional)
 Er ist frei. Er ist frei von ihm. suspension)
- 3) Sie ist spröde.
 Er ist dreieckig und engstirnig.

Among the predicative constructions you find both S-, R-, and Q-relations:

- S: Ich bin seinen grotesken Humor überdrüssig.
 Biraderiniz en yüksek methi müstahiktir. (= "your brother is worthy of the highest praise") (Turkish)
- R: Wir sind von Ihrer Leistung ein bisschen enttäuscht.
 Vyāghro vyādhasya bāṇena hataḥ. (= the tiger was dead (killed) by the hunter's arrow).
- Q: Mir ist heiss. Mich ist fürwitz.
 Нам нужно книгу. (= we need the book).

For anybody capable of reading, the last three examples are nothing less than a revelation. They are the clue to all those subjectless sentences which have for years and years intrigued many an Aristotelian linguist.

All subjectless sentences, i.e. sentences without the faintest implication of a stasis, are Q-relations! Or, if you like, they are Q-relations rather than anything else. We shall have to demonstrate the truth of this thrilling discovery in some detail. It seems that all human sentences are analysable in terms of S-, R-, and Q-relations. To show that this is actually the case, we shall have to take a brief look at some of the most informative cardinal instances that we have just considered. Our sentence material has shown us that there are three main categories of transversal S-relations:

- 1) satiated transversal relations (*he defended him*)
- 2) unsatiated transversal relations (*he is working; he is singing*)
- 3) suspended transversal relations (*he is looking at her*)

Satiated transversal relations are characterized by a transitive *II* with an O_1 (direct object); some *II* are practically always transitive (e.g. *defend*). Unsatiated transversal relations may have a transitive *II* without any O_1 (direct object) or a *II* which only reluctantly takes an O_1 (in the latter case we shall speak of *obtuse* or *dull* transversal relations). A suspended transversal relation, as shown above, is a transversal relation in which the *II*-relation between the two *implicati* is switched off by the use of an indicator.

These simple considerations allow us to operate with the following basic material of simple transversal S-relations:

1. *Satiated transversal S-relations:*

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} \text{Er} & \text{verteidigt} & \text{ihn.} & \text{Ich} & \text{bin} & \text{ihn} & \text{überdrüssig.} & \text{Ich} & \text{habe} & \text{den} & \text{Streit} & \text{satt.} \\ \hline \text{S} & & \text{O}_1 & \text{S} & & \text{O}_1 & & \text{S} & & \text{O}_1 & & \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} \text{Er} & \text{wurde} & \text{ihn} & \text{los.} & \text{Ich} & \text{machte} & \text{seinen} & \text{Wohnort} & \text{ausfindig.} \\ \hline \text{S} & & \text{O}_1 & & \text{S} & & \text{O}_1 & & \end{array}$$
2. *Unsatiated transversal relations:*

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{Er} & \text{sang.} & \text{Sie} & \text{lachte.} & \text{Sie} & \text{arbeiten.} \\ \hline \text{S} & & \text{S} & & \text{S} & \end{array}$$

Er war müde. *Sie* war satt. *Er* ist gross. *Er* ist tot.

(Some languages do not have the possibility of forming the predicative constructions. *They are devoid of independent nuclei.* Cf. Eskimo:

akivoq = er antwortet
 $\overline{\text{S}}$

mikivoq = er ist klein¹
 $\overline{\text{S}}$

siagdlerpoq = es regnet
 $\overline{\text{S}}$

sinigpoq = er schläft
 $\overline{\text{S}}$

tuquvoq = er ist tot
 $\overline{\text{S}}$

anguvoq = er hat einen Seehund gefangen
 $\overline{\text{S}}$ O_1

ajorpoq = er ist schlecht, er taugt nicht
 $\overline{\text{S}}$ $\overline{\text{S}}$

talerpoq = "er hat Armweh", ihm tut der Arm weh

(cf. Ja nie przywieram. = Ich *bin* nicht *wählerisch.* = I *am* not *finicky.*

(Polish)

Dlaczego milczysz? = Warum *schweigst* du? = Why *are* you *silent*?)

(Polish)

From a universal point of view, therefore, the predicative construction existing in so many languages is just a (very often *obtuse*) transversal relation with a specific furnishment (nucleus + predicative) expressive of its obtusity).

3. *Suspended transversal relations:*

Er glaubt an Gott.

Er ist von dieser Sache satt. Er ist stolz auf seinen Bruder.

Er ist übel dran. Ich bin dazu nicht gewillt.

Jeg er ked af det. (Danish)

¹ In other words: Eskimo has only got verbal determinations (from the predicative zone) where English (like other Indoeuropean languages) uses determinations of the zones of designation and of quality, mostly with some mediator of predicativity (a nucleus) (cf. Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderswo*, in: *Språkliga Bidrag* vol. 6, n:r 27, Lund 1972 (p. 110) and in: *Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung*, Heft 28/1' 75, Berlin 1975; Niels Danielsen: *Zu den Nucleuskonstruktionen in der menschlichen Sprache. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Semasiosyntax*, in: *Sprachwissenschaft*, Vol. 3, Heidelberg 1976 (1977)). – Some languages have extremely few adjectives with which to form predicative sentences, cf. Maurice Delafosse: *Essai de manuel de la langue mandé ou mandingue*, Paris 1901, p. 19: "Les adjectifs proprement dits sont peu nombreux en dyoula". The same phenomenon applies to a lot of West African languages (cf. R. C. Abraham: *The Language of the Hausa People*, University of London Press, London 1959). So, instead of saying *the little boy is strong* the Hausa speaker would say something like "the little boy, strength with him" (qanqanen yaro nan, garfi gare shi), thereby using a completely different sentence semantic model with two noun subjects and no finite verb.

Han er stor på den. Hun er lidt spinkel i det. (Danish)
 Han er noget beskeden af sig. Han har aldrig været bange af sig. (Danish)
 Das ist von Vorteil für ihn. (*II* = ist von Vorteil)
 Deine Erklärung steht in Widerspruch zu meinen Grundsätzen.
 (*II* = steht in Widerspruch).

The last two examples show us how we can determine a complex *II* by identifying its apostasis (or a given transactional indication taking its place) as opposed to a free adverb (= the answer to an adverbial **A**).

As treated in detail above, transversal relations may be furnished with a metastasis, a diastasis, or an apostasis (with or without the epistasis) whereby the π of the *II* is considered 'active' (as opposed to 'inactive') from its semantically internalized position:

1. Er entledigte sich *seines Auftrages*.
 Der Chef versicherte den Angestellten *seines Wohlwollens*.
 Man würdigte ihn *keines Blickes*.
 Der Römer ist voll *glühenden Weines*.
 Er spottet *seiner*.
 Er wurde *dieser Sache* gewahr.
 Ich bin *dieser Sache* gewärtig.
 Ich bin *seiner leeren Worte* überdrüssig.
2. Er schenkte *ihm* ein neues Buch.
 Er drohte *ihm*.
 Willfahre *seinem Flehen* nicht!
 Er machte *ihm* seine Kunden abspenstig.
 Er ist *mir* gram.
 Er ist voll *heiligem Ernst*.
 Er wurde *ihm* abhold.
 Es geht *ihm* gut.
 Man sah es *ihm* an.
3. Verres fāna *omnibus dōnīs ornāmentisque* nūdāvit.
 Multi deōrum *beneficiō* perversē ūtuntur.
 Sē dignum *maiōribus suis* praestitit.¹
Им на службе очень дорожат. (= they appreciate him very much at his working place).
 Он идёт *своей дорогой*. (= Germ.: er geht seines Weges).
 Не рискуй *жизнью!* (= don't risk your life!).
 Чем гордишься? (= what are you proud of?).
 Я горд *своими достижениями*. (= I am proud of my achievements)
 Он богат *опытом*. (= he is rich in experience).

¹ Compare the German constructions with an epistasis (Berlin *ist eine Reise wert*), a diastasis (das Mädchen *war ihm nachteilig*), or a metastasis (er *ist keiner Beachtung wert*).

Он не доволен *своим успехом*. (= he is not content with his success)
 Er ist stolz *auf sie*.
 Das Bild ist falsch *herumzusehen*.
 Er ist *zu diesem Humbug* nicht gewillt.
 Sie halten sehr viel *von ihm*.
 Er ist leicht *zu überreden*.
 Das ganze Haus ist voll *von Menschen/mit Menschen*.

Our last example already implies a predicative R-relation. Some languages (e.g. Sanskrit) are extremely rich in predicative R-relations:

Brāhmaṇasya putrā vyāghreṇa hatāḥ. (= the Brahman's sons were killed by the tiger).
 Nagaraṃ Rāmasya putreṇa jitam. (= the city was conquered by Rama's son)
 Ich bin von dieser Arbeit müde. (= ich bin durch diese Arbeit ermüdet worden)
 Ich bin völlig gefesselt von deinem Zauber.
 Er ist von diesem Interesse völlig ergriffen.
 Ich bin von deiner Antrittsrede ein bisschen enttäuscht.

As stated above (cf. p. 57) the basis of an R-relation is the subject of the sentence. The basis of an S-relation, therefore, is its epistasis:

S: Peter kills *John*.
 R: *John* is killed by Peter.

And correspondingly, the basis of a Q-relation is the scopos of that relation:

Q: kill John by Peter. (cf. Urdu: [P.-by J. killed] and
 O_1
 Scottish-Gaelic: [killed by-P. J.] (see p. 58 and p. 74)).

Q-relations may have a non-predicative *II* or a predicative *II*:


1. Sgrìobhadh le Pàdhraic an litir. (= "Patrick has written a letter", or:
 O_1
 "a letter has been written by Patrick") (Scottish-Gaelic)
 Морозом тронуло листья. (= "the frost has attacked the leaves", or:
 O_1
 "the leaves have been attacked by the frost").
 Его убило молнией. (= "he was killed by the lightning").
 O_1
 У меня друзины не приведено.
 ind: Ω Ω
 (= "I haven't brought my companions with me", or: "my companions haven't been conveyed by me").

(As we see from our four examples, the non-predicative *II* of a Q-relation may occur in a special neuter form of the verb (cf. the Scottish-Gaelic form *sgrìobhadh*), in the active (cf. the Russian *тронуло/убило*), or in the passive (cf. the Russian form *приведено*).

2. Ni kar-ist $\frac{\text{ina } \textit{þize lambe.}}{\text{O}_1}$ (= “he doesn’t care about the lambs” (Gothic))
 Skrb $\frac{\text{ga je bilo } \textit{pravice.}}{\text{O}_1}$ (= “he was very much concerned about righteousness”, or: “righteousness was his great concern”) (Slovenian)
 Χρειὼ βουλῆς $\frac{\textit{ἐμὲ καὶ σέ.}}{\text{O}_1}$ (= “you and I need good advice”, or: “good advice is needed by you and me”) (Greek)

These three sentences are structured in such a fantastic way that they ought to be endowed with a heavy linguistic and philosophical treaty of their own. They are all examples of how expressions of pure existence succumb to the demands of a transversal relation, and as such they throw invaluable light on the intricate problem of the semantic and syntactic character of the so-called *verbum substantivum*. As we shall see shortly, the *verbum substantivum* is characterized, obviously, by the unique quality of being able to play the role of a *II* only in a transversal relation of which its own π is both the stasis and the epistasis:

$\frac{\text{Das Sein ist das Sein.}}{\text{S}} \quad \frac{\text{O}_1$



This model is the only one imaginable in which the *verbum substantivum* is transitive in the most subtle meaning of this word, i.e. transitive to the imagination

* In its most concentrated form, with an internalized existential stasis (S^e) and an internalized existential epistasis (O_1^e), our TR of pure existence becomes expressive of a categorial semantic must. We know this from several languages where ‘be’-constructions insist on expressing some kind of obligation (cf. English: you are to be here tomorrow morning at six o’-clock), but no language seems to reveal this basic function of a naked existential sentence kernel as convincingly as Sanskrit, where you find constructions of the following sort:

Tvayā prahr̥ṣṭayā bhāvyaṃ. (= “you must be merry”).

In this instance the existential kernel *bhāvyaṃ* is in the form of an absolutely impersonal gerundive with the extension of a \mathcal{Q} -instrumental (*tvayā*) and its correlate (*prahr̥ṣṭayā*). Translated verbatim into German it would sound: [von-dir dem Glücklichen muss-sein].

The dynamic Sanskrit construction is matched in Lithuanian by a static counterpart with two metastatic \mathcal{Q} s: *Jo esama geros.* (= “he is good”). (Concerning the inter-relationship between the genitive and the instrumental in \mathcal{Q} -functions, cf. pp. 119–20 and Niels Danielsen: *Das Satzverbal (II) und die Kasus*, in *Sprachwissenschaft*, Vol. 1,3, Heidelberg 1976).

of a philosophical member of the species *homo ludens*. It is the nature of pure existence that *it is itself*. If you replace the S of our model with any other notion than the one of pure existence, the outcome will be an existential proposition such as

God is. Gott ist. Deus est.

Bars *bui*. (= "there are tigers") (Mongolian)

Bars *ügei*. (= "there [isn't =] are no tigers") (Mongolian)


with an internalized epistasis π . If, on the other hand, you replace both the S and the O_1 with nominal elements other than the π of the *II*, you will get a predicative proposition like

He is Wilson.

He is good.

She is not Wilson.

But if you replace only the O_1 of our model with an abstract notion other than that of pure existence, you will acquire a highly abstract basis of a Q-relation of the sort we have just demonstrated (the S is thereby internalized into the *II*). This is the astonishing thing about our three sentences from Gothic, Slovenian, and Classical Greek, that they are all transversal relations built up on an existential verb element which is the nucleus of the Q-relation *II*. The nucleus is not expressed in the Greek example, but this changes nothing in the fundamental furnishing of the Greek sentence. None of the sentences has any subject whatsoever. The *II* consists of the existential nucleus (Gothic *ist*, Slovenian *je* + operative verb of existence *bilo*, Greek \emptyset (= $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$)) and the element to which it is the nucleus, and that is: the immediate O_1 (epistasis) on the existential level (Gothic *kar(a)*, "care", Slovenian *skrb*, "concern", Greek $\chi\rho\epsilon\acute{\omega}$, "need"). The two constitute a transitivity on a next-higher level the object of which is the scopos of the sentence (Gothic *ina* (= "him"), Slovenian *ga* (= "him"), Greek $\epsilon\mu\epsilon\acute{\kappa}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \sigma\acute{\epsilon}$ (= "you and me")). The role of the genitive in all three sentences is a very interesting and unusual one, hardly met with in any other type of sentence. It plays a double role: On one hand its relation to the immediate epistasis on the existential level is clearly that of an inherence (cf. p. 91), on the other hand, though, it fulfills the role of a second epistasis on the next-higher level which our sentences on the whole represent in their quality of transversal Q-relations.



Our diagram shows how you can define a metastasis by means of a universal analysis. A *metastasis* = *inherence* + *epistasis* 2.¹ It is obvious to anybody with a minimum of linguistic sensitivity that the genitive in all our three instances (from Gothic, Slovenian, and Greek) plays the role of a metastasis in relation to the π of the next-higher level *II*. The notion of a metastasis is triggered off by the intricate combination of the existential level with the next-higher level. We see exactly the same phenomenon in several other languages:

$\overline{O_1}$	Mih ist $\overline{\Omega}$ es wuntar. (= "I am astonished by it", or: "it astonishes me")	
$\overline{O_1}$	Mih ist $\overline{\Omega}$ es niot. (= "I am longing for it")	(Old High German)
$\overline{\Omega}$	Dessen nimmt mich wunder. ² (= "I am surprised at that", or: "it surprises me")	(German)
$\overline{O_1}$		$\overline{O_1}$

This genitive of ergativity in the epistasis 2 position competes with other cases in plain Q-relations:

$\overline{\Omega}$	Meidän on käytettävä sotaa. (genitive) (= "we must use war", or: "war must be used by us")	(Finnish)
$\overline{O_1}$	$\overline{\Omega_2:O_1}$	
$\overline{O_1}$	$\overline{O_2}$	
$\overline{O_1}$	$\overline{O_1}$	

The O_1 -scopos may be replaced by a metastasis, a distastasis, or an apostasis (or any transactional unity):

¹ The fact that the genitive is used, in some languages, as the case of the epistasis in R-relations (finite or infinite) finds its ideal explanation in the constructions here in question:

\overline{S}	Tas vaikelis buvo motinos labai mylimas. (= "this child was loved very much by (its) mother").	(Lithuanian)
\overline{S}	$\overline{\Omega:\Omega}$	\overline{oV}
\overline{S}	$\overline{\Omega:\Omega}$	\overline{oV}
\overline{S}	$\overline{\Omega:\Omega}$	\overline{oV}
\overline{S}	$\overline{\Omega:\Omega}$	\overline{oV}
\overline{S}	$\overline{\Omega:\Omega}$	\overline{oV}
\overline{S}	$\overline{\Omega:\Omega}$	\overline{oV}

The inherential relation between the genitive, in these examples, and the operative verb in its respective syntagms is evident. The same thing applies to the Ω (ergative) and the *II* in an Eskimo Q \rightarrow S-relation: Qingnip takuvâ. (= "the dog saw it").

² Notice such expressions as *dessen nimmt mich Wunder* and *mich gibt Wunder* with the nuclei [give] and [take]. The connection of these nuclei (and the nucleus [get]) with the nucleus of existence is evident and has been treated elsewhere (cf. Niels Danielsen: *Zu den Nucleuskonstruktionen in der menschlichen Sprache. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Semasiosyntax*, in: *Sprachwissenschaft*, Vol. 3, Heidelberg 1977; Niels Danielsen: *Semasiosyntaktische Universalien im Finnischen*, in: *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher*, Vol. 46, Wiesbaden 1974).

Ainis þus wan ist. (= “you are in lack of one thing”) (Gothic)

Ἀπαλλακτέον τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν. (= “we must release ourselves from the body”)

Ω

Τῷ πολέμῳ χρῆστέον ἐστὶν ἡμῶν. (= “we must use war”)

O_2

Opus est cōnsiliō mihi et tibi. (= “you and I need a piece of good advice”)

O_3

Der bør ændres på de gamle vedtægter af myndighederne. (Danish)

ind

Bellō ūtendum est nōbīs. (= “we must use war”)

O_3

Mir ist sehr an deinem Wohlbefinden gelegen.

Der trænger til fornyelse hos de bildende kunstnere. (Danish)

ind

Our Greek and Latin examples allow us to analyse a diastasis as adherence + epistasis 2, from a universal semasiosyntactic point of view. It is evident that the epistasis 2 in these sentences is diastatical in nature. The semasiosyntactic crossing of adherence and ‘epistasis 2’ may take place, though, on the next-higher sentence level alone.

Q-relations may do without a scopos (or corresponding metastases, diastases, or apostases) (1). They may equally do without an epistasis 2 (this is obligatory in many languages) (2). And they may even do without each of the two (3). This is all depending on the obtusity/non-obtusity of the *II*:

1. Der dances af de unge.

Von den Kindern wird gelacht.

Ἄ senātōre loquitur.

2. Bátinn rak á land. (= “the boat drifted ashore”) (Icelandic)

O_1

Potępiono książki Galileusza. (= “Galilei’s books were banned”)

O_1

(Polish)

Dúntar an doras gach tráthnóna. (= “the door is closed every evening”)

O_1

(Irish)

Его осенило. (= “(suddenly) he saw (daylight)”) (Russian)

O_1

Mich friert.

O_1

Hann sakaði ekki. (= “he wasn’t hurt”) (Icelandic)

O_1

Hay muchas mujeres en esta ciudad. (= “there are many women in this town”)

O_1

(Spanish)

Mich ist fürwitz.

Sram *me* je bilo. (= "I was ashamed") (Slovenian)

Syksyllä sataa vettä ja talvella sataa lunta. (= ["in the autumn it rains water

$\overline{\Omega_2:O_1}$ $\overline{\Omega_2:O_1}$

and in the winter it rains snow'] (Finnish)

Szkoda było takiego nakladu. (= "it was a pity to spend that much")

$\overline{\Omega}$

(Polish)

Mir ist langweilig.

$\overline{O_2}$

Нечего *мече* тут.

Téitear i dtaithí ar gach rud leis an amsir. (= "one becomes accustomed to
ind : O_3 anything in time") (Irish)

and so on ad infinitum.

Impersonal modal nuclei and corresponding modal expressions govern an immediate O_1 (a so-called *transversal subjective*):

Нужно поехать. (= "it is necessary to go") (cf. *нужно музыку* = "we must have some music") (Russian)

Työ täytyy lopettaa. (= "the work must be finished") (Finnish)

Kell menni. (= "it is necessary to go") (Hungarian)

Bisogna cantare. (Italian)

Jokaisen pitää olla täsmällinen. (= "everybody has to be precise") (Finnish)

Czy można zatańczyć? (= "is it possible to dance?") (Polish)

Нельзя объединить народов всего мира. (= "it is impossible to unite the nations of (all) the world")

(The last example leaves no doubt that the infinite governed by *нельзя* is in the domain of the ectonomic sector of the sentence; had it been the mesonomic subject, we would have had the sequence *объединить народы всего мира* with the accusative *народы* and by no means the genitive *народов*).

Cavēre decet, timēre nōn decet. (Latin)

Liberē dīcere libeat. (Latin)

Τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. (= it is necessary to do this).

It is evident that only constructions with an immediate O_1 (transversal subjective) belong to class 2. Impersonal constructions with a modal nucleus + nothing but its immediate infinitive O_1 belong to class 3:

3. Itur.

Hänestä ei ole papiksi. (= "no clergyman is going to become of him") (Finnish)

Piove. (= "it rains") (Italian)

Magaribūtsi. (= "it is evening") (Kanuri)

Fa caldo. (= it is warm) (Italian)

Egētur atque amātur. (Latin)
 Der fægtes en del. (Danish)
 Do téiti go minic ann fadó. (= “long ago people used to go there often”) (Irish)
 Dregur saman með þeim. (= “they are falling in love”) (Icelandic)
 Undarlega bregður við. (= “something extraordinary is happening”) (Icelandic)
 Matar- og lyfjaskorts er tekið að gæta. (Icelandic)
 Skyndilega lægði og birti til. (Icelandic)
 Genug der Witze!
 Verflixt nochmal!
 Жара. (= “it is very hot”) (Russian)
 Już ciemno. (= it is already dark) (Polish)
 and so on and so forth ad infinitum.

In the last four examples the predicative mediator, the nucleus “is”, is totally subdued. This may even be the case in different Q-relations of which the mesonomic sector is merely furnished with 1) an operative verb or 2) a sign of polarisation or 3) nothing whatsoever:

1. Esse quam vidēri.

Быть грозе. (= “there is going to be a storm”) (Russian)
 Быть дождю. (= “it’s going to rain”) (Russian)
 (cf. Нам видно. (= we can see)
 Нам слышно. (= we can hear)
 Мне пора (итти) домой. (= it is time for me to go home)
 Двум смертям не бывать, а одной не миновать. (= there are not two deaths, but the one which there is, you cannot pass by)
 По такому снегу нам не пробраться. (= in such a snow it is impossible to make one’s way).

(All that is left of the mesonomic sector in these five sentences is the operative verb; in the last instance a modal nucleus has been subdued; the operative verb in the Russian examples is connected with a diastasis: this sentence type is very productive in Russian vernacular:

Мне некуда ходить. (= there is nowhere I can go).
 Ему некогда читать. (= he has never got time to read).
 Мне некого послать. (= I’ve got nobody to send).
 Мне некому помочь. (= I can’t help anybody).
 Мне нечего читать. (= I have got nothing to read).
 Вам нечего бояться. (= you have got nothing to fear).
 Ему нечем жить. (= he hasn’t got anything to live on).
 Здесь некуда поставить стул. (= here there is no place to put the table).
 Не у кого спросить. (= there is no one to ask).
 Не с кем перемолвить слова. (= “there is nobody to talk to”)

Не о чём говорить. (= “it is not a thing you talk about”)

Тут нечему удивляться. (= in this case there is nothing to be surprised at)
(Russian))

2. Pas de quoi! = Не за чем.

Мне некогда. (= I haven't got the time) (Russian)

3. Weg mit diesem dreckigen Wischlappen!

To hell with all your nice wishes!

Ned med det hele!

The last three sentences and thousands of others may all be looked on as being expressive of “neutral being” or “neutral bringing about to be”.

Other sentences are expressive of the exact opposite: demonstrative occurrence or being in a place. They have a highly interesting mesonomic sentence sector which we shall call a DIE-sector. A DIE-sector stands for a mesonomic sector which is made up by a demonstrative verb, more exactly: a demonstrative indication of existence:

Ecce homo.

Eccoci arrivati.

Le voici.

Вот дом. (= there is a house). (Russian)


Вон книга. (= there is a book) (Russian)

Nà tò κορίτσι. (= there is the girl) (Modern Greek).

İşte refikam. (= there is my wife) (Turkish)

Iată pe fiul meu. (= there is my son) (Rumanian)

One thing leaves you aghast when you consider this sentence material: the DIE is connected with the nominative (in Latin, Russian, and Modern Greek) or the *accusative* (in Italian). Our Rumanian example shows a representation for an O_1 . In order to explain this, we shall have to look, once again, at our diagram of the existential transversal relation:



The verbal notion of pure existence (lat. *esse*) may be considered as an enclosed realm of its own where the π of the *II* is both the stasis and the epistasis of the *II*. We have seen what happens if the stasis π is replaced by any other notion than that of the π : the epistasis π is internalized into the *II* (cf. *servus adest*, *Deus est*). We have

seen, too, what happens if both the stasis and the epistasis on the existential level are replaced by nominal notions other than that of the π : we get, then, a predicative sentence. What we didn't mention before about this predicative sentence, though, is the interesting fact that it may be materialized in one out of three different ways. It may either follow its own rules, and put both the stasis and the epistasis in the nominative.

It is I. = Det är jag. (Swedish).

Or it may take the form of any plain transversal S-relation:

It is me. = Det er mig. (Danish). $\frac{\text{Huwa}}{\text{S}} \text{ k\bar{a}na} \frac{\text{ka} \text{b\bar{i}r}^{\text{an}}}{\text{O}_1}$. (= "he was big")
 Lastu $\frac{\text{\u0177} \text{a} \text{l} \text{i} \text{b}^{\text{an}}}{\text{O}_1}$. (= "I am not a student") (Arabic)

Or it may even take the form of a plain R-relation:

$\frac{\text{O} \text{H}}{\text{S}} \text{ b} \text{\u0177} \text{y} \text{l} \text{ } \frac{\text{s} \text{c} \text{h} \text{a} \text{s} \text{t} \text{l} \text{i} \text{v} \text{y} \text{m}}{\text{Q}}$. (= "he was happy") (Russian)
 $\frac{\text{O} \text{n}}{\text{S}} \text{ b} \text{\u0119} \text{d} \text{z} \text{i} \text{e} \frac{\text{s} \text{z} \text{c} \text{z} \text{e} \text{\u015b} \text{l} \text{i} \text{w} \text{y} \text{m}}{\text{Q}}$. (= "he will be happy") (Polish)¹
 $\frac{\text{K} \text{i} \text{m}}{\text{Q}} \text{ o} \text{n} \text{ j} \text{e} \text{s} \text{t} \text{?}$ (= "who is he?") (Polish)
 $\frac{\text{Q}}{\text{S}}$

In the case of the DIE-constructions we find only the nominative and accusative realizations of the epistasis. For that is what the nominal part of a DIE-construction is: the epistasis on the existential level. Or in other words, the predicate. This, now, implies that two things at least may happen if you replace the epistasis (and only the epistasis) on the existential level by a nominal notion other than the existential π : you either get a Q-relation basis (cf. p. 113), or you get a DIE if the *II* is switched into a demonstrative identifier of the NAUK-zone.² But this is not all: human language shows us that a third thing may happen and actually does happen in quite a lot of instances if the epistasis of an existential relation is replaced by some notion other than that of its *II*. What you get are sentences which imply occurrence, or that "there is"/"there is not" something (= x). In instances of this kind you will see again and again that the x follows the rule of an epistasis (or its semantic substitute, the partitive, of course). Traditional grammar will tell us that in the English sentence

There is a god.

the word 'god' is the subject. We doubt it. We doubt it because of the special tournure of the sentence (why does the subject come last?), and we doubt it because hundreds

¹ Constructions of the following type may be considered as the corresponding Q-relations on the existential level: *dnes je po\u0161mournno* (Czech) (= "today it's dull" (about the weather)), *teplo je* (Serbocroatian) (= "it's hot"), *est\u00e1 muito quente* (Portuguese) (= "it is very warm"), *est\u00e1 muy fr\u00edo* (Spanish) (= "it is very cold"), *b\u0119dzie w nocy \u015blisko* (Polish) (= "it will be slippery in the night"), and so on. These predicative Q-relations all refer to the weather and are on the whole semi-relations.

² Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen und anderen Sprachen. Eine Vorstudie zu einer konstitutionellen Sprachtheorie*, in: Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung, Heft 28/1' 75, Berlin 1975. Niels Danielsen: *Fokus p\u00e5 syntaksen*, in: Meddelelser fra Gymnasieskolernes Tyskl\u00e4rerforening 55, October 1974, Copenhagen.

of languages witness against this traditional analysis. The same argumentation applies to several other languages, such as Danish and Italian:

Der er en gud. C'è un Dio.

Why is the x in these languages forced into this final position in the sentence? And why is the sentence initiated by the adverb? – Because the x is the predicate of the sentence, the epistasis of the existential relation. The English sentence *there is a god*, the Danish sentence *der er en gud*, and the Italian sentence *c'è un Dio* are all trans-versal Q-relations on the existential level. If you introduce a personal pronoun = x you will see how it is put into the epistasis case:

Der er mig. Der er dig. Der er ham.
Der er os. Der er jer. Der er dem.

In a lot of languages we find constructions of occurrence which support our assumption:

Es ist *ein Gott*. (existential nominative)
Po vsêh pôtih jô je. (accusative) (= “she is there on all roads”) (Slovenian)
Ni was im *barne*. (genitive:partitive: O₁^e) (= “they had no children”) (Gothic)
Heillä on *omaa rahaa*. (partitive: existential nominative) (= “they’ve got their own money”) (Finnish)
Minulla ei ole *kirjoitta*. (= “I don’t have any books”) (Finnish)
 $\Omega_{1/2}: O_1^e$
У меня есть *книги*. (existential nominative) (= “I have books”)
У меня нет *книг*. (genitive : partitive : O₁^e) (= “I don’t have any books”)
 $\Omega: \Omega_2: O_1^e$
Теперь таких людей не бывает. (= “such people do not exist now”)¹
 $\Omega: \Omega_2: O_1^e$ (Russian)

The existential nominative may well be considered as the subject of the sentence. We see, though, how it is widely forced into existential O₁-positions. This trend may go so far that the existential O₁ calls for an *extradynamic*, a “governing” II. We observe this phenomenon in a number of languages:

Nie *ma* takiego wariata w naszym mieście. (= “there isn’t such a fool in our town”) (Polish)
 $\Omega: O_1$
Hay muchas muchachas en esta casa. (= “there are many girls in this house”)
O₁ (Spanish)

¹ Notice the Russian verb of ‘being’ (есть) and the Russian verb of ‘non-being’ (нет): the verb of “materialized existence” (бывать). Concerning the ‘est’/‘non est’-constructions, both in existential and in copulative shapes, cf. Niels Danielsen: *Status und Polarität im Gotischen – im Lichte des Kymrischen dargestellt*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, Vol. 2, Odense 1968 (p. 63); Niels Danielsen: *Semasio-syntaktische Universalien im Finnischen*, Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher, Vol. 66, 1974; Niels Danielsen: *Zu den Nucleuskonstruktionen in der menschlichen Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 3, Heidelberg 1976 (–77).

Δὲν ἔχει τίποτα. (= “there isn’t anything”) (Modern Greek)

O₁

Там има дърво. (= “there is a tree there”) (Bulgarian)

O₁

Ima li ovde današnje novine? (= “is (there) today’s newspaper here?”)

O₁

(Serbocroatian)

Heute *hatte* es viele Zuschauer.

O₁

A *ka male* në Shqipëri? (= “are there any mountains in Albania?”) (Albanian)

O₁

Il y a encore un peu de vin dans la bouteille.

O₁

Chez-li *youx* liangx-chanx teng. (= “there are two lamps here”) (Chinese)

O₁

These are just a few examples of all the languages which use the existential verb of emanence [have] + O₁ (= x). Our German sentence and our French example have obviously turned into S-relations, all the rest are Q-relations (without any subject whatsoever).

The verb ‘have’ is not the only extradynamic nucleus that may be used in sentences of this type. We all know the German constructions with the nucleus [give]; Icelandic may use the nucleus [geta]:

Es gibt sehr wenig Vernunft auf dieser Welt.

O₁

Jetzt gibt’s einen Krach.

O₁

So was darf’s nicht geben.

O₁

Varla getur betra mann. (= “there is hardly a better man”) (Icelandic)

O₁

On the existential level of presence (or occurrence) the verbum substantivum agrees widely with the existential O₁ aspirant (= x) in regard to grammatical congruence:

Vannak ott lámpák? (= “are there lamps there?”) (Hungarian)

Nincsenek itt leányok? (= “aren’t there (any) girls here?”)

There *are* many fools in this world.

Er *zijn* nog werkelijke studenten. (Dutch)

But human language tends to give up this grammatical congruence:¹

†В этом городе *суть* продукты питания. (= “in this town there are provisions”)
 В этом городе *есть* продукты питания. (= “in this town there are provisions”).
 Çocuklarımızın yeni şapkaları *var*. (= “our children’s new caps—their are there”: “our children have got new caps”) (Turkish).

In Swedish, for instance, an RQ-relation on the \bigcirc [find] is used:

Här finns det inget vatten. (= “there is no water here”) (Swedish)
 Finns det någon källa här i skogen? (= “is there a well in this wood?”)
 (Swedish)

The same thing applies for Sanskrit or Arabic:

Vāriṇi viṣaṃ *vidyate*. (= “there is poison in the water”) (Sanskrit)
 Fil-madrasa yūjad mudarras. (= “in the school there is a teacher”)


These German S-relations and Swedish, Sanskrit, and Arabic RQ-relations are matched by corresponding Danish Q-relations:

Her findes der ikke vand.
 Her findes ikke spiritus.
 På denne gåde gives der kun én løsning.

The corresponding Swedish and German constructions are our warrantors that these Danish sentences are pure Q-relations. A specific Danish analysis would easily lead us to the wrong conclusion that they must be R-relations.

The German sentence *es gibt kein Mitleid* is an S-relation.

The corresponding Danish sentence *der gives ingen medlidenhed* is a Q-relation. And so is its companion *der er ingen medlidenhed* (= “there is no pity”). Now, let us look at a triad of sentences from Swedish, English, and French:



Both the subject of the Swedish construction *det* (= German *es*) and the indefinite adverb of place in the English construction *there* (= Danish *der*, Italian *ci*) are represented in the French syntagm (*il* corresponds to the Swedish *det*, and *y* matches the English *there*). The extraordinary French construction *il y a* turns out to be as well-considered as it is considerate of linguistic universals.

¹ An $O^e \rightarrow S^e$ switch may be observed even in predicative constructions, cf. Polish: *Kim on jest?* (= “who is he’?”) (answer for example: “he is a professor”) with the predicative in the instrumental case, but: *Kto to jest?* (rarely *Kto on jest?*) (= “who is he’?”) (answer for example: “he is Piotr”) with the 2 x subject construction. Compare German: *Wir sind es*, Russian: *Кто это был?* (= “who was that?”).

Sentences expressing a process have much in common, syntactically, with sentences expressive of existence and occurrence. They are built up on nuclei with the meaning of [happen], [become], [grow], [fall], etc. They, too, may have their predicatives in either of the epistasis cases, or in a predicative nominative:

Det blev *jag*. (nominative) (Swedish)
 Det blev *mig*. (accusative) (Danish)
 Это становится *забавным*. (instrumental) (= "now it'll be amusing")
 Позже *главным их занятием* стало земледелие. (instrumental)
 On został *dziennikarzem*. (= "he became a journalist") (Polish)

Sentences denoting "dead process" ([stay], [remain]) have the same distinguishing marks:

Она осталась *полной и единственной хозяйкой* в больнице.
 Jag förblir *jag*. (existential nominative) (Swedish)
 Jeg forbliver *mig* (selv). (accusative) (Danish)

Two cases play a cardinal role as epistasis markers in process sentences and "dead process" sentences: the translative (process epistasis) and the essive (state marker). These cases serve to indicate the epistasis on a specific process level and a specific level of state, respectively:

Hän on yhä vielä *heikkona*. (= "he remains very weak") (Finnish)
 Poika rupesi *merimieheksi*. (= "the boy became a sailor") (Finnish)
 Hän tuli *ylimieliseksi*. (= "he became arrogant") (Finnish)
 Olen pysynyt *terveenä*. (= "I have kept in good health") (Finnish)

In the following examples the accusative (or partitive) epistasis and the essive/translative epistasis each belong to a specific level of their own:

Lakimiehenä hän ei voinut muuta kuin tuomita tekoa. (= "as a lawyer he could do nothing but condemn the action") (Finnish)
 Kansleri nimitti hänet *professoriksi*. (= "the chancellor appointed him a professor") (Finnish)
 Tunnen itseni *paremmaksi ihmiseksi*. (= "I feel a better human being") (Finnish)


In English and German, for instance, these two categories, the essive and the translative epistasis on the levels of state or process, are often expressed with the help of a specific representation:

Als Rechtswissenschaftler muss ich diese Schandtät verurteilen.
 Er ernannte ihn *zum Vizekonsul* in Rotterdam.

Our considerations on the structure of human sentences have eventually led us to the astounding result that *the homo sapiens speaks in transversal relations*. These transversal relations are materialized on three levels:

- 1) an existential level (*there is a god; he is good; the devil exists*)
- 2) a process/non-process level (*he got mad; he remained his enemy*)
- 3) a next higher ("plain") level (*Peter loves Irene*).

The outcome of our research lead us automatically to a simple universal case model (the cases are thereby classified with regard to their priority according to their cardinal semasiosyntactic features):



The stasis and epistasis cases are:

ergative (\mathcal{Q} in TR-Q)	accusative (O_1)	essive (O_1^e)
nominative (S)	instrumental (\mathcal{Q})	translative (O_1^p)*

They denote the final points of simple transversal relations.

The convergent cases are the genitive and the dative. They are expressive of integration and contingency (cf. p. 89).

The cases of transaction denote apostasis functions. They are such cases as the illative, the elative, the inessive, the sublative, the delative, the superessive, the allative, the ablative, the adessive.

The purely adverbial cases are such cases as the comitative, the prolative, the instructive, the abessive, and what else human brains have called them. They are rather semantic zone markers than cases, i.e. they are nothing but adverbs. Only a very tenacious and serious work in the field of semantic research in depth, will bring you to this conclusion.¹

The partitive is another problematic unity within any universal case theory. On one hand it is rather a semantic ('non-definite') category, but on the other hand

* O_1^e = existential epistasis; O_1^p = epistasis of process.

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderen Sprachen. Eine Vorstudie zu einer konstitutionellen Sprachtheorie*, in: Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung. Heft 28/1 '75, Berlin 1975.

it plays an important role as a substitute for the accusative O₁ (and even sometimes for the nominative S) in different transversal relations.

Some cases are vagrant. The instrumental case may be used as a case of trans-action, and so may the essive and the translative. The box of the purely adverbial cases may be fed with cases from all the other four boxes.¹

This means that our case classification is based on the primary (or sovereign) semantic and functional qualities of every single case category.²

¹ The absolute nominative, the absolute accusative, the absolute partitive, the absolute genitive, the absolute dative, the absolute ablative, and the absolute instrumental turn out to be nothing but adverbialized transversal relations:

absolute nominative (or nominative + essive):

Da dehnt sich die Stadt, *die Winde darüber sausend.*

Pojat palaavat metsästä *vaatteet läpimärkinä.*

absolute accusative:

Er fleht, *die Hände zum Zeus erhoben.*

absolute partitive-essive:

Metsästäjät olivat palanneet *muutamia jäniksiä saahinaan.*

absolute genitive:

Χειμῶνος ὄντος ἠγάγκασαν τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα ἀλλίξεσθαι.

Ἐπιλειπόντων δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐπιέζοντο πολλὸν χρόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ.

absolute dative:

Dalaþ þan *atgaggandin imma af fairgunja, laistidedun afar imma iumjons managos.*

(Matth. VIII, 1) (Gothic)

Giboganemo kneuwe fora imo bismarotun inan sus quedenti. (Old High German)

absolute ablative:

Rēge duce prōcessimus. Hōc factō, oppidum mūrō firmāvit.

Tum, *sōle merīdiānō flagrante, sub umbrā arbōrum cōnsēdimus.*

absolute instrumental:

Na tvayā 'tra *mayā 'vasthitena kā 'pi cintā kāryā.* (= "with me at hand, thou needst feel no anxiety whatsoever on this point").

absolute locative:

Mūle hate hatam sarvam. (= "when the root is killed, everything is killed") (Sanskrit)

absolute prepositional phrase:

Hann kom *að fundi loknum.* (Icelandic)

Hann dó *að fjölskyldunní viðstaddri.* (Icelandic)

Of the same adverbial nature are absolute constructions with the accusative alone or the nominative + the inessive or the adessive and constructions with the nominative or partitive + the inessive or the adessive, as we know them from Finnish:

Sitzen Sie nicht im Zug, *den Kopf bloss und in Hemdsärmeln!*

Die Soldaten marschierten, *das Gewehr auf der Schulter und den Tornister auf dem Rücken.*

Koululaiset odettavat *kirjat kainalossa.*

Pojat palaavat metsästä *taskut täynnä pähkinöitä.*

Neuvottelijat saapuvat lentoteitse *uusία ehdotuksia mukanaan.*

Even the nominative alone (but hardly ever the ergative) may function as an adverbializer:

Wir wandern *Hand in Hand.*

Sie kommen per Flugzeug, *neue Vorschläge mit sich führend.*

² The universal case model and the inner inferential relations are reflected in the case manifestations after a ruling indicator: Rōmam = "to Rome", cf ad Rōmam (epistatic case); Rōmae = "in Rome", cf. German "wegen Mordes" (convergent case of integration); Sanskrit: *vanāya pratiṣṭhati* = German "er bricht *nach dem Walde auf*" (convergent case of contingence); Rōmā = "from Rome", cf. ā Iuliā (case of transaction) (cf. the Russian instrumental, so as instrumentals and locatives, not only in Russian, but in a whole series of human languages; compare also the indication replacing functions of the epistasis cases essive and translative: *nourna* (essive): *as a boy*, *professoriksi* (translative): *into a professor*; even a governed stasis case (*wie deine Mutter*) may match a governed epistasis case: *wie deine Mutter* = *ὡς ἂν τὴν μητέρα σου* (Modern Greek)).

The so-called vocative is the affective status of the stasis. It is acquainted with the imperative rather than with any functional noun category.

The stasis and epistasis cases are the ergative, the nominative, the accusative, the instrumental, the essive, and the translative. They denote the immediate functions in simple transversal relations. The nominative is the case of the basis in a simple transversal R-relation:

Pater amātus est ā filiō.
S

The accusative is the case of the basis in a simple transversal S-relation:

Filius patrum amāvit.
O₁

The nominative and the accusative, therefore, may both be the cases which denote the scopos in a simple transversal Q-relation:

Fe'm gwelir gan y bobl. (= "I am seen by the people") (Welsh)
O₁
(accusative)

Avattiin ikkuna. (= "the window was opened") (Finnish)
O₁

(nominative)

Bubadi ktab қақуна. (= "the father took the book") (Lesginian)
O₁
(nominative)

The instrumental is the case of the epistasis in a simple R-relation:

Женщина была поцелована им. (= "the woman was kissed by him").
Q

The ergative is the case of the remainder in simple non-existential transversal relations, i.e. the epistasis of the Q-relation:

ПарІала гъургъал акъуне. (= "the hen laid an egg") (Aghulian)
Q O₁

Paṭara Niḳom daiḳia perangi. (= "little Niko has torn his shirt to bits")
Q/S fV O₁ (Georgian)
(nominative)

In some languages cases of interference take over the role of the instrumental:

Tas vyras buvo vaiko labai mylimas. (= "that man was loved very much by the child") (Lithuanian)
Q

Jörðin þaktist laufi. (= "the earth was covered by leaves") (Icelandic)
 $\overline{O_2}$

Our Lithuanian example reveals the inherential π -relatedness of the epistasis in an R-relation. Our example from Icelandic shows us a corresponding adherential π -relatedness.¹

The genitive takes over the role of the ergative in many languages (this function must, as its Ω -function, be seen in the light of its value in existential transversal relations):

\overline{Dessen} nimmt mich wunder.
 $\Omega: \Omega \rightarrow S$
 Qingmip igdlo takuvâ. (= "the dog saw the house") (Eskimo)
 $\Omega: \Omega \rightarrow S$
 $\overline{Ernerssuata}$ aningaussat aivai. (= "his big son brought the money") (Eskimo)
 $\Omega: \Omega \rightarrow S$

As we see from our Eskimo sentences, the genitive may give extra information about the inherential relatedness of the subject to the π .²

The essive is the O_1^e -case in existential transversal relations, and the translative is the O_1 -case of transversal relations of process.

The partitive turns out, eventually, to be the case of the π :

Hän tekee $\overline{työtä}$ kaupungissa. (= "he works in the town") (Finnish)
 Ω_2

The theory of transversal relations (such as the theory of status and polarity) has proved, once again, its universal validity as an integrated part of a constitutional procedure of language analysis. It has given us an extremely simple case model the universality of which is put at "safe" by its fulfilment of the highest demand any scholar can pose on his scientific project: that is to say nothing irrefutable, and that is to claim only laws of general value.

It is now very interesting and useful to pursue our transversal relations into the infinite syntagms of the ectonomic sector of the sentence, and to several extended subject constructions as well. Let us look at a sentence like:

I disapprove of John's smoking.

It will be clear that the sequence *John's smoking* is a transactional object. If we compare our sentence with its counterparts in other languages, we shall find out whether it is a pure apostatic indication or an expanding transaction (replacing a genitive or a dative).² The sentence on a whole is a suspended transversal S-relation,

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Das Satzverbal (II) und die Kasus*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1/3, Heidelberg 1976.

² Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Das Satzverbal (II) und die Kasus*, in: Sprachwissenschaft 1/3, Heidelberg 1976.

of *John's smoking* being the suspension. The sequence *John's smoking*, though, is obviously expressive of an infinite S-relation (*John smokes*). The infinite transversal relation is obtuse. It need not be:

I disapprove of *John's smoking hay*.
inf TR-S

In this example the infinite transversal relation is satiated.

Another renowned sentence couple becomes quite clear in the light of transversal relations:

1. Er liess *ihn malen*. (= "he let him paint")
S fV TR-S

2. Er liess *ihn malen*. (= "he had him painted").
semi TR-Q

In the first sentence *malen* is the operative verb of the nucleus *liess*. The O_1 of the transversal relation is *ihn*. The sequence *ihn malen* is expressive of an S-relation (*er malt*).

In the second sentence *malen* is again the operative verb of the modal nucleus. But this time *ihn* is the object of *malen*, and of *malen* alone (the agent of *malen* (*man*) is unexpressed (and could not possibly be expressed because it doesn't have any \mathcal{Q} form!)). The sequence *ihn malen* hides a transversal relation Q in which *ihn* is the scopos and the epistasis 2 is not materialized. This is exactly the sort of semi-relation which, in its finite manifestation, is so productive in many languages (cf. Irish, Polish, Finnish, etc.).

In the same way, the subjects of the following sentences are expressive of transversal relations:

Amor dei integer. (= "God's love is unchanged")
TR-S

Amor dei integer. (= "the love of God is unchanged")
TR-Q

Dich zu lieben war immer mein Ziel.
semi TR-S

Von dir geliebt zu werden war immer mein grösster Wunsch.
TR-R

Das Wilde-Tiere-Halten ist verboten.
TR-Q

A syntactical sequence from the New Testament may serve as an outstanding example of the capacity of a nomic analysis:

Μὴ οὖν ὁμοιωθῆτε αὐτοῖς· οἶδεν γὰρ ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν ὧν χρεῖαν ἔχετε πρὸ τοῦ
 ὑμᾶς αἰτῆσαι αὐτόν.

$\frac{O_1:\underline{\Omega}}{\quad} \quad \underline{\Pi} \quad \frac{O_1}{\quad}$

(= “be not ye therefore like unto them: for your Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask him” (Matthew 6,8)).

The nominalized verb form αἰτῆσαι (an infinitive in the genitive) is the Π of an infinite Q-relation, of which αὐτόν is the O_1 and ὑμᾶς is the $\underline{\Omega}$. We have seen it before: the second partner of an S-relation (the O_1) takes over the role of the second partner (the $\underline{\Omega}$) of a Q-relation.¹

How a traditional syntax and grammar describe this Greek $O_1 : \underline{\Omega}$ in an infinite syntactic sequence we don't know. They will probably come to the result that an accusative ‘is used there’. With our constitutional analysis we seem to achieve an explanation of why the phenomena are as they are rather than statements concerning their mere occurrence. This must be the aim of any constitutional analysis: to answer the *whys* rather than stating the *thats*.

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Das Satzverbal (II) und die Kasus*, in: Sprachwissenschaft 1/3, Heidelberg 1976.

CHAPTER THREE
Kinetic Analysis of Sentences

It seems that we have now come to a point where we can start analysing sentences. This has always been difficult. The task has not become easier since the rise of various transformational schools of syntax which have deprived the great majority of linguists of independent thought. We consider any theory which speaks of learning models¹ and of language having no objective existence apart from its mental representation¹ as false, and what is even worse: totalitarian. Totalitarian because it does not allow for spontaneous, unguided activity which might produce unforeseen results. We believe the depth of human language is as unfathomable as man's own self of which it is the auditive means of communication. This is our firm belief which is still waiting for its refutation. What we can do is to consider any human sentence as expressive of a *possibility* rather than of a *necessity*. Nothing is necessary in the strict sense of this word as long as man is free to be born in the jungles of Cameroun, in the Isles of the Aleuts, or in an English manor-house, and as long as the woman giving birth to the child in the manor-house may be a native Aleutian, a girl from Yaounde, or a Russian actress. Whether the mother returns to her home country with the child or not does not change the fact that the child's brain is equally open to any language which might be imposed on it by its mother's tongue, by its birth-place, or by its mother's dispositions or lack of dispositions. One thing is sure: you cannot say a thing of universal value about human language by analysing English syntagms and claiming that the arrangement of English sentences is, in some way or another, the clue, given a priori, to all other languages. It is incredible that American linguistics has succeeded in making hordes of linguists accept the validity of what you feel tempted to call the noble intellectual outrage upon the needy intellectualism of the 60's and 70's.² No member of our species has ever pointed out so clearly as Søren Kierkegaard why this totalitarian muddle is utterly wrong. Actually, he was

¹ Cf. Noam Chomsky: *Language and Mind* (Enlarged Edition), New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta 1972 (p. 169).

² Cf. F. A. Hayek: *The Road to Serfdom*, London 1944 (p. 122: "Probably it is true that the great majority are rarely capable of thinking independently, that on most questions they accept views which they find ready-made, and that they will be equally content if born or coaxed into one set of beliefs or another. In any society freedom of thought will probably be of direct significance only for a small minority. But this does not mean that anyone is competent, or ought to have power, to select those to whom this freedom is to be reserved. It certainly does not justify the presumption of any group of people to claim the right to determine what people ought to think or believe.").

the thinker who once and for all anticipated the generative disaster.¹ "All coming into being comes about through possibility, and not through necessity" is one of his most weighty arguments for human freedom, including the freedom of human language. No knowledge of language has been internalized in some manner by the language user, as Chomsky will have it. A language user knows *that* he has a language, and he has to work hard in order to obtain more or less the knowledge of the particular language which he has been brought up with, but often his knowledge of foreign tongues will be deeper and more comprehensive than the knowledge he has of his mother tongue. A human being has no more internalized knowledge of his language than he has of his own self. So our only choice is to deal with our language as we deal with other natural things. We can only describe it when it has come into being, because only there start the symptoms of lawfulness, only there begins the necessity.²

In order to describe the *genesis* of a sentence in an exhaustive manner, we shall operate on three planes, 1) a semantic plane, 2) a semasiosyntactical plane, and 3) a syntactic plane. The semasiosyntactical plane is split up into the upper semantic level and a lower syntactic level:

¹ Cf. Søren Kierkegaard's "Mellemspil" in the "Philosophiske Smuler" (Søren Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker, udgivne af A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg og H. O. Lange, vol. IV, Copenhagen 1923) (p. 265: "Hvorledes forandres det, som bliver til; eller hvilken er Tilblivelsens Forandring (*κωησις*)? Al anden Forandring (*αλλοιωσις*) forudsætter, at Det, med hvilket Forandringen foregaaer, er til, selv om Forandringen er den at ophøre at være til. Således ikke med Tilblivelsen; thi dersom det Tilblivende ikke i sig selv forbliver uforandret i Tilblivelsens Forandring, saa er det Tilblivende ikke dette tilblivende, men et andet, og Spørgsmaalet forskylder en *μεταβασις εις αλλο γενοσ*, idet den spørgende i det givne Tilfælde enten med Tilblivelsens Forandring seer en anden, som forstyrrer ham Spørgsmaalet, eller han seer feil af det Tilblivende og bliver derfor ikke istand til at spørge. Dersom en Plan, idet den bliver til, forandres i sig selv, saa er det ikke denne Plan der bliver til; bliver den derimod uforandret til, hvilken er da Tilblivelsens Forandring? Denne Forandring er da ikke i Væsen men i Væren, og er fra ikke at være til, til at være til. Men denne Ikke-Væren, hvilken det Tilblivende forlader, maa jo ogsaa være til, thi ellers "forblev det Tilblivende ikke uforandret i Tilblivelsen", uden forsaavidt det slet ikke havde været, hvorved da Tilblivelsens Forandring atter af en anden Grund vilde blive absolut forskjellig fra enhver anden Forandring, da det slet ingen Forandring var; thi enhver Forandring har altid forudsat et Noget. Men en saadan Væren, der dog er Ikke-Væren, det er jo Muligheden; og en Væren, der er Væren, det er jo den virkelige Væren, eller Virkeligheden; og Tilblivelsens Forandring er Overgangen fra Mulighed til Virkelighed.

Kan det Nødvendige blive til? Tilblivelse er en Forandring, men det Nødvendige kan slet ikke forandres, da det altid forholder sig til sig selv, og forholder sig til sig selv paa den samme Maade. At Tilblivelse er en Liden, og det Nødvendige kan ikke lide, ikke lide Virkelighedens Lidelse, hvilken er denne, at det Mulige (ikke blot det Mulige, der bliver udelukket, men selv det Mulige, der bliver antaget) viser sig Intet i det Øieblik det bliver virkeligt; thi ved Virkeligheden er Muligheden tilintetgjort. Alt, hvad der bliver til, beviser netop ved Tilblivelsen, at det ikke er nødvendigt; thi det Eneste, der ikke kan blive til, er det Nødvendige, fordi det Nødvendige er.

Er da Nødvendigheden ikke Eenhed af Mulighed og Virkelighed? – Hvad skulde dette sige? Mulighed og Virkelighed ere ikke forskjellige i Væsen, men i Væren; hvorledes skulde der af denne Forskjellighed dannes en Eenhed, der var Nødvendighed, hvilken ikke er Værens Bestemmelse, men Væsens Bestemmelse, da det Nødvendiges Væsen er at være. I saa Fald vilde jo Mulighed og Virkelighed, ved at blive til Nødvendighed, blive til et absolut andet Væsen, hvilket ingen Forandring er, og vilde, ved at blive til Nødvendighed eller det Nødvendige, blive til det Eneste, der udelukker Tilblivelsen, hvilket er ligesaa umuligt som selvmodsigende. (Den aristoteliske Sætning "det er muligt", "det er muligt ikke", "det er ikke muligt". – Læren om falske og sande Sætninger (Epicur) griber forstyrrende herind, da der reflekteres paa Væsen, ikke paa Væren, og der følgelig ad den Vei Intet naaes med Hensyn til Bestemmelsen af det Tilkommende.)

² That linguistic freedom: linguistic necessity cannot possibly be described in terms of deep structure operations has been shown by several scholars, for example by Hans-Peder Kroman in his excellent article "Wortstellung in der Transformationsgrammatik des Deutschen", in: Sprache der Gegenwart (Schriften des Instituts für deutsche Sprache), 24, Linguistische Studien IV (Festgabe für Paul Grebe zum 65. Geburtstag), Teil 2, Düsseldorf 1973.

upper syntactic level	nomothetic line
lower syntactic level	index line
upper semantic level	nomogenetic line
lower semantic level	kinetic limit sub quo nihil linguisticum ¹


A constitutional analysis of a sentence starts with a description of the lower semantic level. Our only guarantee of the furnishing of this level is the sentence we have in front of us on the upper syntactic level. We have no reason whatsoever to believe in deep structures or transformations, because all we know about a sentence is ultimately to be deduced from the arrangement of its surface structure. This does not prevent us, however, from describing the genesis of a sentence starting with the lower semantic level. Only this procedure presupposes a broad abstract basis of generalization. It requires that you have dealt with languages of many different families and syntactic structures, and a profound research in the field of basic semantic categories must be foreseen. Any deduction inferred from the outcome of such investigations must have as its lodestar the absolute demand for the highest possible empirical content (including the demand for the highest attainable degree of universality, and the demand for the highest attainable degree of precision).

This must be so because *having a language is primary to being able to discuss a language*. Or: the language we describe is a language we have already got and without which we cannot describe anything whatsoever, including language itself. Let us now consider the lower semantic level of a given English sentence. The means we have for this purpose are still very green and untested, and they have to a great extent been drowned by preachers of antisemanticism or by people who took a greater interest in futile discussions about personal competence or about "more adequate problems". We cannot see that any linguistic analysis may have the faintest chance of becoming exhaustive and "to the point" if it does not comprise semantics.²

¹ A German dative or a Russian Imperfect is no more psychological than an Icelandic definite article or a synthetic transversal relation in Eskimo. (Nevertheless Noam Chomsky and his school of syntactic deep-sea explorers claim that mental representations (i.e. psychology) are the only objective existence of language (!) (cf. Noam Chomsky: *Language and Mind* (Enlarged Edition), New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta 1972 (p. 169)).

² Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Status und Polarität im Gotischen, im Lichte des Kymrischen dargestellt*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, Vol. 2, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Die Frage. Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchung*, Det kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Historisk-Filosofiske Skrifter 7,1, København 1972; Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderen Sprachen. Eine Vorstudie zu einer konstitutionellen Sprachtheorie*, in: *Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung*, Vol. 28, 1/75, Berlin 1975. We shall have to use some abbreviations from this article in our attempts to describe the lower semantic level in terms of semantic unities (Z design = zone of designation, Z pers = zone of person, D = determination, ID = demonstrative identifier, IZ = personal identifier, etc.)

Let the following lower semantic level be given:



On this lowest level of our description of the sentence genesis only the semantic ingredients as such are taken into consideration. Nothing is yet organized linearly. We find ourselves in a realm of unformed entelechy. We can see that the sentence is positive in meaning ("logically"). We can see that it has two adverbs. It is evident, too, that it has a *II*. But we cannot see whether it is a transversal S- or R-relation. Or perhaps a Q-relation? Any semantic content may be expressed in the form of any of these three relations. This is exactly what justifies the introduction of a lower semantic level in our analysis. It is the prior-to-TR-level. The [A] and the [O] have not yet assumed their transversal functions. The notation m used with the *II* reveals modality.

When we cross the nomogenetic line we enter the upper semantic level. The nomogenetic line is marked with the notations (S, R, or Q) of the transversal relation in question. On the upper semantic level the semantic ingredients are organized linearly according to their function in the given transversal relation. The order of the elements is completely optional on this level of our description:

upper semantic level

S: + [A] ~ [*II*] ~ [O] ~ [adv] ~ [adv] nomogenetic line

lower semantic line

positive

[O] [adv]

[A]

[*II*] [adv]

Alloyings take place on the upper semantic level. As we shall see clearly from the following examples, alloyages must be considered as prior to the final choice of stasis. The choice of stasis may be a rather complicated affair. In our sentence the stasis

is already given: the nomogenetic line tells us that our sentence is to be materialized in the form of a transversal S-relation. So the [A] automatically takes the place of the stasis on the upper semantic level. As this [A] is not alloyed in our example, nothing can prevent it from being the indisputed stasis on the lower syntactic level:¹

lower syntactic level

S ~ fV ~ oV ~ O ~ adv ~ adv

index line

upper semantic level

+ [A] ~ [II^m] ~ [O] ~ [adv] ~ [adv]

S: _____ nomogenetic line

lower semantic level

positive NE

[O] [adv]

[A]

[II^m] [adv]

Apart from the final settling of the stasis, the most important thing happening on the lower syntactic level is the basic allotment of the *II*. It may remain undivided, or it may, as in this case, be split up into a nucleus (or more nuclei) + an operative verb (or more operative verbs, of which some may be nuclei of second, third, or fourth order). The former [O] is described as O₁ (omikron one) on this level: the epistasis is taken over from the upper semantic level. On the upper syntactic level the elements are adjusted according to a particular nomos. The nomogenetic line carries the sentence notation (cf. 126). The nucleus and the operative verb are distributed according to the lawfulness of the given language. The grammatical information given on the upper syntactic level differs in amplitude from one language to the other. Our language gives very little grammatical information in the sentence we operate with:

upper syntactic level

You ought to put that money there tomorrow.

S fV oV O adv adv

βZ propositive _____ nomothetic line

lower syntactic level

S ~ fV ~ oV ~ O₁ ~ adv ~ adv

index line

¹ In the Hungarian alloyage *szerettek* the [A] and the [O] have both become alloyed with the *II*. They may both be reintroduced, though, on the lower syntactic level (*én szerettek téged*. In this case, the stasis finally settles where it was supposed to from a broader syntactical view upon "abundant" Hungarian syntagms).

upper semantic level

+[A] ~ [I^m] ~ [O] ~ [adv] ~ [adv]

S: _____ nomogenetic line

lower semantic level

positive NE

[O] [adv]

[A]

[I^m] [adv]

The stasis may become elided from the lower to the upper syntactic level (in our example this is irrelevant).

The grammar of a given language is extra information from the nomogenetic line to the upper syntactic level. Some languages are completely devoid of grammar (e.g. Pidgin English), others are more or less rich in grammar (e.g. Latin and Danish) and some are abundant (e.g. Basque, or Georgian). All grammar is universal property, but particular languages differ as to informativity. Grammatical extra information given in one language may be concealed in another: the grammatical form is individual for every particular language, and so is its syntactic arrangement. What is universal is to be found below the nomothetic line. The generative grammarians seem to overlook this simple fact. They try, in earnest, to analyse human language universally starting with the accidental syntax of a language which they happened to learn at school. You need not be ingenious to realize what the outcome of such operations is going to be: unlimited multiplications of truisms walking on an everlasting safety-net of endless cramped English (or, at the most, Indoeuropean) deep structures. He who wants to make linguistics a proper science of orderly habits must obviously set to work in exactly the opposite way. In order to say something of universal value about human language he must study *human languages*, and not constructed English sentence patterns. What he must find, first of all, is all that is relevant, linguistically relevant, below the nomothetic line. Then, and only then, will he be able to describe the syntactic filigree above this line in terms of what he found. A man who wants to make a map of France does not start by making a digging machine meant to analyse those grains of sand which fit into it. On the contrary, he must be aware of the far-reaching perspectives which only journeys through the land and hard work with the ruler and the theodolite can give him. Linguistic perspective is hardly attainable without a semasiosyntactic wide-angle lens. With the accent no less on *semasio* than on *syntactic*.

What we need, most of all, is a limited amount of concise semantic notations (or universally adequate basic semiotic categories). We already have a very limited stock of sentence semantic manifestations.¹ We have an exact classification of the basic

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Status und Polarität im Gotischen, im Lichte des Kymrischen dargestellt*, Odense University Studies in Linguistic vol. 2, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Zum Wesen des Konditionalsatzes – nicht zuletzt im Indoeuropäischen*: Odense University Studies in Linguistics vol. 1, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Die Frage. Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchung*, Copenhagen 1972.

constitutional elements in human language.¹ And we have our nuclei, our transversal relations, and our limited number of sentence notations (cf. pp. 127–28) by means of which the component semantic entities of a sentence are realized.

So what on earth are we waiting for?

We can now analyse sentences either by feeding a given semantic lower level with adequate notations, or by looking at the sentence as we meet it auditively/visually. Let us take any German (or Turkish, or Quechua, or for that matter English) sentence and see what it tells us:

Was für eine Dummheit du da begangen hast!

The sentence is characterized by an **A**-marker. This implies that it is a constitutional sentence. It is exclamative. It is a βZ -sentence (the subject comes before the verbum finitum). It is propositive (the word *not* does not occur in it). And it is positive (in meaning). It is a plain transversal S-relation. The *II* of this transversal relation is *begangen hast* built on the presential nucleus *hast* of the nucleus *haben* (the emanent reflected image² of *sein* (= “to be”). The operative verb is *begangen*. The stasis of the TR-S is *du* (IZ 2nd person singular), and the epistasis is *WAS für eine Dummheit* which contains the **A** of the sentence. This **A** is the much used circumlocution *WAS für ein* (**A**_{spec} + indicator *für* + the DK (the existential disposer) of the zone of designation) for the **A** WELCH/- of the zone of designation. It is attributed to the determination *Dummheit* (from the zone of species). The sentence contains one adverb, the ID 2/3 pers. *da* (of the locus zone). The element *da*, though, is not used here in its strict local sense: the locus zone shows, once again, its strongly expanding nature (\rightarrow zone of time, zone of species, etc.). The element *da* thrusts itself in between the S *du* and the oV + fV, thus cutting the mesonomic part of the sentence into halves. The endonomic part of the sentence is *hast* and the ectonomic part is *was für eine Dummheit . . . da . . .*. Of these two only *was für eine Dummheit* has an *ectostatic* relation to the verb, whereas *da* is purely adverbial (or *circumstantial*). No syntactic permutations are allowable in this sentence: the sentence follows a particular German nomos which allows the eight words of the given theme to be materialized only in the actual order. The sentence follows a schedule which you will observe in legions of German exclamative sentences starting with an **A**_{design} + a determination in the O₁ position. In German, the sentence could only be formed syntactically in this very manner, because a German brain is brought up with this special model valid for **A**_{design}-sentences. But no transformation! What for? Can't we

¹ Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhoehdeutschen – und anderen Sprachen*, in: Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung Heft 28/1 '75, Berlin 1975.

² Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Zu den Nucleuskonstruktionen in der menschlichen Sprache. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Semasiosyntax*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 3, Heidelberg 1976 (–77); Niels Danielsen: *Zur Universalität der Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1, Heidelberg 1976; Niels Danielsen: *Semasiosyntaktische Universalien im Finnischen*, in: Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher 66, 1974.

say more than enough of universal value without transformations? And, by the way, what would a transformation tell us?


But we have not yet quite finished our analysis of the sentence. We have not looked at its grammaticality, or in other words: we have not investigated which grammatical universals are registrable on the upper syntactic level. The signals it gives us from the nomogenetic line are the following:

Was für eine Dummheit *du da begangen hast.*
 <-eduangen...st > (the grammar of the sentence)

The signal *-e* stands for attributivity (nominative/accusative). The accusative (O_1) is chosen because its counter-stasis turns out to be *du* (a clear-cut stasis because nominative). The signals *-angen + -st* indicate perfect tense/ 2nd person singular. The nuclear arrangement of the *II* is of universal interest, too, but it occurs on another level of the sentence genesis (nuclei are mainly syntactic tools which are introduced immediately on the lower syntactic level).

This is about all that we can say about our sentence; and should it turn out to be all there is to be said about it, no matter – we see no reason to say more. Well, we forgot about the phonology (or phonetics, as some have it) and the intonation. They are simply the physically measurable means by which everything below the nomothetic line is expressed. For many years they were considered the only disciplines worthy of linguistic research by too many theoreticians.


We can now describe the genesis of our sentence starting with the upper syntactic level or, the other way round, starting with the lower semantic level. We have the means to feed that level with the necessary notations. It must be one of the most important tasks of the linguists of coming generations to ameliorate our semantic apparatus towards complete precision:



lower semantic level

positive/C_(onstitutional)

[O = $\mathbf{A}_{design/qual}$ (: D_{spec} = Dummheit)]



This is to show, especially, the role of the nomothetic line. The nomothetic line is the syntactic filter between universal nomos and particular nomos. The nomothetic line shows us what is universal and what is not. It is the line which puts, so to say (cf. *nomothetic*), or *transfers* the given universals into the sphere of a particular syntactic legislation. In our example the legislation turns out to be very strict. It allows the elements of the lower syntactic level to enter its upper counterpart only in a given order. Other particular legislations might be more permissive, but hardly any would be quite unhampered. Several legislations would be as strict as the German one we have just seen, but the strictness might be based on other demands for lawfulness.

Some models of our theme in question might not allow for the nucleus allotment on the lower syntactic level. Latin wouldn't, for example. Neither would Russian, nor Eskimo. The latter is practically devoid of nuclei. This is a feature which characterizes a lot of languages. Nucleus constructions are grammatical mediators between the nomogenetic line (which dominates, as a grammatical rafter, the lower and the upper semantic levels) on one hand and the upper syntactic level on the other. This mediator may or may not be utilized by human language. Often languages with a highly complicated grammar do not profit from this syntactic possibility.

We can now *allow* elements on the lower syntactic level to *pass* on to the upper syntactic level (if we consider it from the upper syntactic level), or we can *transfer* elements from the lower syntactic level to the upper syntactic level (if we look upon it from the lower syntactic level). We should always *allow* or *transfer* our genetic elements in accordance with the consistency of a given language, i.e. adjust its lowest levels to its uppermost level as two images of the same thing.

Now we may change our sentence a little: we may place the nucleus *hast* (the finite verb, or the endonomic part of the sentence) between the O₁ (*was für eine Dummheit*) and the S (*du*):

Was für eine Dummheit hast du da begangen?


If we do this we alter the semasiosyntactic theme completely. This is a beautiful proof of the absolute coherence between semantics and syntax. Our permutation has

turned our sentence into an interrogative one with a completely different communicative value. We know of modern language schools which call this a transformation. What we would like to know, though, is whether A is a transformation of B, or vice versa. As long as this question cannot be answered, the word transformation is as meaningless as it is uninteresting.

By introducing into our model a limited set of significant abbreviations for the basic functions of simple and extended transversal relations, we can now analyse any human sentence in an exhaustive, meaningful, and reasonable way. (All representations are thereby introduced on the upper syntactic level).

Thus, what we owe the reader who has followed us truly so far, are some informative analysis models. First of all, let us look at some transversal relations containing a diastasis, a metastasis, or/and an apostasis. As English is very poor in cases we shall choose our examples from more revealing languages.

I. *Diastasis:*



The corresponding French theme is subjected to another legislation:

Je lui offris un bon salaire.

So if from the very start you choose the same order of basic elements on the French upper semantic level as we just did in our German example, you will have to take the trouble with the syntactic authorities at the nomothetic line. And vice versa; if by chance you had chosen the same order of basic elements on the German upper semantic level as the one represented immediately by the French upper syntactic level, you would have had to adjust the syntactic sequence of these elements to a particular German legislation.

No syntactic legislation is in any way primary to any other, much less more distinguished or more preferable. This is a thing which many so-called modernists seem unable to realize.

Both our German and our French sentences have a marker of indefiniteness in front of the O_1 . Articles (indefinite/definite) are introduced in some languages on the upper syntactic level. They are greetings of grammaticality from below the nomothetic line. They are universal entities, but not all languages express them.¹ They ought to be indicated already on the lower semantic level.

Thousands of interesting facts could be said about this simple sentence, but this is not the place. This is supposed to be a book, and a book must come to an end. Thus we shall go on with our basic description of the genesis of human sentences. Let us consider the German sentence:

Er antwortete mir.
er -te mir

upper syntactic level

S fV O

p βZ _____ nomothetic line

lower syntactic level

S ~ fV ~ O_2

upper semantic level

[A] ~ [II] ~ [O] ~ [Δ]


S: _____ nomogenetic line

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Bestimmtheit: Unbestimmtheit. Kontrastive Beobachtungen* (forthcoming in: *Semantische Blätter*, Heidelberg).

lower semantic level

positive NE

[O = π]



This model shows how a π is internalized into a II on the upper semantic level. All internalizations of π into II belong here: they are prior to the failing O₁ on the lower syntactic level, and they are posterior to the kinetic (or lower) semantic level.

All that we have said about genuine diastasis constructions (without or with an internalized π) is valid, too, for metastasis and apostasis constructions, only that you introduce the notations [M] (<[. .O]) and [◀] (<[...O]), respectively, instead of the diastasis notation [Δ] on the upper semantic level:

Man überführte ihn des Betruges.
 man -te ihn des -es

upper syntactic level

S fV O1 O2

p βZ _____ nomothetic line

lower syntactic level

S ~ fV ~ O₁ ~ Ω


..... index line

upper semantic level

[A] ~ [II] ~ [O] ~ [M]

S: nomogenetic line

lower semantic level




The element *man* in this sentence is expressive of grammaticality insofar as it is indicating in a decisive way the stasis of the S-relation. The element *des* is abundant in grammaticality: it indicates definiteness, singular, not-feminine, and metastasis.

And now for a metastasis construction with an internalized π :

Der Umfang der Verwüstungen spottete jeder Beschreibung.
 der der -en -te -er


upper syntactic level



lower syntactic level




upper semantic level




lower semantic level

positive NE



The relation of the two elements of the complex stasis is an inherence. All grammatical entities of contingency and integration, even pro-destination, must be indicated on the lower semantic level: they are prior to their manifestations on the upper semantic level. (The notation IE (individual identifier) : (I)P signals that an individual identifier like *every*, German *jeder*, French *chaque*, and so on, plays the role of an IP (a universal identifier) such as *all*, French *tout*, German *all*. The two categories IE and IP show an outspoken tendency to overlap in semantic value, cf. Heute ist nicht *alle* Tage: today is not *every* day).

Up to now we have only considered plain and peaceful S-relations. Let us now take a look at a Q-relation with an apostasis, to kill two birds with one stone:



(π = 'brug' in the corresponding Danish construction: *der bør gores brug af krig*).


This Latin instance is an interesting example of how an expression of modality is being materialized through a genetic model with an **A** -nucleus and a specific operative verb. The epistasis 2 is an example of O₂:Q. And *bellō* is the 'ablative object' (the ablative being the only case of transaction in Latin). That *bellō* virtually

is an ablative in this sentence is evident for two reasons: 1) the syntactic structure characterizing a Q-relation points decisively to *bellō* as the ectostatic implicatum governed directly by the verb; 2) a substitution of *bellō* by a feminine like *terrā* will unveil the ingenious interaction between the categories gender and case: syncretisms of one case paradigm will turn out to be independent categories in a corresponding paradigm of a different gender. It is only through this interaction that the case markers of final points in a transversal relation achieve their unequivocal value as indicators of given roles in given syntactic situations. Such are, at any rate, the conditions in the grammatical system of Latin.

Let us now take a look at different syntactic situations which seem to be of cardinal importance in a semasiosyntactic discussion. First of all, let us consider some simple instances of alloyings and elisions. Such sentences have never before been analysed thoroughly, and their similar appearances, at first glance, have lead to many misconceptions in traditional grammar.


In other words: what is an unexpressed subject (or object)? (In some languages you will hear about implied subjects, or objects, although traditional grammar for some mystical reason rarely cares for the objects).

On the first page of the Latin grammars we used at school we find alloyages They used to startle us in the beginning, and it took us some time to get acquainted with them:




Our model shows us how the **A** is becoming alloyed to the **II** on the upper semantic level. A physical sign of this process is the ending $-\bar{o}$ on the upper syntactic level. If the stasis is reintroduced on the lower syntactic level, you get the sentence: *ego amō patria*. This construction may be used if you want to stress the subject.

As an example of the opposite phenomenon, that the *object* is alloyed on the upper semantic level, we can take the English sentence




This model shows how an [O] is alloyed to the **II** on the upper semantic level. This alloying leaves no trace in the English syntagm, but it does in the Hungarian one: the ending $-\bar{o}$ (of the so-called definite conjugation) indicates a implied O_1 .

And now we shall see an example of how both things happen simultaneously:




lower semantic level




In the left row the [A] and the [O] are alloyed to the *II* on the upper semantic level. No stasis or epistasis is reintroduced on the lower syntactic level. The result is a synthetic transversal relation (cf. *sciō* above).

In the right row the stasis is reintroduced on the lower syntactic level, and so is the epistasis. You now get a sentence with the alloyment *szertlek* (with the ending *-lek* indicating ‘I’ (stasis) and ‘you’ (epistasis) in one) and the stressed subject *én* (= ‘I’) and the stressed object *téged* (= ‘you’).

As opposed to the case of an alloying the loss of the materialized stasis in an elision takes place on the nomothetic line:



lower semantic level



This is the first time we see a model of a recusative sentence. The notation r of the nomothetic line indicates that the sentence is expressive of ‘not-ness’. – The epistasis of the sentence is subject to an alloying on the upper semantic level. In this respect our example differs in no way from the English *I know* and the Latin *sciō* above. But the subject proceeds undisturbed to the lower syntactic level: it does not leave any explicit traces of an alloying (*weiss* might as well be the 3rd person singular), and stasis alloyings are, on the whole, unsymptomatic of German sentence genesis. On the upper syntactic level, then, the stasis is elided.

We have just been looking at a sentence which was negative/recusative. A sentence which is negative (in meaning) is not always recusative (containing the word ‘not’), and vice versa: a propositive syntagm need not always be positive. Let us look at a simple model for recusativity/positivity (or a recusative *diaxy*):

Wie entzückend er nicht singt.

upper syntactic level

er	-t
adv Adv S	fV

r βZ _____ nomothetic line

lower syntactic level

adv Adv ~ S ~ r fV


..... index line

upper semantic level

[A adv] [Adv]] ~ [A] ~ [II] ~ [O]

S: _____ nomogenetic line


lower semantic level positive C_{onstitutional}




[adv = **A** Z QUAM (gradus neutr.)]

[adv = D_{mod}
(entzückend)]

In some sentences the word 'not' may or may not be there without any impact on the semantic value of the sentence (cf. German: *ich komme nicht, bevor du (nicht) antwortest*). In other cases the word 'not' must always be there in certain constructions with a positive semantic value (cf. French: *je crains qu'il ne vienne*). Let us take a look at a sentence without the word 'not' but with a negative meaning (a so-called propositive *diaxy*):



negative NE



Our English sentence shows abundancy in respect to its grammatical arrangement: The notion 3rd person singular is expressed twofold: 1) in the subject *he*, and 2) in the verb morpheme *-s*. The element 'he' is there to express 'masculine'. (A lot of languages, however, do not distinguish 'he' and 'she'. Some of them do not even distinguish the difference between 'he' and 'she' and 'it'.)


This is an example of how we can use our model to show what is abundant in a syntagm and in which sense it is abundant.

We have now reached a point where we simply have to set a limit to our investigations on the semasiosyntactic arrangement of human language, if we do not want to get lost in an endless series of analysis instances. But before we bring our considerations on this captivating topic to a culmination, we shall have to consider three other cardinal issues in the field of semasiosyntactic analysis: 1) representations, 2) the role of the adjective, and 3) the subordinated clause (i.e. the problems in connection with the joining elements of finite superordinates and their finite subordinates).

Representations are of three sorts: 1) stasis or epistasis representations, 2) representations of transactions, and 3) expanding transaction representations. Let us consider a stasis or epistasis representation:

Watakushi wa suri ni tokei o suraremashita. (= "I have been robbed of my
-aremashita watch by a pick-pocket")
(Japanese)


upper syntactic level




lower syntactic level



upper semantic level



lower semantic level



The transversal relation above is an RQ-relation. The stasis of the R-relation is being represented by the indicator *wa*. The scopos of the Q-relation is being represented by the indicator *o*. And the epistasis 2 of the Q-relation is being represented by the indicator *ni* (corresponding to the English indicator 'by').

Arabic may use a marvellous stasis representation:

'Inna r-riġāla fattasū dhalika l-ġiwāra. (= "the men searched that neighbourhood")
repr: S fV O₁

The stasis representation is 'inna r-riġāla ('inna is the indicator and governs the accusative!).

In the Spanish sentence *yo conozco al señor Martínez* you have an O₁-representation (*al señor Martínez*). The German sentence *er wird von allen bewundert* there is an O₁-representation (*von allen*).


On the existential level some languages have representations for the existential epistasis (= the predicative):

Y mae dyn doeth yn onest. (= "a wise man is honest") (Welsh)

yn onest is the predicative representation of the adjective *gonest* (= "honest" (notice the leniating mutation of *gonest* > *onest* after the indicator of predicativity *yn*)).

Indications of transaction are indications of transactional cases (cf. *parasta on olla hiiskumatta sanaakaan koko asiasta* (Finnish): *am besten ist es, kein Wort von der ganzen Angelegenheit verlauten zu lassen* (with a representation in the German sentence)), and expanding transaction representations are representations for convergent cases (genitive or dative): *Er gab dem Jungen ein Buch: il donna un livre au garçon; Er erinnerte sich seiner Mutter: il se souvenait de sa mère*. All this can be easily indicated in a genetic sentence model.

The genetic model of a predicative sentence looks like this:



status signaled by the status marker *that*)¹. Subordinate clauses are hierarchized on the lower semantic level as specific units and analysed in detail on the upper semantic level.

Differently materialized syntagms may follow identical genetic rules. And vice versa: identical semantic information may follow different genetic models. For instance, the English sentence *I have a headache* is a nice transversal S-relation with an S, an fV, and an O₁. Its Eskimo counterpart is *niarqordlugpoq* which is an obtuse transversal relation and has to be genetically depicted as such. No less than two important things, though, connect our two sentences, the English one, and the Eskimo one: 1) they have got exactly the same communicative value, and 2) they both have a *critical field of distribution*.¹ This is the highest syntactic universal without which no sentence order would be imaginable.

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Semasiosyntaktische Universalien im Finnischen*, in: Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher 66, 1974; Niels Danielsen: *Status und Polarität im Gotischen, im Lichte des Kymrischen dargestellt*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, vol. 2, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Die Relativa im Neuhochdeutschen – und anderswo. Eine Vorstudie zu einer konstitutionellen Sprachtheorie*, in: Språkliga Bidrag vol. 6, n:r 27, Lund 1972, sowie in: Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung, Heft 28/1 '75, Berlin 1975; Niels Danielsen: *Zum Wesen des Konditionalsatzes – nicht zuletzt im Indoeuropäischen*, Odense University Studies in Linguistics, vol. 1, Odense 1968; Niels Danielsen: *Zur Universalität der Sprache*, in: Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. 1, Heidelberg 1976.


CHAPTER FOUR

The Critical Field of Distribution

We have treated this linguistic pit of human statements in detail before.¹ Every serious linguist seems to have to put up with its abstract existence. Human language itself tells us that it exists, and if human language tells us such a thing, we should rather believe human language than any prejudiced language philosophy. If you listen to all the sentences that are spoken on our earth during a lifetime, or if you read all literature expressive of meaning which has been written down, or printed, since man began to write, you will see that one and only one thing is in common to all sentences ever formulated, and this is: either they have a subject and a verb, or they have only a verb and no subject, or they have only a subject and save the verb, or they have neither of them. They may, however, in some cases, have two subjects, or two verbs, with or without a verb or a subject, respectively. This last phenomenon is a very interesting one which has often been overlooked. What we can say in common about all these sentences is that they have a critical field of distribution which allows two (a verb and a subject) or three at the most, often only houses one (a subject or a verb) and sometimes does without either of the two categories. This is what those linguists who put Aristotle on a ruling throne above language seem to have forgotten. Language uses subjects and verbs, but it is free not to bother with them. If you let all human sentences pass through a machine with a red lamp for verb and a green lamp for subject, you would see how often one of the two does not give any colour signal, and how often no colour signal is received at all. And if you give both lamps the technical capacity of showing a green light when they register a subject and a red light when they register a finite verb, you will see both lamps showing green and red alternately. The two panes showing the alternating lights, or only one of them at a time, or even none of them, is the *critical field of distribution*.

In the following we shall attempt a classification of human sentences according to the syntactic arrangement of their critical field of attribution. We shall group the sentences in three rows (a β -row ("S- or P-rather-than-verb-sentences"), δ -sentences ("verb-rather-than-noun-sentences"), and γ -sentences ("both-and"/"neither-nor"). Subjectless and nucleusless predicative sentences are classified independently, in accordance with the thoroughness which their special communicative value demands:

¹ Cf. Niels Danielsen: *Semasiosyntaktische Universalien im Finnischen*, in: *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher* Vol. 66, pp. 78–83, Wiesbaden 1974; see also Niels Danielsen: *A First Constitutional Step towards a Universal Syntax* (forthcoming in *Semantische Blätter*, Heidelberg).




* This group of CFDs is to be considered as predicative explicitations of the CFDs Y:δZ and X:δZ.

(vP indicates 'verbal protone' (= the finite verb in a critical field of distribution), S indicates 'subject', P indicates 'predicative', DIE indicates 'demonstrative indication of existence', O indicates nucleus (of existence, process, or remanence), and Ø indicates 'zero').

III. γ Z-sentences:

Qanqanen yaro nan, qarfi gare shi. (= “the small boy, force with him”, or:
“the little boy is strong”) (Hausa)

As a student I used to talk in rudimentary stasis syntagms to a friend of mine. This method functioned efficiently. One rudimentary stasis syntagm may be the subject of the other:



After having dealt with the γ -sentences we shall go on to the δ -sentences:

I. δ Z-sentences:

Bellō ūtendum est nōbīs.

Ihm wurde von seinem Bruder geholfen.

Loka varð flugvellinum um tíma. (Icelandic)

Kradnyło je so kruch drjewy. (= “a piece of wood was stolen”) (Lusatian)

Широку громадськість було ознайомлено з проектом.

(= “the general public was informed of the proposal”) (Ukrainian)

Sömu sögu er að segja frá Bretlandi. (Icelandic)

Hana vantar bókina. (Icelandic)

Honum er spáð enn öðru áfalli. (Icelandic)

Nie znaleziono dzielnego podróżnika. (= “the valiant explorer was not found”)
(Polish)

Her arbejdes der. (Danish)

Pluit. (= “it rains”) (Latin)

(*Ἰτείτε*), *καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν*. (= “ask, and (it) shall be given you”) (Greek)

All Q-relations belong to this group of sentences the number of which is as the sand of the sea.

II. Y: δ Z-sentences:

Vengo subito. (= “I shall come in a moment”) (Italian)

Kavfiliorniarumagaluarpugut. (= “we would like to make coffee”) (Eskimo)

Będziemy zawsze razem. (= “we shall always be together”) (Polish)

Szeretlek. (= “I love you”) (Hungarian)

Nalúngilara. (= “I know it”) (Eskimo).

X: δ Z-sentences:

vP	Ø
----	---

Kommst morgen?
Bliv hos mig!

These two groups of sentences, the Y: δ Z-sentences and the X: δ Z-sentences, comprise stasis elisions and alloyages.

III. δ Y-sentences:

a	S	vP	vP	:Z
b	vP	S	vP	
c	vP	vP	S	X:

- a) Я позвоню вызову такси. }
 b) = Позвоню вызову я такси. } (= "I shall call a taxi")
 c) = Позвоню вызову такси я. }

Jönnek-mennek az emberek. (= "people come and go") (Hungarian)

IV. δ X-sentences:

vP	S
----	---

Qaṭa'a l-ḥammālūna ḥibāla 'aḥmālihim. (= "the carriers cut the ropes of their burdens") (Arabic)

Y mae hi wedi dyfod. (= "she has come") (Welsh)

Tha Dòmhnall air chuideachadh a bhràthar. (= "Donald has helped his brother") (Scottish-Gaelic)

Echu eo an diduadenn. (= "the break (between school lessons) is finished") (Breton)

Nyns yu marow myghtern Arthur. (= "King Arthur is not dead") (Cornish)

Féachann an gairdín go hálainn. (= "the garden looks lovely") (Irish)

Sa vinaka na vale ni kana. (= "the restaurant is good")

[is good the home of eat] (Bauan, Fiji Islands)

És pitjor el remei que la malaltía. (= "the remedy is worse than the malady") (Catalan)

Lass ich es lieber!


Vengono gli altri. (= "the others are coming")

May you think of her many times in your life!

Gehen Sie! / Gehen Sie? Dann gehen sie.

Inte fâr du komma med mig hem. (Swedish)

Haben wir jetzt die Sache ein bisschen näher untersucht.

V. $\delta\bar{Y}$ -sentences:

Toplo je. (= "it is warm"). (Serbocroatian) (Q-relation)

X: $\delta:\bar{Y}$ -sentences:

Bonus est. (= "he is good") (Latin) (the stasis is an unexpressed personal pronoun)

Z: $\delta\bar{Y}$ -sentences:

Dwie godziny są. (= "it's two o'clock") (Polish) (the stasis is a notion)

VI. $\delta\bar{X}$ -sentences:

Está caliente. (= "it is warm") (Spanish) (Q-relation)

Y: $\delta\bar{X}$ -sentences:


Bist gar nicht dumm! (German) (the stasis is an unexpressed personal pronoun)

Z: $\delta\bar{X}$ -sentences:

Mae'n ddeng munud i bump. (= "it is ten minutes to five") (Welsh)

The groups V and VI are predicative sentences without a subject whether this be irrelevant (as is the case in Q-relations) or elided.

And now for the β -sentences:

I. βX -sentences:

Samba diñkenkatu. (= "Samba struck me" [Samba's (his)-having struck me])
(Seres)

A thief!

That idiot!

Und jetzt ein doppelter Rittberger.

$\Phi\omicron\nu\eta\ \beta\omicron\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta\mu\omicron\varsigma$. (Matth. 3, 3)

Constructions like these are *intimated* transversal relations. They consist of a stasis. Considered as an intimated transversal relation the sentence

Water!

means: "there is some water". The Greek $\theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha\ \theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$ (= "the sea! the sea!") in Xenophon's *Anabasis* is one of the most famous intimated transversal relations in world literature.

II. Z: β X-sentences:

S	\emptyset
---	-------------

Et *tū*, Brūte!
 Even *he*!
 Selbst *meine eigene Frau*!

Y: β X-sentences:

\emptyset	S
-------------	---

El-ḥamdu li-llāh. (= "praise be given to God!") (Arabic)

III. 1) X:Z: β X-sentences:

DIE	x (= S)
-----	---------

Ecce homo!
 Вот река! (= "look, (that's) the river!")
 Dacw'r dyn! (= "that's the man!") (Welsh)

2) Y:Z: β X-sentences:

x (= S)	DIE
---------	-----

То-то вот!

IV. β Y-sentences:

P	S
---	---

Maitso ny ahitra. (= "the grass is green") (Malgassian)
 Schön der französische Wein! / Vṛthā vṛṣṭiḥ samudrasya. (Sanskrit)
 Широка страна моя родная. (= "wide is the land of my fathers") (Russian)

V. 1) X: β Y-sentences:

x (= P)	DIE
---------	-----

Le voici.

2) Z: β Y-sentences:

DIE	x (= P)
-----	---------

Eccoci arrivati.

VI. β Z-sentences:

S	P
---	---

Русский человек честен.
 Omnia praeclāra gāra.

VII. X: βZ -sentences:

P	\emptyset
---	-------------

ρ Αγαθόν. (= "it's good") (Classical Greek)
 Çok güzel! (= "it's very beautiful") (Turkish)

Y: βZ -sentences:

\emptyset	P
-------------	---

Good!
 Bon! Phantastique! Tant pis!
 Fertig!

VIII. βY -sentences:

a) X:	S	S	vP
b)	S	vP	S
c) :Z	vP	S	S

- a) Кто это был? (= "who was it?")
 Ага degü qoyar barsi ečigedüriyen ögbei. (= "the elder and the younger brother gave the tiger to their own father") (Mongolian)
 Ano onna-no-hito wa san-nin kodomo ga arimasu. (= "that woman has three children") (Japanese)
- b) Det var engång en konung. (= "once there was a king") (Swedish)
 Es geht nichts über die russische Küche.
- c) Þóttu það mikil tíðindi. (Icelandic)

IX. βZ -sentences:

S	vP
---	----

Mêrqat tikípat? (= "have the children come?") (Eskimo)
 KuleikkiRa nāy vēṭṭei piḍikkumā? (= "will the barking dog catch anything?")
 (Tamil)

I love you.

A wise man ought to talk with caution.

Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.

Die Gesundheit geht vor allem anderen.

Le bon fromage me plait beaucoup.

Dəwuame gǎ vá anyígba lá dzí. (= "a great hunger came upon the country")
 (Ewe)

Tôi chu-ra học bài. (= "I haven't studied my lesson yet") (Vietnamese)

Ell ha vingut amb mi. (= "he has come with me") (Catalan)

Bars miqa idemüi. (= "a tiger eats meat") (Mongolian)

Igl utschi sgola sul tetg. (= "the bird flies up on the roof") (Rhaeto-Romansch)

In earliken-ien is net altiten forstannich.

(= "an honest man is not always wise) (Frisian)

This type of sentence is especially interesting. It is the sentence pattern (verb phrase to the right and noun phrase to the left) from which generative grammar operates in order to explain all the others by means of transformations, applying rewriting rules based on insertions and deletions.

That a transformational procedure of this sort leads to no scientific result, ought to be obvious to anyone who is in possession of a minimum of common sense. How would you be entitled, logically, to attribute to any one of our sentence categories the prerogative of being the type previous or primary to all the others?¹ And anyway, what entitles you to suppose that βZ -sentences be prior to δX -sentences? A βZ -sentence in English, or Greek, or Chinese, will always be matched by its δX -counterpart in Welsh, Irish, or Arabic. That Aristotle spoke Greek, and that generativists speak English is a pure coincidence on which no serious linguistics can be founded.

We can show the poor results a generative analysis will lead to if we try to analyse the following short Finnish verse from a first year's school book:

Tuli tuli, = the fire came,
 tuli tuuli, = the wind came,
 tuuli tuuli, = the wind blew,
 tuli sammui. = the fire went out.

Now, if you analyse the sentences of this nursery rhyme, you will arrive at the following interesting result:

- 1 Tuli tuli, (tuli = 1) "fire", 2) "came")
- 2 $\frac{\text{Tuli tuuli,}}{\text{fV S}}$ (tuli = "came", tuuli = "wind")
- 3 tuuli tuuli, (tuuli = 1) "blew", 2) "storm", "wind")
- 4 $\frac{\text{tuli sammui.}}{\text{S fV}}$ (tuli = "fire", sammui = "was extinguished")

Line 2 is obviously a δX -sentence. Line 4 is obviously a βZ -sentence. Our reader will have divined our question: What are the sentences 1 and 3? No linguist can answer this question if he has got the answer in advance.

Our Finnish couplet of sentences is a brilliant example of how language doesn't care about the strict rules that certain metalinguists impose on it. Language is free to follow its own system without being responsible for baffling surprises which may cross your own concepts about what language should and should not do, and this is what puzzles its intruding users most. For that is the unique quality of language: that

¹ To be quite exact, there *is*, as indicated above in our diagrammatical survey, a ninth main category of β -sentences (βZ : X-sentences) with two subjects and a nucleless predicative (cf. Arabic: *ana huwa l-malik* (= "it is I who am the king"); Scottish-Gaelic: *chan e duine neo-onorach duine ciallach* (= "a wise man is not dishonest"); Russian: *хорошо это ездить везде и много видеть* (= "it is good to travel all over and see a lot of things!").

you cannot point to anyone who invented it and who might explain to you how it came about that its machinery began to work. 'Εν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος is what St. John states at the very beginning of his gospel, and this sounds reasonable and more to the point than any later linguistic theory. The old ones have said the truths, leaving younger generations the sole possibility of the truisms.

A human language is the physically symbolized realization of a limited set of transversal relations (or economic parts of such relations) nomically adjusted to a fixed limited number of critical fields of distribution. The correct adjustment built up on the semantic stand of basic constitutional elements and framed into universal categories of status and polarity on one hand, and a nomic sentence arrangement on the other, is what the native speaker (or, more correctly, the *child*) learns, with or without the universal *possibility* of nucleus constructions.

Language starts with *us*, and not with our attempts to explain its coming into being. This is a simple fact too seldom realized by many modern linguists.

Language is *nomos*. It is in each single case a particular lawfulness based on some fascinating form of jurisdiction. Any particular grammar is a possible codex among hundreds of possible codices. But none of them is possible without the imprint of universality.

Not all in a given grammar may seem universal, at a first glance. And yet, very little will turn out to be *sui generis*. Certain categories like gender or strong/weak verbs may leave the impression on the intermediates of being without any universal quality. Still gender turns out to be an important category of interaction, tied up with the case category, which would not, in many languages, be able to function properly without it in its quality as marker of concise final points in transversal relations. Moreover, gender is just one manifestation, sometimes twofold, never more than threefold, of the need for classification so characteristic of human language and finding, in many languages, other ways in the shape of noun classifiers (cf. Chinese), or noun classes (Bantu). – And the distinction 'weak verb'/'strong verb' may find some day, after a great deal of research, a plausible explanation as a means of reflecting an older principle of distinction between 'lack of obtusity'/'susceptible to obtusity'. My Danish ear tells me that strong verbs in my own language tend to express obtusity. This, of course; is a hypothesis, and may as such cost me my life some day. Language is abundant in universals, if by universals you mean countable categories realizable or realized in a human language and symptomatic of more-than-codical lawfulness. The scholar who searches for them with all his intellect will be amply repaid.

Until one day he will realize that what is so fantastic about all those different languages on our Earth is that they do not differ more than they do. That, on the contrary, they are linked to each other by the strong ties of some pre-Babelian principles of constitution.

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